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SUMMARY 
This study is concerned with the nature of political discourse in the 2003 devolved 
Scottish elections. The investigation explores the potential effects of the new 
constitutional arrangements and electoral system on the campaign discourse of 
Scottish political parties. 
The four weeks of election campaigning are studied, from the 1st April to the 1St May 
2003. Analysis focuses on many of the main texts produced during the election 
campaign, including manifestos, party election broadcasts and newspaper articles. 
Conducted in the Critical Discourse Analysis tradition, this investigation combines 
insights from Fairclough's social focus and three dimensional analysis of discourse 
and van Dijk and Chilton's cognitive approaches. This synthesis of approaches is an 
attempt to produce an analysis that can explicate both social and cognitive aspects of 
ideological discourse production. In so doing, the study reappraises van Dijk's 
original conception of the `ideological square' (1998) as a description of competitive 
discourse. The thesis explores the dynamics of party political competition and 
ideological negotiation in devolved Scottish politics, with particular attention paid to 
the discourse of coalition and nationalist politics. 
The thesis begins by outlining the following: the need for this investigation; initial 
background information on the events leading up to Scottish devolution; preliminary 
methodological detail; and a structural outline of the thesis. Discussion then focuses 
on the ideological character of Scottish politics, both in terms of public opinion and 
the positions of political parties, as represented by the content of their manifestos. 
Continuing the analysis of party manifestos, chapter 3 explores discursive strategies 
used by political parties to construct identities and negotiate relationships in light of 
actual or potential coalition government. The following chapter then moves the 
analysis onto party election broadcasts, taking particular interest in the rhetorical 
methods employed in the positive and negative presentation of policies. Chapter 5 
then analyses the press reception of party election broadcasts. Looking at the recycling 
of political messages, chapter 5 uses metaphor analysis to investigate representations 
of elections in press coverage. Having established the importance of a nationalist 
agenda in Scottish politics during previous sections, Chapter 6 investigates 
representations of Scottish national identity in election discourse. The final chapter 
summarizes results, discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the thesis' design and 
suggests avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: NEW SCOTTISH POLITICS, NEW 
DISCOURSE? 
The coming of devolution and the first Scottish Parliament elections in 1999 heralded 
a new era in both Scottish and British politics. Since the first elections there has been, 
predictably, a rash of academic work focusing on post devolutionary Scotland, its 
politics and culture. Numerous works have appeared, such as The new Scottish 
politics (Hassan and Warhurst, 2000), New Scotland, New Politics? (Paterson et al, 
2001), New Scotland, New Society? (Curtice et al, 2002), The Scottish Electorate 
(Brown et al, 1999), Understanding Scotland: the sociology of a nation (second 
edition) (McCrone, 2001), Break-Up: Twenty-Five Years On (Nairn, 2004), Scottish 
Government and Politics (Lynch, 2001), Dislocating the Nation: Political Devolution 
and Cultural Identity on Stage and Screen (Jackson, 2004), Anatomy of the New 
Scotland (Hassan and Warhurst, 2002) and Claiming Scotland: National Identity and 
Liberal Culture (Hearn, 2000). This is by no means an exhaustive list but an 
impression of the intellectual energy exploring post devolutionary Scotland. Many of 
these titles either explicitly or implicitly express newness and change; and it is 
newness and change that give this investigation its focus. The starting point for this 
thesis is that given there are new systems of governance in Scotland there are also, 
potentially, new ways of communicating in those systems: in effect new discourses. 
The inquisitorial spotlight of this study falls on the 2003 elections, the second 
balloting for the Scottish Parliament. Elections are a locus of frenetic political and 
media activity and they are also bounded, given the limited time in which to campaign 
and advocate political arguments. As such, an election provides an opportunity to see 
competing political arguments in action and an occasion to observe if the `new 
politics' (Paterson el al, 2001: 17) has given rise to new political discourses. If there 
are new discourses, one can investigate how they are constituted by the new politics, 
how they are ordered and operate in the new environment. In turn, if there are new 
discourses one can investigate how they represent and negotiate relationships between 
the various competing political parties. Evidence is drawn from a corpus of texts 
composed of party political materials, such as manifestos, party election broadcasts, 
and media texts, drawn from the Scottish press. In this way, the study may investigate 
many of the phenomena of contemporary democratic elections, as constituted directly 
through the texts of the party political campaigns and indirectly through the mediated 
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texts of mass media coverage. One such phenomenon might be the strategically 
planned and implemented nature of party messages, producing consistency across 
different modes of communication and at different times; messages, therefore, are not 
limited to their immediate context of production. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter will lay out some of the recent 
historical and political background which led to devolution, introduce the 
investigative methodology and indicate the structure of the forthcoming exposition. 
1.1 Background to Devolution 
This section will not attempt to recount the numerous and complex debates 
concerning Scotland's changing constitutional arrangements with the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK). Such discussions have occurred 
in greater detail than could possibly be afforded here (e. g. Bogdanor, 1999,2001; 
Brown et al, 1996; Devine, 1999; Devine and Finlay, 1996; Finlay, 1997; Linklater 
and Denniston, 1992; Paterson, 1994). Drawing on the aforementioned work, a brief 
precis of the arrangements of governing Scotland before devolution and the main 
issues which led to devolution in the last 30 years will be given. 
Before devolution, Scotland occupied a unique position in relation to its 
system of governance in the world of democratic nations. It was the only nation to 
have its own legal and educational systems and `separate arrangements for the 
handling of executive business, but no separate legislature to which the Scottish 
Executive could be held responsible' (Bogdanor, 2001: 117). Instead, Scotland's laws 
were made in a parliament outwith its borders, where its elected representatives 
occupied a minority of the legislative seats. 
For much of Scotland's political union with England, party political 
representation north and south of the border remained comparable in terms of the 
number of votes parties received per head of population. Across the UK, government 
proportionately represented its constituent parts; no one area, with the exception of 
Northern Ireland, voted significantly differently to other parts. However, with the 
dawn of the 1960s, the distribution of votes in England and Scotland began to change. 
From 1959 the Labour Party dominated the political scene in Scotland, winning a 
majority of seats in every election. This supremacy would reach its zenith with the 
decimation of Conservative party support in the 1997 general election, where the 
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party failed to win a single seat in Scotland. Therefore, whenever a Conservative 
government occupied Downing Street a democratic deficit existed between the 
Scottish nation and its political masters. For 27 out of 38 years, between 1959 and 
1997, Scotland's elected will was under-represented in Westminster government. 
The 1960s also witnessed the rise in the electoral fortunes of the Scottish 
National Party (SNP), and their ascent would continue until they became the second 
party of Scottish politics, rivalling Labour. The SNP's incursion introduced an overtly 
nationalist flavour into politics north of the border, which further differentiates the 
nature of Scottish politics from its southerly neighbour (McCrone, 2001). Scotland's 
constitutional relationship with the rest of the UK is brought into sharp focus when 
the two main parties of Scotland are divided over support for the Union. Therefore, 
with an asymmetrical relationship between representation of executive power and the 
growth of a nationalist-separatist vote, the constitutional status quo has been under 
significant threat since the 1970s (Bogdanor, 2001; Budge et al, 2004). 
It is not the case that nationalist support grew from nowhere. Before the 
democratic deficit arose, `agitation for reform in Scotland [had] resulted in increased, 
responsibilities accruing to the Scottish Office' (McCrone, 2001: 45). Brown et al 
(1996), McCrone (1992; 2001), Paterson (1994) and others have commented that the 
powers of the Scottish office both reflected a sense of Scottishness and helped to 
reinforce that identity through the institutions of civic democratic administration. 
McCrone comments, 
As democracy slowly made its way into the governing structures of these islands in the nineteenth century, so it helped to consolidate Scottish civil 
society. The remarkable growth of separate political administration for 
Scotland since 1886 has undoubtedly helped to reinforce the sense of 
`Scotland'. It is easier to visualise what a separate Scotland would look like 
precisely because by the 1980s the Scottish Office had become a Scottish 
semi-state with powerful administrative apparatus. (2001: 44) 
The administrative arrangements supporting and administering Scotland lent weight 
to calls for devolution once the political climate had altered. 
The general elections of 1974 brought key shifts in the tides of party political 
support, resulting in devolution climbing up the political agenda. In the two elections 
of that year the Conservatives lost 13 per cent of their vote in Scotland and a total of 
eight seats to the SNP (Bogdanor, 2001: 137). The scene was now set for the 
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introduction to Parliament of Labour's devolution proposal, the 1976 Scotland and 
Wales Bill. The Scottish Labour Party from its inception had found appeal in home 
rule, but calls for devolution had been tempered by greater political forces of the 
times. From the 1930s the Scottish Labour Party perceived more benefit for Scotland 
in a centralised, UK based model for administering social welfare and economic 
policies. However, the success of the SNP by the mid 1970s meant that the Labour 
Party could no longer ignore devolution (Devine, 1999). Due to its minority status, 
Harold Wilson's first Labour government in 1974 had to rely on support from 
nationalist and Liberal MPs who supported devolution. In addition, the report of a 
Royal Commission on the UK Constitution in 1973 recommended a directly elected 
parliament with legislative powers for Scotland, (Brown et al, 1996) adding to the 
strength of the prevailing political wind. However, while the previous Conservative 
leader and then prime minister, Ted Heath, had been more in favour of devolution, the 
new leader Margaret Thatcher was less well disposed to the idea, later commenting in 
her autobiography `As an instinctive Unionist, I disliked the Devolution commitment' 
(1995: 322). Against renewed Conservative opposition to the Bill, as well as some of 
their own `sceptics' (Brown et al, 1996: 20) Labour could only get the legislation 
through Parliament with significant amendments: restricted powers for the assembly 
and 40 per cent of the total voting population needed to support devolution in the 
referendum vote. 
If timing is everything, then the 1979 referendum campaign had little in its 
favour. James Callaghan's Labour government had been dealing with an economic 
crisis and growing industrial unrest from the unions. The wind had changed and now 
the referendum campaign had to be steered through a hostile political climate. The 
campaign would prove ultimately unsuccessful. Devine recounts, 
A number of factors combined to cause the failure of the 1979 [devolution 
campaign]... The electorate were mainly concerned with strikes, industrial 
relations and unemployment, and a mere 5 per cent of those interviewed gave 
any priority to devolution. Equally significantly, the Tories were doing well in 
these surveys and, alone among the major parties, were committed to opposing 
devolution. At a time when the country seemed to lurch from crisis to crisis, 
people appeared to be more concerned with jobs and living standards than 
with constitutional reform. 1978-9, saw the notorious `Winter of Discontent', 
when Britain was rocked by a series of industrial disputes and the big unions 
smashed through the government's pay norms. Television images of 
uncollected rubbish piled high on the streets and hospital workers out on strike 
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conveyed an image of public anarchy. At one point even the dead went 
unburied. A government which had demonstrated such incompetence was 
hardly in a position to convince the Scots of the merits of the Scotland Act. 
(1999: 589) 
Not only was the political context unfavourable but the `yes' campaign itself was 
severely divided with Labour and SNP refusing to cooperate with each other. Unionist 
Labour argued, as they would in the late 1990s, that devolution would strengthen the 
union, while the SNP suggested devolution would eventually lead to independence. 
While the Welsh devolution result was a clear `No', Scotland's vote produced a `Yes' 
win but failed to meet the 40 per cent threshold. Callaghan's minority Labour 
government then had to deal with the political fall out, which would taint the 
affections of supportive minority parties. Labour were unable to implement 
devolution, resulting in both the SNP and the Conservatives motioning for a vote of 
no-confidence. The Liberal and SNP votes against the government would produce a 
twist of political irony. In helping to defeat Labour, the Liberals and SNP, on the back 
of the devolution issue, ushered in eighteen years of anti-devolution Conservative 
rule. The Scotland Act was repealed by the incumbent Conservative government in 
May 1979, despite 43 out of 71 Scottish MPs voting against repeal. Devolution would 
remain off the political agenda of Westminster government for nearly the next 20 
years, but would be rejuvenated with the eventual return of a Labour government. 
Conservative rule at Westminster, with the decline of its vote in Scotland 
would act as a fulcrum against which the case for devolution could be persuasively 
levered. While England moved ideologically to the right during the 1980s, Scotland 
moved in the opposite direction (Curtice et al, 2002). The Thatcher government's 
firmly unionist tendencies, coupled with its `policies of competitive individualism' 
(Bogdanor, 2001: 196) would see the Scottish Office as an obstacle to those 
objectives. These factors would also come to be seen as running counter to Scotland's 
elected will. With the unpopular poll tax being introduced in Scotland before England, 
it was easy for opposition parties to paint the Conservatives as anti Scotland 
(Paterson, 2002). As successive Conservative governments and the Scottish electorate 
seemed to grow even further apart during the 1980s and 90s, the political conditions 
were laid in which devolution could achieve popular support. 
During this period some of the pro-devolution opposition parties and 
interested civic agents began to build some of the machinery that would eventually 
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support another bid for home rule. Precisely a year after the failed referendum a cross 
party group formed a Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, its Constitutional Steering 
Committee producing a Claim of Right for Scotland (Bogdanor, 2001: 196). The 
Claim of Right (Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995) called for the 
establishment of a Scottish Constitutional Convention and proclaimed `the right of the 
people of Scotland to decide their own constitution, and indicated that the UK state 
had become too centralised' (Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 1996: 63-4). The 
Convention, which would eventually come to fruition and meet for the first time in 
March 1989, was made up of the Labour, Liberal Democrat, Green and Communist 
parties and representatives from various civic groups. The Conservatives refused to 
take part and the SNP withdrew from the Convention just as it began, claiming 
independence was not up for serious consideration (Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 
1996: 64). Bogdanor comments of the political role of the Constitutional Convention 
within the political climate of the time, 
Devolution was not a high priority at Westminster, even for Labour, and there 
were fears that a Labour government might not be willing to prepare new 
devolution legislation only to see it once again destroyed by hostile English 
back-bench MPs, as had occurred in 1977 with the Scotland and Wales Bill. 
Since Scottish issues were subsidiary to United Kingdom matters, there 
seemed no way in which the Scots could make known their support for 
devolution other than by voting SNP, and that would be regarded as a vote for 
separation. There was, therefore, a gap in the Scottish representative system. 
The Convention was intended to fill that gap. Its role was to draw up a specific 
scheme which could then be adopted by an incoming government sympathetic 
to devolution; and also to promote its chosen scheme. (2001: 197) 
The Scottish Constitutional Convention, therefore, functioned as a vehicle with which 
to galvanise and express support for devolution, keeping it on the political agenda in 
Scotland while it was off the agenda at Westminster. In addition the Convention 
sought to give an outlet to Scottish public opinion's disquiet with Conservative 
government, an outlet which did not have to manifest itself as a separatist protest vote. 
The Convention can be seen to have been successful, as its recommendations 
were largely taken on board by the UK Labour Party leadership. Come the Labour 
general election landslide of 1997 the stage was set for the enactment of devolution 
legislation. The leader of the Labour Party, Tony Blair, had insisted in 1996 that there 
must again be a referendum. This move was much criticised in Scotland but it proved 
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important in terms of circumventing criticism from English back-benchers (Bogdanor, 
2001: 198), who could hardly argue against the popular will of the people of Scotland. 
The referendum took place on September 11`f', 1997, asking two questions: should 
there be a Scottish Parliament; and should that parliament have tax-varying powers? 
Seventy four per cent of voters supported the first question and 63 per cent supported 
the second. This time there was no 40 per cent threshold in place; if there had been the 
first question would still have stood, while the second would have failed. 
Nevertheless, Scotland would have a devolved assembly. 
Paterson et at (2001) comment of the first election campaign that, although the 
pro home rule parties, including the SNP had been more cooperative during the 
referendum campaign, cordiality did not survive to polling day. They note, 
With some opinion polls in 1998 putting the SNP ahead of Labour... there 
was significant nervousness in Labour's ranks, and old rivalries between the 
two parties surfaced. Prominent players in the Labour Party, including Donald 
Dewar, used the occasion of the Scottish conference in March 1999 to attack 
the SNP and to warn of the dangers of a costly `divorce' from the rest of 
Britain. In such a climate the `new politics' associated with the Scotland 
Forward referendum campaign were no longer in evidence. (Paterson et al, 
2001: 17) 
This `divorce' motif in Labour's electoral discourse will be further scrutinised later, 
as it was manifest in the 2003 campaign as well. Despite the new electoral system the 
parties seemed to follow adversarial habits in this first election. However, it will be 
argued later that the 2003 campaign exhibited a more complex rhetoric. 
The first Scottish Parliament elections took place on May 6`h, 1999, electing 
129 Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs). Labour obtained the most seats (56) 
. 
but failed to obtain an overall majority, the SNP received the next largest share of 
seats (35), the Conservatives came third (18), the Liberal Democrats forth (17), and 
the Greens, the SSP and an independent candidate received one seat each. Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats decided to enter into a coalition, the first ever on peacetime 
British soil. By the 14th May Labour and the Liberal Democrats had signed the first 
Partnership Agreement (Hassan and Warhurst, 2000: 10). 
The above result was produced by a new mixed form of electoral system, 
based on both proportionality and a Single Member Simple Plurality (SMSP 
alternatively known as First Past the Post) system. This Additional Member System 
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gives electors two votes `one for a constituency member and a second for a party list' 
(Paterson et al, 2001: 67). The majority of seats, 73 in total, come from the 
constituency SMSP vote; the remaining 56 seats are accrued from the proportional 
regional list system. 
1.1.1 Researching Scottish Politics 
The next election would be fought on the same mixed electoral system; however, the 
2003 vote would now occur after four years of stable coalition government. This 
produced new quandaries as to how election campaigns would be conducted. Now on 
a second run through of the electoral system, interested parties would be well aware 
that a majority led by either one of the two big Scottish Parties, Labour and SNP, was 
unlikely. Instead, a coalition was the likely outcome and, as will be discussed in the 
next chapter, for reasons of ideology the minority Liberal Democrats would probably 
hold the balance of power, whether they chose to sit in or outside the Executive. As it 
turned out the Liberal Democrats again decided to sit in the Executive with Labour'. 
Also, for the first time ever in British politics, two parties, Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats, would be campaigning on separate agendas but arguing from the same 
policy record in office. The devolved elections also mark a new dynamic in the 
makeup of electoral power, with three centre-left parties dominating the Scottish 
political scene. As the Conservatives are the only right wing party in the devolved 
parliament, there is a pervading centre-left hegemony in the governance of Scotland. 
How these relationships are to be negotiated in what Pritcher (2002a) refers to as a 
traditionally adversarial media environment is unknown and unexplored. This thesis 
will attempt to address these issues of how competing Scottish party political 
ideologies and the new constitutional arrangements affect the construction and 
negotiation of political discourse in Scotland's devolved elections. In particular, much 
1 Results for the 2003 election were as follows, Labour 50 seats, SNP 27, Conservative 18, Liberal 
Democrats 17, Green 7, SSP 6, and independent candidates 4. The positions of the parties, therefore, 
remained much the same. However, while the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives won the same 
number of seats, Labour lost 6 and the SNP 8 seats from their 1999 totals. The big parties' losses were 
the gains of the smallest minority parties and independent candidates: the Greens were up from 1 to 7, 
the SSP up from 1 to 6, and three extra independent candidates up to 4 from 1999 levels. For a more 
comprehensive breakdown of election results see: 
http: //www. scottish. parliament. uk/msp/elections/analysis/index. htm (24/07/2006) or The Electoral 
Commission (2003) 'Scottish elections 2003: The official report on the Scottish Parliament and local 
government elections 1 May 2003'. 
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of the focus of this analysis will fall on the three dominant centre-left parties as the 
new dominant matrix of party political power in Scotland. 
To date much of the analysis of Scottish politics has been conducted in the 
traditions of political science, sociology and history. The first two disciplines have 
been particularly concerned with the empirically measurable assessment of political 
events and social structures (Hassan and Warhurst, 2002; Linklater and Denniston, 
1992; McCrone, 1992,2001; and Paterson, 1994), voting results (Bennie, Brand, and 
Mitchell, 1997; and Paterson et al, 2001) and public opinion (Bromely and McCrone, 
2002; Curtice et al, 2002; and McCrone, 2001). It would be an over simplification to 
state that this was the sum of what is in reality a rich and varied study of Scotland's 
politics. The pervading paradigm for studying what McCrone (2001) calls `politics in 
a cold climate' is the empirical one, but strongly supported by a canon of 
constitutional theory (Bogdanor, 1999,2001; Dicey and Rait, 1920; Kellas, 1975; and 
Nairn, 1977,2004) and studies of nationalism (Coupland, 1954; Harvie, 1994; Heath 
and Kellas, 1998; and Kellas, 1991). This thesis by no means wishes to discount this 
previous work; on the contrary it embraces many of its insights and practices, while 
questioning a few. Coming from a CDA perspective, this study values the analysis of 
the social and historical, and as such will at times draw on these methods of analyses. 
However, while supporting the aforementioned work, this thesis does hope to add 
something to it both in terms of methodological approach and its resulting insights. It 
is hoped the methodological framework discussed in the following section will be 
able to add to the study of Scottish politics, particularly the neglected area of political 
discourse in Scotland. 
1.2 A Critical Discourse Methodology 
This thesis stems from the critical discourse analysis tradition. The CDA approach, as 
developed in the last several decades, has been predominantly the domain of 
linguistics, as typified by the work of Fairclough (1989; 1992; 1995a; 1995b), Fowler 
(1991; 1996), Kress (1996), van Dijk (1993; 1994; 2006a; 2006c), van Leeuwen 
(1996) and Wodak (2001; 2006). Fewer non linguists work in the tradition, exceptions 
being Chouliaraki (1999; 2000; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999) and Billig (Billig 
and Macmillan, 2005), for example. As a mode of study, however, CDA aims to be 
multidisciplinary, pulling together insights from a range of the social sciences, 
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humanities and arts. Though there are variations, or parallel paradigms, operating in 
the tradition they all share some common methodological assumptions. There are 
three main traditions that broadly fit into three categories: social, cognitive and 
historical. Though approaches to analysis differ in certain respects, all three view 
language as a social resource, which stands in a dialectic relationship to society. By 
this assessment, language is both a product of society and a productive resource which 
influences it. Seen here is the theoretical influence of Western European Marxism, 
that of Bakhtin (1981), Habermas (1984; 1989), Voloshinov (1973) and Gramsci 
(1971), which began to see language as part of productive power. In addition to the 
economic and physical capital of industrialised society, language or discourse is also 
able to be used as a tool of domination and of resistance. Also significantly influential 
was the work of other European critical social theorists, such as Bernstein (1968; 
1990), Bourdieu (1977; 1990; 1991) and Foucault (1972; 1984). Through these 
theorists CDA inherits its focus on ideology and its behaviours of social dominance 
and resistance. Ideologies are operated, in addition to physical means, through 
language. Ideology can, therefore, be seen in language; and to study language in use 
can be to study ideology and, in turn, the operation and resistance of power. 
Fairclough comments, 
As well as being determined by social structures, discourse has effects upon 
social structures and contributes to the achievement of social continuity or 
social change. It is because the relationship between discourse and social 
structures is dialectical in this way that discourse assumes such importance in 
terms of power relationships and power struggles. (2001: 30-31) 
What can also be found in the above theorists is that the meanings of ideologies 
(particularly powerful and dominant ones) are not always transparent. The traditional 
Marxist `false consciousness' influences the concept of `hegemony', where dominant 
ideologies (those of the dominating elite groups of a society) are reproduced as 
representations of the natural order or common sense (Fairclough, 1989). Such 
representations dialogically reinforced and encode the constitution of social 
structures, such as educational, legal, religious, industrial, economic and 
governmental institutions, which are ordered in terms of the interests of powerful 
social groups. Pardo explains further, 
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A dialectal relationship is assumed between particular discursive facts and the 
situations, institutions and social structures in which they are embedded. On 
the one hand, situational contexts, institutional and social, delineate and affect 
discourse; on the other, discourse influences political and social reality. In 
other words, discourse constitutes a social practice and social practice is, at the 
same time, constructed by discourse. (2001: 91) 
This relationship between discourse and society is a key one for the validation of the 
use of language to explore socio-cultural issues, and the use of social issues to explore 
language. 
At this point it may be useful to discuss the differences between the dominant 
paradigms of CDA. It is important to explore methodological nuances as this thesis 
attempts to productively marry two of those approaches. The social (more 
sociologically driven) tradition, as seen in the work of Fairclough (1989; 1992; 1995a; 
1995b), Kress (1989; 1996), Hodge (Hodge and Kress, 1979; 1988) and van Leeuwen 
(1996), has been significantly influenced by Foucault's theory of discourse and, as 
such, has retained a strong sociological focus. Wodak et al (1999) points out these 
theorists tend to be British. Additionally, Halliday's social semiotic theory (1978) and 
his systemic functional linguistic analysis (1985; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004) 
feature prominently in social critical discourse analytical practice (Wodak et al, 1999: 
7). The social tradition uses a tripartite description of discourse: discourse, orders of 
discourse/discourse practices, and culture practices. The dialogic relationship between 
language and society is reflected in this three dimensional analysis. As language 
relates to society, the analyst considers discourse from three perspectives: the 
language (or text) itself; the means and social conventions governing the production 
of that language; and the social and cultural practices from which the discourse 
emanates. This is the theoretical point at which social and linguistic theories are 
married together. Crudely put, in Halliday's social semiotic, language is a system of 
choices and that system is at least in part governed by social context. Different social 
contexts produce different linguistic choices, which Halliday (1985) encodes as three 
metafunctions: ideational, interpersonal and textual. Fairclough observes of his use of 
systemic functional linguistics, 
I have followed systemic linguistics... in assuming that language in texts 
always simultaneously functions ideationally in the representation of 
experience and the world, interpersonally in constituting social interaction 
between participants in discourse, and textually in tying parts of a text together 
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into a coherent whole (a text, precisely) and tying texts to situational contexts 
(e. g. through situational deixis). This multifunctionality of language in texts 
can be used to operationalize theoretical claims about the socially constitutive 
properties of discourse and text... Texts in their ideational functioning 
constitute systems of knowledge and belief... and in their interpersonal 
functioning they constitute social subjects (or in different terminologies, 
identities, forms of self) and social relations between (categories of) subjects. 
(1995b: 6) 
However, this dense linguistic terminology should not lead the reader to conclude that 
critical discourse analysis is only concerned with discrete levels of analysis, with text 
or discourse being the linguist's prime or only concern. One must remember the 
dialogic links made by theorists between discourse and the context and means of its 
production. In this view, discourse and its production is a form of social practice 
(Fairclough, 1995b). Therefore, to study discourse is an essential part of studying 
society, and Halliday's contributions supply much of the tools for performing 
linguistic analysis, for example grammatical transitivity and modality analysis. 
The second main paradigm in CDA orientates toward cognitive studies. Most 
notably developed by Teun van Dijk (1998) and Paul Chilton (2004), this approach 
also uses a three dimensional model to investigate discourse and society2. This time 
the triadic method explores `how personal and social cognition mediates between 
social structures and discourse structures' (Wodak et al, 1999: 7). The cognitive 
approach is particularly helpful in viewing discourse participants as social and 
individually motivated agents. Ideology is, by definition, a group phenomenon: a 
system of beliefs common amongst a collective (van Dijk, 1998). The cognitive CDA 
paradigm, in addition to the above social thinkers, borrows from cognitive linguistics 
(Fauconnier, 1997; Lakoff, 2002,1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1981; Sperber and 
Wilson, 1995; and Turner, 1991) and cognitive scientists (Abrams and Hogg, 1990; 
Billig, 1982,1990; and Tajfel, 1981,1982) to examine the relationships between 
language, group identity and the maintenance or resistance of social structures, roles 
and institutions. 
2A note on George Lakoff should be made here as his work will be drawn on. Some theorists (e. g. 
Hart, 2005) refer to Lakoff as a critical discourse analyst but he is not. He has, provided CDA theorists 
with a valuable tool kit with which to explore discourse with a cognitive inflexion. Analysts with an 
interest in cognition naturally draw on his work as a cognitive linguist. Some of Lakoff's activity has 
been bound up with neo-conservative discourse in the U. S. (2004), but this is hardly done from either 
the methodological or ideological standpoint of CDA. 
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The third significant paradigm in CDA is the historical, typified by the Vienna 
School of Discourse Analysis. Ruth Wodak is the most prominent proponent of this 
approach. Wodak et al (1999) assert that Bernstein's theory strongly influences their 
methodology. The Viennese method in analysing political topics and texts puts 
emphasis on `the historical dimension' (Wodak et al, 1999: 7). Wodak et al explain 
this has a two pronged approach, 
Firstly, the discourse-historical approach always attempts to integrate as much 
available information as possible on the historical background and the original 
historical sources in which discursive events are embedded. Secondly, a 
number of investigations... have traced the diachronic change, which 
particular types of discourse undergo during a specified period of time. (1999: 
7-8) 
Still important are the aspects of critically questioning power and ideology. Again 
they employ a three dimensional approach, this time between the historical, socio- 
political and the discursive. This final methodology is briefly drawn on in the 
workings of this investigation (see chapter six). However, the social and cognitive 
models are more important to the present study. 
This thesis combines the social and cognitive approaches to CDA in several 
ways. In particular, Fairclough's triadic social methodology roots an analysis in the 
explication of socio-cultural practices as productive in accounting for manifestations 
of discourse, and vice versa. So for example, in this study, understanding the political 
context that led to devolution, as outlined above, provides the analyst with insights to 
the political and social background of Scottish politics. Similarly, understanding the 
characteristics of the current constitutional arrangements, i. e. the mixed electoral 
system for Scottish elections, provides explanations for social and institutional 
pressures on discourse participants. Where the social approach is lacking is in 
providing a detailed model for explaining the motivation for individuals to act in 
groups. 
The social explanation for group motivation stops at the operation and 
resistance of power (which includes accessing resources); and it does not give an 
account of how and why discourses are structured in particular ways, other than it is 
in the interests of the group. Where the cognitive approach has its strength is in 
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addressing these issues. For example, van Dijk (1998) provides an explanation of 
group behaviour which he formulates into the `ideological square', which is discussed 
further in chapters 3 and 4. In brief, the ideological square reduces to positive 
representation the in-group's actions, attributes and achievements and negative 
representation of the out-group. Van Dijk draws on work in social psychology, 
particularly Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self Categorisation Theory (SCT). 
These theories, exemplified by the work of Abrams and Hogg (1990), Billig (1982; 
1990) and Tajfel (1981; 1982), explain that `groups only exist if members identify 
themselves with the group' (Billig, 1995: 66). This membership inevitably involves 
making categorical distinctions between one group and another. The motivation for 
being a member of a group and thus making such distinctions is that group 
membership adds to positive conceptions of self (Tajfel, 1981). Therefore, an 
important aspect to the operation of ideological groups is not only the obtaining or 
maintenance of access to power or scarce resources but also the construction and 
maintenance of a positive in-group identity. Groups are not, therefore, merely 
agglomerations of individuals in pursuit of power and at the behest of social 
pressures, but responsive collectives actively engaged in both internal and external 
dialogues. Ultimately, the pursuit of power for scarce resources is bound up with the 
maintenance of positive identity for the group and correspondingly the individual. 
Van Dijk's ideological square is a model based on understandings of group behaviour 
that describes the cognitive framework used to order ideological discourse. 
For the purposes of this study, van Dijk's ideological square begins to give a 
framework for understanding the structuring of group (in this case, that is the party) 
discourse, in relation or response to external pressures, namely the conditions of the 
electoral campaign and its potential outcomes. Groups are positively and negatively 
categorised; discourses are then ordered to reproduce those meanings in advocating 
group interests, in the competitive environment of the election. 
Chilton's (2004) cognitive discourse analysis allows the analyst to then 
investigate further the construction of in and out-groups in discourse. His deictic 
method illustrates how in-groups are plotted proximal to the speaker in terms of 
space, time and modality (which equates to a moral and truthful rightness). Out- 
groups are then manifest as distal coordinates with respect to the in-group who is 
producing the discourse. Through the use of these three dimensions of deixis one can 
investigate who is plotted as antithetical to the in-group and how out-groups and their 
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members are characterised. These representations are understood through a spatial 
metaphor that equates to their cognitive representation, where out-groups are spatially 
and morally distal to the in-group. Therefore, van Dijk's ideological square provides a 
cognitive model that accounts for ordering of discourse based on the representation of 
positive in-group interests; while Chilton's method then allows in and out-group 
categorisation to be mapped in special terms (which related to cognitive 
representations) in discourse. 
Applying these cognitive approaches to this thesis means that the study can 
regard party political discourse from the perspective of group behaviour operating in 
response to both internal and external social pressures. Parties will be expected to try 
to represent themselves positively and their opponents negatively, therefore 
constructing different positions in political discourses like manifestos and party 
election broadcasts (PEBs). However, as will become apparent, such a clear 
bifurcation of discursive strategies is not the complete picture. In light of evidence 
from the Scottish election van Dijk's model requires some alteration. 
1.2.1 A definition of discourse 
The word `discourse' has already been used quite extensively in this discussion and, 
therefore, requires some clarifications as to its usage in this thesis. The term 
`discourse' is widely used in scholarly work today and its meanings vary depending 
on where it is used. Functionalist studies of language and critical social theory, both 
of which find their nexus in CDA, define discourse in the manner used by this study. 
As should be evident from the earlier part of the discussion of CDA, it is the 
functional view of discourse `language in use' (Brown and Yule, 1983) or language in 
social context (Halliday, 1978) which is important here. Discourse should be 
understood as language not just as serving some social function but as a social act in 
and of itself. In the systemic functionalist account different social functions are 
inherent in the structuring and use of language. And in the CDA paradigm language is 
both action and social behaviour, where language stands in a dialectal relationship 
with social practice. The triadic approaches to analysis in CDA most strongly indicate 
how discourse is to be understood. Discourse is not just instances of language or text 
(for example a manifesto); e. g. text is at one and the same time an instance of 
discourse practice and social action. Critical discourse analysts sometimes refer to 
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different types of discourse, such as `media discourse', `court room discourse' or 
`political discourse'. This further communicates the social function of language in use 
and can also be understood in terms of `genre', where features of texts are said to 
encode aspects of their social context. Therefore, the definition of discourse used here 
is language rooted in social context and as social practice, dialectically shaping and 
being shaped by social action. 
1.3 A Structure for Exploring Scottish Electoral Discourse 
Now that a domain and method of analysis have been defined, the structure of the 
forthcoming investigation will be indicated. Chapter 2 explores electoral discourse 
from the perspective of party manifestos, which are the main party documents of an 
election, providing the most comprehensive and unmediated account of parties' 
prospective policy programmes. In exploring these texts, the argument is situated 
within a discussion of the ideological centre ground of Scottish politics. A centre 
ground defined in terms of both the political ideologies of parties and voters. And 
where appropriate comparisons are made between Scottish and English and UK 
politics. It is important to understand this centre ground because it is generally where 
the majority of public opinion resides and from where elections are fought and won. 
The centre ground of devolved Scottish politics is mapped and the distinctive nature 
of Scottish politics indicated. The importance to Scottish political culture of centre- 
left and nationalist ideological agendas is highlighted. In identifying the dominant 
ideological similarities and differences, this investigation will lay the foundations for 
a wider discussion of the discursive strategies used to negotiate relationships in 
devolved electoral politics. This is in line with CDA triadic methodological practice: 
investigating the socio-cultural context of discourse (text) and discourse practices 
(orders of discourse). 
Chapter 3 then goes on to further examine manifestos, this time from the 
perspective of the discursive strategies employed in them to negotiate the ideological 
field of the Scottish election. This chapter addresses the issues of how a political 
system with several parties occupying similar ideological ground on the centre-left is 
negotiated. How parties discursively construct and negotiate their differing identities 
and relationships - bearing in mind the likelihood of coalition government - are 
explored. In doing this, how parties discursively label and position opponents is 
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scrutinized. Again the importance of the nationalist agenda and the contextual 
pressures of the likely outcome of the election, due to the electoral arrangements, are 
shown to affect discursive strategies in ideological competition. Both Scotland's 
relationship with the UK and potential coalition relationships characterise the 
discourse practices of Scotland's political parties. The electoral arrangements produce 
less adversarial discourses, alongside adversarial discourses, shaped by ideological 
differences between Labour and the SNP over the Union. This investigation is 
conducted by introducing a synthesis of the two approaches of Chilton (2004) and van 
Dijk (1998). These approaches are the three dimensional deixis analysis and the 
ideological square. The former indicates how ideological agents and actions are 
constructed in terms of proximity to the utterer; while the latter provides a cognitive 
account of the ideological structuring of discourse. However, evidence presented in 
this chapter questions the adequacy of the ideological square's descriptive powers; as 
such, a reformulation of the square is recommended. 
Subsequently, chapter 4 moves the investigation to another mainstay of 
political campaigning: party election broadcasts. Whereas the previous chapters 
looked at how ideological opponents are labelled and positioned in Scottish political 
discourse, chapter 4 investigates strategies for rhetorically structuring and presenting 
arguments for and against policies. Focusing once more on Holyrood's centre-left 
parties, the chapter again employs the ideological square. Of particular interest is how 
parties negotiate actual or potential coalition partnerships in adversarial elections. As 
such the following issues are explored: how Labour and the Liberal Democrats claim 
responsibility for a shared policy programme while maintaining individual identities; 
correspondingly, how Labour and the Liberal Democrats negotiate pressures to 
criticise each other in an adversarial election, while leaving open the possibility of 
future collaboration; the strategies used by the main opposition, the SNP, and the 
Liberal Democrats to mediate a potential coalition, again while maintaining separate 
identities; and how the two main parties of Scotland, Labour and SNP, argue against 
each other's position. This analysis further supports the assertions of the previous 
chapter: that while adversarial discourses persist, less adversarial discourse strategies 
are in evidence in devolved Scottish politics. These observations also lend weight to 
the assertion that van Dijk's ideological square requires some modification to account 
for competitive circumstances that produce potential and actual compromises and 
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coalitions between adversaries. Also, the prominence of the nationalist agenda is 
again shown to be important in Scottish electoral discourse. 
The analysis of the 2003 elections then moves, in chapter 5, to investigate 
political discourse in the media: specifically the Scottish press. In this chapter the 
effects on the representation of political elections of pervasive metaphors and their 
associated cognitive schemata are analysed. Through a study of a corpus of 
newspaper articles, which covered the PEBs of the election, metaphors of war, 
pugilism and argument are shown to be integral to the representation of political 
elections by politicians and journalists. It is suggested that these three metaphors are 
intimately related cognitively, forming an overarching `conflict schema' for the 
discursive representation of politics. As such, elections and politics are represented as 
competition between two sides. This then privileges, in the production of discourse, 
representations and meanings that fit the schema, i. e. two party adversarial politics, 
where the winner takes all, as in Westminster SMSP elections. Meanings associated 
with non-adversarial politics are less likely to be represented in the news media. The 
appropriateness of this metaphorical representation of devolved Scottish politics is 
then questioned. The evidence of less adversarial discourse strategies, demonstrated in 
previous chapters, leads one to suspect that representations of politics that do not 
reproduce a two party hegemony would be more appropriate. Chapter 5 goes on to 
further explore the nature of press reception in the reproduction of specific policy 
messages contained in PEBs within the schematic representations of politics just 
mentioned. This focuses specifically on Labour and SNP messages because their 
PEBs were the only ones to receive coverage, probably because of their role as 
protagonists in the aforementioned conflict schema. 
As the nationalist agenda is shown in previous chapters to be conspicuous in 
the discourse of devolved Scottish electoral politics, chapter 6 investigates the 
discursive construction of Scottish national identity in electoral discourse. Taking 
manifestos and PEBs together, chapter 6 studies what discursive representations of 
Scotland and Scottish national identity look like in the locutions of the nation's 
politicians. This analysis is placed against previous political science and sociological 
work on Scottish national identity (Brown et al, 1999; Curtice et al, 2002; and 
McCrone, 2001), and against Billig's (1995) conceptions of banal national identity. 
Both approaches are found to be useful but in need of revision in light of observations 
made here and elsewhere (e. g. Higgins, 2004a, 2004b; Law, 2001). Within this 
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framework two main issues are studied. Firstly, what forms of national identity are 
reproduced and whether the discursive evidence from this investigation tallies with 
previous work on Scottish national identity. And secondly, the discussion addresses 
the conflation of state and national identities in Billig's (1995) discursive account of 
banal national identity. On the first issue the distinction between what Brown et al 
(1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone (2001) call civic and non-civic national 
identity is supported by the evidence presented. This distinction equates to the 
differentiation of Staatsnation and Kulturnation made by Wodak et al (1999) in their 
critical discourse study of Austrian national identity. The two forms of identity are 
shown to be simultaneously deployed in the language of Scottish politics of all 
political hues; this questions some of the conclusions of previous work on Scottish 
national identity. On the second issue, Scottish national identity and British state 
identity are shown to be clearly differentiated by all parties in Scottish politics. 
Chapter 6, therefore, recommends that Billig's theory be adapted to accommodate the 
negotiation of state and national identities in a sub-state nation like Scotland. 
The final chapter summarises results, draws together the observations of this 
thesis and indicates its unique contribution. Chapter 7 also takes the opportunity to 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the study; before, finally, suggesting possible 
avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: A MANIFESTO ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL CENTRE OF 
SCOTTISH ELECTORAL POLITICS 
2.1 Introduction 
The 2003 election manifestos are the focus of analysis in the following two chapters. 
Manifestos are the most comprehensive publicly available documents produced by 
political parties in the UK. They are the major location of extensive accounts of 
both 
individual policy detail and extensive proposed policy programmes for campaigning 
parties3. It is not only the comprehensiveness of manifestos which makes them of 
interest to researchers of ideology and political discourse; it is also the salience they 
are afforded in election campaigns and beyond. These are documents intended 
for 
public consumption, but very few of the electorate actually read manifestos (Brack, 
2000: 1): however, manifestos are extensively covered by the media (Rosenbaum, 
1997: 212). Because the political debate which develops around them occurs in the 
nation's mass media, a party's manifesto is their best known document to the 
electorate (Cooke, 2000: 1). The manifesto is representative of the party in general, 
whatever its internal disputes, with the content often discussed and influenced by the 
wider membership (Budge et al, 2004). If elected, a party (or parties in a power- 
sharing government) will claim to have a mandate for the implementation of its 
policies and ideology on the basis that the electorate voted for its manifesto. 
Journalists will cross-question politicians during and after election campaigns on the 
statements made in these documents. Pressure groups and opposition politicians will 
refer to pledges made and promises broken in the government's manifesto (Kavanagh, 
2000). Discursively, manifestos serve as a centripetal force on a party's activists and 
spokesmen. Pulling the party's discourse to its centre these documents function as the 
hub of policies and beliefs around which a party's electoral campaign revolves. That 
is to say, manifestos define the areas and boundaries of their party's electoral debate. 
Manifestos are a major, if not the major, source of policy and ideological record for 
the public, politicians and journalists alike; they are the textual centre-piece of 
contemporary electoral campaigning. 
3 For a brief history of the development of post-war manifestos in Great Britain see Rosenbaum (1997: 
210-212). 
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The Manifesto Research Group (MRG) and the Comparative Manifesto 
Project (see Budge et al, 2004, Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 1987, Budge and Farlie, 
1983)4 have built up a body of analysis investigating general election manifestos. 
There is limited work available on Scottish editions of British general election 
manifestos (Leith, 2006). Emanating from political science, this research is generally 
rooted in the quantitative and qualitative research methodologies of that discipline and 
its focus thus far has been entirely on Westminster elections. Compared with other 
areas of political enquiry such as psephology, constitutional theory or party histories, 
manifestos have received far less attention. Within the CDA tradition manifestos have 
not received a great deal of attention, with the exception of Charteris-Black (2004). 
Critical discourse studies have investigated a range of text types from a variety of 
perspectives: and as discussed in the introduction there has been a significant interest 
in political subjects from the field's researchers. A strong interest in political texts and 
discourses is hardly surprising in a discipline whose raison d'etre is the investigation 
and de-mystification of ideologies and ideological conflict. What is surprising is that 
in a well established body of research, with specific interests in political discourse, 
there is a notable lack of work on what are the core political documents of Western 
democracies. This neglect is still more surprising given that the majority of CDA has 
occurred over the last twenty years, at a time which saw significant shifts by the main 
UK parties to the ideological right and centre. The following two chapters, therefore, 
intend to begin filling this gap in current research. 
There is, evidently, an opportunity for more analysis of manifestos in the 
newly devolved Scottish political context, and for that to be done from a CDA 
perspective. What the above political science research (with the exception of Leith, 
2006) does, is to consider manifestos as texts which are a record of policies which are 
involved in a political dialogue with the electorate and the media, neglecting that 
manifestos also form part of the dialogue between political parties. This inter-party 
dialogue is even more relevant in a political system likely to yield a coalition 
government, as in Scotland. Under such conditions co-operative dialogues become a 
necessity of acquiring and managing power. As the textual site of comprehensive and 
detailed policy programmes, manifestos are ideal locations to investigate ideological 
negotiation in the political realm. As the main documents of party political 
4 Though work by these research groups has not just focused on British manifestos, taking a broader 
view of European democracies. 
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competition in elections, they are in the vanguard of ideological competition in 
modern liberal democracies. From a discourse analysis perspective, one can 
therefore: 
" Compare constructions of parties' ideological statements 
" Identify discursive trends and ideological characteristics of Scottish political 
discourse at a particular time 
" Investigate the construction of parties' `in' and `out-groups' 
" Attempt to draw conclusions concerning the negotiation of inter-party 
relationships within a specific political context 
" And thereby assess the effects of the political context on the actions and 
discourses of political agents within that political context 
These are some of the reasons why election manifestos for the devolved Scottish 
parliament are investigated in this thesis. This chapter and the one that follows will 
attempt to address these potential areas of analysis: chapter 2 deals with the first two 
of the above points, while chapter 3 concerns itself specifically with the third point. 
Taken together these chapters address the final two points. 
A distinction is made in this methodology between the content of ideologies 
and the rhetorical strategies used in their discursive competition - though in reality 
the two are intimately connected. Chapter 2 investigates the content of the ideologies 
in the Scottish political centre, whereas chapter 3 is more concerned with the 
rhetorical strategies used to persuade voters in devolved elections. In layman's terms 
one might make the distinction between style and substance in political discourse: 
substance being content and style the methods of presenting content to a public 
audience. However, rhetorical strategies can encompass more than mere 
presentational finesse. It will be illustrated in chapter 3 that an important part of 
ideological competition is the construction of competing perceptions of `in' and `out- 
groups'. 
2.1.1 Investigating ideological content 
Brown et al assert that `any academic analysis which failed to look at policies 
themselves... would be failing to address the actual discourses of politicians and of 
everyday discussions of politics' (1999: 93). Thus far this thesis has discussed 
ideologies in quite non-specific and abstract terms, laying a descriptive framework 
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and methodology for the forthcoming investigation. This investigation will now 
attempt to move from a general to a more specific discussion of ideologies. As such, 
the ideological landscape of Scottish politics will be the focus of what follows here. In 
discussing this, the ideologies of Scotland's people and the political parties that are 
elected to represent them are discussed. 
Labour, Liberal Democrat and SNP policies and beliefs form the ideological 
centre of Scottish party politics. This research has contended that the Liberal 
Democrats are ideologically compatible coalition partners for the Scottish Labour 
Party and the SNP -a fact borne out, at least in part, by the Labour-Liberal Democrat 
executive partnership prior to and after the 2003 election. This is because all three 
parties occupy similar political ground on the centre-left of the political spectrum 
(Brown et al, 1999, Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 1996 and Paterson, 2002). As 
these three parties are currently the most likely parties of power in Scotland their 
political positions demarcate the centre of Scottish political debate. This chapter will 
therefore examine how the so called `centre ground' is defined in Scottish politics i. e. 
what policies and other expressions of ideology occupy the centre of political debate 
in a devolved Scottish election. Mapping the ideological centre is important because 
it forms the basis for potential power-sharing and provides a context for discussing 
features of Scottish devolved election discourse. In turn, this will indicate any change 
in the manner in which the political field is discursively negotiated. Therefore, it 
should be possible to begin to explore Bogdanor's assertion that `Devolution requires, 
and may conceivably help create, new relationships of consensus and co-operation' 
(2001: 286). It will be argued that Scotland does have a definably distinct political 
culture which is reflected in its centre-left standing. However, Scottish national 
identity plays a central role in explaining the character of mainstream political 
ideology in Scotland: that is the primacy of the interests of'the Scottish nation' within 
the context of United Kingdom - or the removal of Scotland from that context, as the 
case may be. 
Analysis in this chapter is not linguistic in character, as grammatical, 
pragmatic or semantic analysis does not feature when comparing manifesto 
statements. However, as this thesis is an analysis of `discourse' as a social product, 
rooted in social practice, it is necessary to engage with the content of policy, 
considered as articulations of group beliefs. This approach is consistent with CDA 
methodology, which explicitly roots discursive aspects of ideological investigation in 
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the institutional content, background and production of ideologies (Fairclough, 
1995a). Analysis would be inadequate if it failed to compare the detail of party policy, 
as it is integral to discourse practices of the political field, and is a product of party 
ideology. 
2.2 What is an'ideological centre'? 
The most commonly held conception of political ideologies in the UK is that of the 
left-right dichotomy, where parties' political beliefs are described as being left or 
right wing in nature. The left is defined in terms of policies which reflect a socialist 
position, such as the centralised redistribution of wealth to alleviate poverty and the 
nationalisation of industries and public utilities: whereas the right is associated with 
more laissez-faire economic policies, the privatisation of public utilities and the 
introduction of free market principles into the welfare state and public services. In 
terms of values, crudely put, the left is more collectivist than the individualist right. 
These values in turn are realised by the above left/right policy preference. However, 
`left' and `right' do not provide a complete descriptive framework of political 
ideologies. The other main descriptive dichotomy is between libertarian and 
authoritarian positions, where liberal policies reflect more individual autonomy, 
freedom and entitlements, and prohibitive policies on individual freedoms represent 
an authoritarian standpoint. These positions (left-right and libertarian-authoritarian) 
form imaginary clines or axes upon which parties' relative positions to each other can 
be mentally mapped. And these positions are metaphorical descriptions that conjure 
spatial denotations to make meaningful otherwise abstract beliefs (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1980). On both of these metaphorical clines one can envisage ideological 
positions which have varying degrees of distance or proximity, and as such some 
point in between two extremes is the centre. Left-right and libertarian-authoritarian 
clines do not necessarily run in parallel with each other. Thatcherism, for example, 
combined policies of the neo-liberal right with authoritarian ideologies to produce a 
brand of so called neo-conservatism, with similarities to its transatlantic contemporary 
in Reaganism. Thatcher's governments were off the centre of public opinion in terms 
of UK attitudes to public services but were in the centre of English (but not Scottish) 
attitudes on the libertarian-authoritarian scale (McCrone, 2001). One nation 
conservatism, however, is more centrist on both left-right and libertarian-authoritarian 
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clines. On the other hand the far left of the Labour Party historically could find much 
agreement with the right of the Tory Party in terms of their authoritarianism, but 
disagreed profoundly on economic policy. 
However, it is the left-right distinction that is often the focus of UK politicians 
(Curtice et al, 2002: 199) and will be largely the focus of this chapter. The centre is 
where the groundswell of public and elite opinion can be found, as well as the median 
from which the extremes of political opinion lie. The centre is of importance to 
politicians and their parties because the centre ground is where elections are fought 
and won, as it attracts the highest number of votes. Paterson comments that 
successfully seeking the centre for the purpose of winning elections is a matter of 
`whether and how party thinking corresponds to the thinking of that broad block of 
electors who are not at either end of the left-right spectrum' (2002: 197-198). For 
example, Labour Party reformers of the 1980s and 90s moved the party to the centre 
ground to win elections because they saw the majority of voters occupying that 
ideological position (Paterson, 2002). There are instances of parties winning elections 
and governing from off centre positions - the 1980s governments of Margaret 
Thatcher being a case in point (Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 2001). As this chapter is 
written the UK Conservative Party is currently seeking the centre ground again under 
David Cameron, their fourth leader since losing office in 1997. In doing so they are 
undertaking numerous policy reviews to determine where their policies should lie in 
order to win elections - this is inevitably a process to find policies which can be 
supported by both a majority of party supporters and non-affiliated voters who occupy 
the centre ground in public opinion. 
It must be stressed, though, that the centre is a relative position. One country's 
centre may be to the right or left of another country's. As mentioned above, Scotland's 
centre is roughly described as centre-left; this is particularly clear when viewed in 
comparison with England. Bennie, Brand and Mitchell (1997), Brown et at (1999), 
Curtice et al (2002), and McCrone (2001) all point to differences at the level of social 
beliefs between Scottish and English electors, which correspondingly produce 
different policy preferences from elected representatives. What follows is an 
investigation which relates the policies and other ideological statements of Scotland's 
centrist parties to the wider research field and evidence of public opinion. By relating 
evidence of public and political belief with explicit ideological statements found in 
manifestos this chapter combines analysis of socio-cultural context with discourse 
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practices, in accordance with the CDA methodological framework. In terms of the 
overall analytical goals of this thesis, a more detailed explication of the ideological 
landscape of devolved Scottish politics is necessary because it provides for: 
" An analysis of both socio-cultural and discourse practices 
" The gathering of specifically Scottish features of public ideological 
negotiation 
" The development of a more general theoretical framework and analysis of 
ideological negotiation in public discourse 
2.3 The centre ground of Scottish politics 
One may ask why Scotland has political values that are different to those South of the 
border? Why should the Scottish people and their politicians currently look in a more 
left and libertarian direction than their English counterparts? And what then are the 
values and accompanying policy preferences of a centre-left Scotland, i. e. what does 
the ideological centre of the Scottish electorate look like? Many authors have stressed 
that Scotland retained a distinct civic-culture after the Treaty of Union of 1707 
(Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 1996, McCrone, 2001 and Paterson, 1994) and this 
thesis discussed Scotland's socio-cultural distinctiveness within the UK in chapter 
one. This distinctive culture, with its different legal system, religious make-up, 
educational traditions and party politics inevitably informs and is informed by the 
attitudes held by those people who now inhabit Scotland, but how? 
2.3.1 Social structure and national identity 
It may be that Scotland has a significantly different social structure, for example with 
more working class and levels of religious participation than England, and that these 
differences affect mass public political values. Brown et al (1999) note that Scotland 
has a higher proportion than the rest of the UK of people who identify themselves as 
'working class', some 71 per cent. Therefore one explanation as to why the 
Conservatives fare less well at elections in Scotland and correspondingly Labour do 
much better is that traditionally Labour benefits from proportionally more `working 
class' votes in Scotland. In the past religion has also played a significant role in 
Scottish politics, where the Catholic-Protestant split is more telling than in England 
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which is overwhelmingly Anglican. The Conservatives had to be able to dominate 
general elections and used to command the working class Protestant vote (McCrone, 
2001: 114-115); however, post World War II their share of the working class vote of 
any religious persuasion has been in decline. Brown et al (1999) discount social class 
and religion as the only significant explanations as to why Scotland feels and votes 
differently to England. Therefore, there must be some other explanation for the 
topographic differential in political values and voting behaviour between Scotland and 
England. 
There is a clear relationship in Scotland between voting behaviour and 
national identity. The explanation for Scottish voting behaviour, therefore, appears to 
be the strength of national identity, or, to be more specific, a Scottish national identity 
as opposed to or superior to a British state identity. The same relationship, between 
national identity and domestic politics, does not exist in England where Englishness is 
not as politicised as Scottishness is in Scotland. More than 50 per cent of Scots 
consider themselves either'Scottish and not British' or Scottish more than British' 
(Brown et al, 1999). Paterson confirms this, noting that'All ideological groups in 
Scotland are predominantly Scottish in their allegiance, while in England Britishness 
is stronger' (in Curtice et al, 2002: 211). Such conclusions reinforce previous work 
(Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 1996) which proposes that parties in Scotland which 
are seen to best represent the interests of Scotland within the UK context are those 
which reap the electoral rewards. Brown et al (1999: chapter 3) also indicate that 
Scottish national identity translates into support for parties such as Labour and the 
SNP, which are perceived as being pro-Scotland, and weak support for the 
Conservatives, perceived as the least pro-Scottish of the main parties. The 
Conservatives have previously been able to dominate Scottish politics, but this was at 
a time (the end of WWI and the mid-1950s) when public opinion perceived 
Scotland's best interests to be served by the Union. At this time (when Britishness 
and Empire played strongly in the public's imagination and when Scotland was 
industrially productive) Scottish Conservatives stressed more collectivist values, such 
as civic duty and social responsibility (McCrone: 2001: 113). Alternative views to the 
strongly unionist Tory model arose as the British economic and social situation 
changed following WWII, as McCrone (2001: 115) observes, 
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By the 1970s and 1980s, alternative versions of political Scottishness, 
associated with the SNP and nationalist elements of the Labour Party, sought 
to emphasise the gulf between Scottish and British national consciousness, 
rather than their continuity. The ending of empire, of military conscription, 
together with fifty years without a major war, coupled with the extensive 
secularisation of Scotland and Britain, combined to erode and enfeeble the 
connection between Conservatism, Protestantism and British national identity. 
Opinion grew that Scotland's union within the UK was not always to its benefit, 
shifting focus from a British centred identity to a more Scottish one. Correspondingly, 
antipathy to the union grew, finding political expression in the rise of the SNP during 
the 1960s and 1970s. More and more Scots began to feel that Scotland's interests 
were not best served by the Union. During the 1980s and 1990s the Labour Party 
increasingly turned to embrace devolution. As Thatcherite neo-conservatism 
increased the ideological gap between Scotland and England, and Scotland's 
industrial decline continued, the union more than ever began to be seen as less than 
beneficial to Scotland. Therefore, as social and economic conditions altered, parties 
were rewarded at the ballot box if they could project policies which the electorate saw 
as in the interests of their nation. Over time, political parties which are perceived as 
representing Scottish interests within the UK benefit most in Scottish balloting 
(Paterson, 2002). 
McCrone comments further on this link between national identity and political 
values, 
... if we measure Scottish opinion vis-ä-vis that in the rest of Britain, we find 
that Scots are somewhat more likely to be more 'socialist' (as opposed to pro- 
market), more 'liberal' (as opposed to socially conservative), and less 'British 
national' (as opposed to Scottish)... Labour voters in Scotland were 
significantly more left-wing than their English counterparts, and less 'British' 
in national orientation. There was a clear association between 'Scottish' and 
having social democratic values which had been building up during the 
previous twenty years [the period of Conservative rule at Westminster 
between 1979 and 1997], and which helps to explain why the Conservative 
Party came to be identified as an 'English' party (reinforced, of course, by its 
hostility to Home Rule). (2001: 124) 
There is no reason why a strong sense of Scottish national identity should be linked to 
more left-wing and liberal ideologies. National identity is normally seen as something 
quite 'banal' (Billig, 1995), i. e. a national identity is something which everyone has 
but, at least within the context of domestic politics, it does not usually gain internal 
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political significance unless that identity is disputed. However, within the UK 
political context, clearly British and Scottish, as well as Welsh and Irish/Northern 
Irish identities are politically significant, as discussed in the introductory chapters. 
The Scottish-British identity relationship is changing, and within Scotland at least, the 
Scottish aspect of most people's national identity takes priority, whilst in England a 
sense of Britishness is more prevalent (Paterson in Curtice et at, 2002: 211). However, 
as Brown et at suggest'it is important to remember that in a crucial sense Scottish 
politics have always been nationalist insofar as Scotland's interests have always been 
paramount in explaining the success and failure of the parties' (1999: 5). Currently, 
both the Labour Party and the SNP have been more successful in being perceived to 
act in Scotland's interests (McCrone, 2001: 125), and both of those parties have linked 
Scottish national interests (evoking national identity) and left-wing and social 
democratic views together in their political discourse (Brown et at., 1999: 78). 
Unsurprisingly then, Scotland's political parties play an important role in delineating 
the ideological centre-ground and mediating this relationship between national 
identity and political ideology. So it is the political parties' role that will now be 
considered. 
2.3.2 National Identity and Party Politics `in a Cold Climate' 
Westminster politics has three main parties, Labour, Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat. Scotland, however, has four with the addition of the SNP who are the 
second largest party in terms of share of seats at the devolved elections. The 
Conservatives, far from being the electoral alternative to Labour, as they are in 
England, are only the third largest party in the Scottish Parliament, lagging far behind 
the SNP. A significant conservative presence in the devolved parliament is only 
possible because of the proportional character of an electoral system they opposed 
(Brown et al, 1999). As the only substantial party of the right in Scotland, the 
Conservatives find themselves somewhat ideologically isolated, being ill-suited to 
coalition partnerships with any of the other parties at Holyrood (including the Greens 
and SSP). The presence of the SNP in Scottish politics clearly differentiates the 
Scottish political scene from England in terms of both party dominance and the 
relative importance of nationalist sentiment in domestic political discourse. 
29 
Paterson has commented on the effect of the SNP and not the Conservatives 
being the main opposition to Labour in the ideological centre of Scottish politics, 
noting that it 'encourages the centre politics to look leftwards rather than to the right, 
especially in the context of a broadly proportional electoral system' (2002: 216). Add 
to this the rise of the SSP on the left of the political spectrum and the Scottish Green 
Party on the libertarian ground, Scotland has additional party competition of a kind 
not yet found in English politics. The two largest parties of Scottish politics are both 
left-leaning and more liberal in their ideological position. Therefore, the main 
ideological competition and resulting policy environment is over the centre-left in 
Scotland, whereas in England it is more to the right as the Conservatives inject a more 
right-wing and authoritarian edge to Westminster politics. As McCrone observes, 
The key battle ground in Scottish politics lies between Labour and the SNP, 
Scotland's two major parties. Both are trusted to work in Scotland's interests, 
and both tap into similar left-of-centre policy preferences. (2001: 125) 
McCrone then goes on to note of the two main parties in Scotland, that around two- 
thirds of each parties' supporters 'give the other party as their second choice, 
reinforcing the competitive nature of Scottish politics around a similar battleground' 
(2001: 125). Therefore, in an electoral system which allows for two choices, as with 
the Scottish Parliament, voters could be voting for both parties, reinforcing both the 
centre-left parties and those parties which are perceived as acting in Scotland's 
interests. 
Coming sections in this chapter will delineate the policy differences and 
similarities of the three parties of the Scottish centre. Ideological compatibility is 
particularly important in a system which is likely to result in a coalition. Therefore 
having an understanding of what might determine potential patterns of partnership in 
government, would be useful in understanding the mechanics of Scottish politics and 
its discursive negotiation. As discussed in the introduction, the three centrist parties in 
Scotland are in favour of varying degrees of Scottish autonomy within the Union 
beyond the pre-1999 constitutional arrangement. Labour is the most unionist of the 
three; being the party at Westminster which delivered devolution it can also still claim 
to be pro-Scotland. The Liberal Democrats are federalist, and therefore still unionist 
in the sense that they want to retain Scotland within the UK, but they also wish to 
create a constitutional symmetry and devolve powers to English regions as well, 
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within a federalist constitutional framework5. The SNP are the only mainstream 
separatist party advocating independence for Scotland (but with the retention of the 
Monarchy). 
These ideological positions with regard to Scotland's constitutional standing 
therefore dictate the potential patterns of division and co-operation in Scotland. 
Though the SNP and Scottish Labour are both more left-wing than the Liberals a 
coalition partnership between them is precluded by their relative positions on Scottish 
independence. That is, no coalition is likely in the current political climate, with a 
pro-unionist Labour Party in office at Westminster. However, a Conservative 
Westminster based government, with a left-wing consensus presiding in Scotland 
could create a political atmosphere, as in the 1980s and 90s, where Scotland feels 
politically misrepresented in the UK. Such a situation could push the Labour Party 
closer to their nationalist contemporaries, in a bid to retain power in Scotland. If the 
Conservative Party changes direction and advocates more powers to the Scottish 
parliament, to regain a foothold in the periphery, this may equally push the other 
parties of the Scottish centre to advocate even more powers in order to remain to be 
seen as the most pro-Scotland. However, as things currently stand the Liberals are 
seen by both Labour and the SNP as the only acceptable coalition partner. There are 
rumblings in Scotland's quality press that the Scottish Greens are potential third party 
partners, with the centrist parties, if a situation where a two party coalition still cannot 
form a majority. Possible coalition became a point of discussion at the Scottish 
Greens 2005 autumn conference. Nevertheless, in Scotland coalition partnership in 
the devolved parliament is determined by parties' constitutional preferences for 
Scotland in addition to ideological compatibility on the left-right and authoritarian- 
libertarian axis. These patterns of potential coalition again illustrate the political 
import of Scottish national identity to internal, domestic Scottish politics. 
2.3.3 From mass values to policy preferences 
Thus far in this section on the political centre-ground in Scotland, how Scotland 
differs from England in terms of social structure, national identity and party political 
5 Labour at Westminster had been in favour of devolution to the English regions, including elected 
mayors and assemblies (with far less powers than the Scottish Parliament). However, extending devolution to the English regions appears to have halted at the time of writing. 
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representation have been discussed. This chapter suggests these differences account 
for Scotland's political ethos, which draws on a more centre-left, more liberal and 
Scottish-centred national identity. The basic theoretical contention of the political 
scientist who is interested in voting behaviour and political culture is that policy 
preference stands in relation to underlying political values. Although there may not be 
a one-to-one relationship between political values and a set of policy preferences, 
there is necessarily some determining factor at play. That is to say, 
policy is the practical effect of values. Thus when people place themselves on 
a scale running from left to right, the practical political effect of that will be to 
influence their attitudes to such policy areas as redistributing wealth or 
supporting comprehensive education. (Brown et al, 1999: 93) 
How these ideological differences are made manifest as different policy preferences 
among the Scottish electorate has not been discussed. Therefore it is to mass public 
values and their resulting policy preferences that this section now turns. Such a 
discussion is particularly important within the context of a discussion of the Scottish 
Parliament, as Brown et al comment, 
the whole tenor of the debate about Scottish political distinctiveness over the 
last two or three decades has been principally about disagreements over 
policy, and the main agreement for a Scottish Parliament is that it will produce 
better policy, by which is usually meant policies more in keeping with what 
people want in Scotland. (1999: 94) 
The Scottish Parliament was argued for and established (among other reasons) to 
better represent Scottish public opinion and translate that opinion into legislation. 
Bromley and McCrone (in Curtice et al, 2002: 166-195) claim that Scotland is by no 
means completely uniform in the social attitudes held by its population, and that 
differences exist from region to region. But there are general national trends that can 
be identified and which indicate mass social values and policy preferences 
particularly on the left to right-wing and authoritarian-libertarian scales as identified 
earlier (Brown et al, 1999: 78). 
Scotland's centre-left values resultantly make Scots favour governmental 
intervention on economic matters, therefore they are: 
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" More hostile to privatisation of public utilities and correspondingly also more 
pro the nationalisation of industry, and more likely to support the trade union 
movement (Bennie, Brand and Mitchell, 1997: 138) 
" More disposed to government action on poverty and the redistribution of 
wealth i. e. through taxation and state benefits (Brown et al, 1999: 99 and 
Paterson in Curtice et al, 2001: 210-211) 
" And more likely to support a minimum wage policy (McCrone, 2001: 124) 
On education, Scots are: 
" More opposed to selection in state schools than the English electorate 
(McCrone, 2001: 124) 
" And against private sector involvement in education (Brown et al, 1999: 99) 
At the international level Scots are more likely than the English to be: 
" In favour of the EU social chapter 
" And more in favour of giving greater power to Europe (Bennie, Brand and 
Mitchell, 1997: 138, Brown et al, 1999: 99 and McCrone, 2001: 124) 
However, it is more a case of Scots being a little less anti-Europe, with slight 
majorities on the left, the right and in the centre still not favouring the Euro (Paterson, 
2001: 211). 
Therefore, there are significant differences between Scotland and England, 
covering far reaching and strategic aspects of policy, on the economy, on education 
and on aspects of international affairs. In relation to the Scottish Parliament, however, 
and its ability to translate Scottish political values into desired policy preferences 
there may be a problem. As Brown et al postulate, 
The striking point, though, is that - with the exception of education - the 
differences are not mainly in areas which will be within the powers of the 
Scottish Parliament. They mainly concern the overall structure of taxation, 
large-scale redistribution, and even some areas of foreign affairs. (1999: 100) 
On the face of it political parties in Scotland face a difficulty in that the devolved 
powers of the Parliament are insufficient to deliver the policy changes desired by the 
Scottish electorate. However, as the following sections in this chapter and the 
discussion in chapter 3 on the 2003 party manifesto will show, the parties of the 
Scottish centre do attempt to address all of the above areas of policy: in doing so the 
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parties do not always choose to frame policy issues within the defined context of the 
devolution settlement. 
2.4 Manifesto Statements of the Scottish Centre 
The preceding section discussed the ideological centre of Scottish politics from 
several perspectives, including social and party political differences between Scotland 
and England, and resulting public opinion. Together this has given an overview of the 
ideological centre in terms of mass public opinion and party political competition. 
This section will consider the three centre parties of Scottish politics (as defined 
above), to investigate how the centre-ground is classified by looking at manifesto 
policy statements. Such an investigation will illustrate how party representation 
related to public opinion, and therefore how closely party political ideology matched 
public opinion, in the 2003 Scottish Parliament election. One might not expect an 
exact match between the public and their representatives as there is a tradition of 
political representatives leading as well as representing public opinion. The difference 
between public opinion and mainstream political opinion on capital punishment is a 
case in point. The political establishment is against whereas opinion polls tend to 
show a majority of the UK public in support of the death penalty. However, as 
mentioned above the tenor of the argument for a Scottish Parliament was that 
Scotland had a different political culture at both the public and party political level, 
and therefore one would expect to see some ideological fit between the two expressed 
in political discourse. 
As discussed above, the SNP are the main opposition to the Labour Party in 
Scotland, not the Conservatives. Along with the Liberal Democrats there are three 
mainstream parties occupying the ideological centre in Scotland. The centre would 
therefore appear quite crowded, with all three parties reflecting the broad ideological 
preferences of the centre-left electorate. If they all sit in the centre ground then it is 
legitimate to ask, what is the difference between them or conversely are their policies 
the same? The similarity of the parties was a prominent enough issue for Jack 
McConnell to address it in the introduction to Labour's manifesto. 
The choice Scotland faces in the election of May 1 is not a personality contest between people with the same priorities, not a potluck between parties who 
34 
have the same policies, and not incidental to the future of our country. 
Politicians are not the same and parties do have different priorities. (2003: 5) 
What follows will illustrate that one can define areas of significant similarity but as 
indicated above there are also key areas of disagreement. Both areas of similarity and 
disagreement help differentiate Scottish politics from politics south of the Border. As 
much as possible, the rest of this chapter will focus on policy details as well as 
general policy statements, such as a commitment to increased spending on health, 
education and policing. The reason for a concern for details of policy proposals 
(where this is possible as detail is not always given) is one might assume that if the 
parties share similar ideological ground they will not only share a desire for similar 
ends but also similar means to those ends. 
The following comparisons, for convenience of analysis, are made in seven 
areas: 
" Health 
" Education 
" Law and order 
" Economy and finance 
" Democracy 
" Agriculture/aquaculture 
" Environment 
In their manifestos the parties do not always categorise the following policies within 
the same areas as this analysis - for example policies on bureaucracy and Private 
Finance Initiatives/Public Private Partnerships (PFI/PPP) can and are found 
throughout manifestos, funding different policies. Generally speaking the policy areas 
discussed below represent areas of devolved concern, for example educational matters 
such as class sizes and undergraduate university student funding, or on health issues 
such as the recruitment of NHS staff and hospital funding. That is not to say, 
however, that matters which technically lie outwith the gift of the Scottish Parliament 
are not discussed. Such ultra vices policies, perhaps unsurprisingly, coalesce around 
the range of the parliament's powers or the very status of the parliament as a non- 
sovereign body. Therefore, unionist and nationalist sentiments will be shown to play a 
defining role in Scottish politics, contributing to the ideological negotiation of the 
centre ground. 
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2.4.1 Health 
On nurses' pay and recruitment all three parties of the centre articulate policies which 
advocate the increased recruitment of nurses into the National Health Service, as well 
as better pay. The Labour Party claim to have `increased the number of qualified 
nurses by 1,700' (2003: 21) and will continue their programme to `recruit and train 
11,000 nurses and midwives' (2003: 25) by 2005. Labour state this policy raises their 
original target by 1,500: they commit to giving nurses a 10 percent pay rise over three 
years. The Liberal Democrats commit themselves to 2,000 extra nurses (2003: 3) and 
better training conditions for them, while the SNP want to retain more nurses and 
midwives by giving them an 11 percent pay rise. This pay rise, they claim will also 
result in increasing numbers of student nurses completing their degrees, thereby 
increasing overall nursing numbers (2003: 5). 
The Liberal Democrats and Labour share their commitment to the so called 
`free personal care for the elderly' policy. Both point to the policy as an example 
which positively characterises the actions of their respective in-groups. This free care 
policy originally emanated from the Liberal Democrats and Scottish Labour were 
`reluctant converts' (Paterson, 2002: 206). This policy was a major legislative 
moment of the first parliamentary session, and was a provision that the Westminster 
government did not emulate, rejecting the policy as uneconomic. Paterson claims, on 
evidence from the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2000 and the British Social 
Attitudes Survey 2000, that, 
The overwhelming majority of people in all ideological groups believe that it 
is definitely the government's responsibility to maintain the living standards of 
old people... Indeed, in the centre and on the right, the support in Scotland for 
this is firmer than in England: 88 per cent as against 81 per cent in the centre, 
and 76 per cent against 71 per cent on the right. Although the question as 
asked in the survey was a general one, not relating specifically to the costs of 
long-term care, the pattern of views... suggest that any government action to 
help old people would be welcomed in Scotland, especially in the centre and 
on the left. (2002: 206) 
Within this context the SNP's lack of criticism is unsurprising as it was policy they 
actually supported through the parliament, but they are also not forthcoming with 
explicit praise for the policy. 
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2.4.2 Education 
Labour and Liberal Democrats abolished tuition fees in the first parliamentary 
session, established the graduate endowment and reintroduced grants for university 
students. The Liberal Democrats pledged they wanted to `Increase the funding of 
Further and Higher Education in Scotland above inflation over the lifetime of the next 
Parliament' (2003: 17). Labour stated that they also committed to an increase of 15 
percent in the higher and further education budget by 2006 (2003: 8). Although, the 
SNP would, abolish the graduate endowment - stating it `remains absolutely 
committed to the principle of free education' (2003: 13) and `will work to ensure a 
more comprehensive, coherent and fair national system of student welfare funding' 
(2003: 13) - all three parties oppose the introduction of tuition 
fees in their manifestos 
and state a commitment to achieving a `high skilled' economy through further and 
higher education. Therefore, the centre of Scottish politics certainly shares much on 
education, not least a commitment to a high skilled workforce and hostility to tuition 
fees. However, on the detail of how to achieve a high skilled work force there is both 
agreement and disagreement among the parties. Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
share a policy on undergraduate student funding, perhaps unsurprisingly after four 
years of coalition; whereas the SNP disagree with both the other two parties of the 
centre on this point of policy. Paterson (2002: 203-204) notes that a majority of 
people in all ideological groups, left, centre and right, in both Scotland and England 
favour means-tested fees. The UK government, on this point at least are in step with 
public opinion north and south of the boarder. 
All three of the centre left parties pledge to reduce class sizes. The SNP 
commit to reduce class sizes to eighteen or below within five years for the first three 
years of primary school (2003: 11): Labour focus on secondary education, promising 
to `reduce class sizes to a maximum of 20 in Si and S2 for Maths and English' (2003: 
20): while the Liberal Democrats claim they will `use the expected fall in school rolls 
6cBuilding our skill base and focusing on science, research, ideas and knowledge is central to 
Scotland's future economic growth. That is why we are committed to increasing the higher and further 
education budget by 15 per cent by 2006. ' (Scottish Labour: On your side, 2003: 8) 
'The SNP believes that Scotland's future success must lie in drawing the right lessons from our past 
and investing in a highly skilled and educated workforce. ' (SNP: Release our potential, 2003: 12) 
'Scotland's universities and colleges are vital drivers both of our economic future and of the 
achievement of a liberal, well-educated and articulate society. ' (Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the 
Difference, 2003: 17) 
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to cut class sizes' (2003: 18 Make education for life). The Liberal Democrats also 
claim they will reduce class sizes by recruiting 3,000 extra teachers (2003: 18 Make 
education for life). Similarly Labour pledge to recruit 2,500 more teachers (2003: 20). 
The SNP however make no explicit commitment to recruit more teachers; this may be 
a logical implication if they wish to reduce class sizes but the reader can only assume 
this to be so. 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats both claim credit for free nursery places for 
three and four year olds. Labour state `The right start comes with our commitment to 
maintain free nursery places for every 3 and 4 year old in Scotland' (2003: 17). While 
the Liberal Democrats expand on their policy commitment, 
Accessible, flexible and comprehensive childcare is important in tackling 
inequality and poverty and equipping people for work... We will: Aim to 
create flexible childcare provision accessible to all, building on the 
achievement of nursery school provision for children of three and four, 
expanding childcare facilities, particularly in the public sector and through co- 
operative arrangements. ' (2003: 35) 
The SNP demonstrate a consensus amongst the three parties of the Scottish centre 
stating `Welcome progress has been made with nursery education' (2003: 11). Like 
the Liberal Democrats they go on to pledge to expand on state supported childcare `by 
introducing a series of pilot childcare projects' (2003: 10). 
2.4.3 Law & Order 
As with teachers and nurses all three parties of the Scottish centre pledge to find 
funding to employ more police officers, specifically in the area of visible policing. 
Labour give no specific figures but say they will 'significantly increase the number of 
police officers on operational duty in every Scottish Force' (2003: 29) and increase 
funding for support staff and technology to free up more officers for the beat. 
Recruiting 3,500 officers over the four year parliament is the goal of the Liberal 
Democrats (2003: 21 and 24): while the SNP set their target at 1,000 more officers on 
the streets (2003: 9). Therefore, although the parties differ in how much they would 
increase the numbers of officers on the beat, they share a commitment to visible 
policing as an effective way to cut crime. 
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The topic of youth crime features strongly in the law and order sections of all 
three centre left parties. Labour state `Youth crime is a particular challenge' (2003: 
30): the SNP agree saying `Youth crime is a growing problem in many of our 
communities' (2003: 9): and the Liberal Democrats confirm the consensus pledging to 
cut youth crime and asserting that `More than 30 per cent of recorded crime is 
committed by young people. Addressing criminal behaviour at an early stage will help 
cut crime now and in the future' (2003: 22). As well as sharing a sentiment that youth 
crime is a problem, Labour, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats have similar policies, 
with which they propose to deal with the problem. All three parties suggest review 
and reform of the legal systems for dealing with young offenders: Labour calls for the 
modernisation of the Children's Hearing System (2003: 30), expansion of youth 
courts and `fast-track' Children's Hearings (2003: 31): the SNP similarly recommends 
`tougher sanctions for persistent young offenders' and more options given to 
Children's Panels (2003: 9): while the Liberal Democrat propose a programme to 
`continue to expand the availability of sentences that work to stop reoffending, 
seeking to divert young people from a life of crime' and to `Improve the information 
given to panels and judges on the availability of non-custodial facilities. ' (2003: 23- 
24). All three centre parties identify a need for secure accommodation for young 
offenders: Labour wish to increase the number of places by 125: the SNP commit 
themselves to doubling the number of secure places available in Scotland: and the 
Liberal Democrats state `for the most persistent and serious young offenders, secure 
accommodation is appropriate. We will devote more resources to making secure 
accommodation better at reducing reoffending than it does at present' (2003: 24). 
Again there is a consensus in the Scottish-centre, which identifies parental 
responsibility as important in dealing with young offenders. Labour propose the 
introduction of Parental Orders to `make parents accept responsibility for their 
children' (2003: 31): the SNP propose similar orders called Parental Compensation 
Orders (2003: 9): the Liberal Democrats differ slightly, wishing to `Promote parental 
responsibility through voluntary measures' (2003: 24) and not legal action. 
The SNP indicate a consensus between the centre parties in dealing with 
narcotic offences with'In 1999 the SNP pioneered the idea of Drug Courts as an 
effective way of tackling drug related crime. Over the last term of Parliament, the 
Labour-LibDem coalition introduced this concept with positive results' (2003: 9). 
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Rehabilitation features as a part of Labour, the SNP and the Liberal 
Democrats' strategies to deal with crime. The SNP proclaim their position with 'It is 
vital that we create conditions in prisons that aid the rehabilitation of prisoners and cut 
re-offending' (2003: 10): both Labour and the Liberal Democrats express similar 
sentiments in their own manifestos. However, there is a rhetorical difference between 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats: Labour (2003: 29-30) foreground the punishment 
aspect of judicial redress, followed by a commitment to rehabilitation of offenders: 
whereas the Liberal Democrats (2003: 22-23) do the opposites. Labour identifies 
rehabilitation specifically with programmes to end drug addiction, rather than issues 
connected with custodial provision, poverty and equality of opportunity (or at least 
these alternatives are not present in their manifesto). The Liberal Democrats express 
policies which aim to deal with offender rehabilitation within the context of custodial 
sentences and with what they refer to vaguely as 'increasing the range and availability 
of programmes to stop reoffending' (2003: 22). The level of ambiguity and lack of 
detail in this policy area affords all three parties a great deal of rhetorical latitude in 
terms of agreement or disagreement, as there is little explicitly stated with which to 
pin them down. 
Both the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats suggest the extension of the 
scheme of restorative justice. Labour prefer to introduce a policy of Community 
Reparation Programmes 'to make the offender repair the community they have 
harmed' (2003: 31), while the Liberal Democrats want to bring young offenders 'face 
to face with the consequences of their actions' (2003: 23). The SNP make no pledges 
in their manifesto on the restorative justice issue. 
There is concord between Labour and the Liberal Democrats over victims' 
rights/victim support. Both parties supply detail rather than just a commitment. 
Labour express their intentions at least twice, 'We will strengthen support for victims' 
(2003: 29), and'In the second term we will keep up the pressure on criminals and 
increase the support we give to local communities and to victims of crime' (2003: 29). 
The Liberal Democratss make similar proclamations, '[we will] Improve the rights of 
victims' (2003: 21), 'Give particular support to victims of crime, both in relation to 
7'For those who commit crime there must be effective and swift punishment but this must also be 
matched by the chance for them to change, so they live law abiding lives alongside the vast majority of 
our citizens: (Scottish Labour: On your side 2003: 29-30) 
a 'Effective rehabilitation to cut crime. Prisons are appropriate for many offenders and offences. But 
they can turn lesser offenders in to more serious criminals. We seek to prevent reoffending. ' (Scottish 
Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference 2003: 22) 
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court cases and as they return their lives to normal. ' (2003: 22) and `We have 
significantly improved the treatment of victims in the last four years. We will build 
on this, making sure the justice system protects victims' (2003: 25). 
Labour identify privacy protection and specialisation of prosecution 
procedures in relation to victims of violent and sexual offences (2003: 29) and 
consultation on issuing bail and remand in relation to protecting vulnerable 
communities (2003: 29) as specific policies which will protect the victims of crime. 
Liberal Democrats proposed to increase victims' rights through: 
" Additional support for the court process and beyond 
" Provision of more information to victims about legal process and decisions 
" And for vulnerable groups such as children through new additional legislative 
provisions (2003: 25). 
Therefore, there is a great deal Labour and the Liberal Democrats can agree on with 
regard to the victims' rights agenda. 
2.4.4 Economy and Finance 
Economic and public funding issues are an area of policy which overarches all other 
policy areas. The discussion of policies related to finance come under five headings: 
" Funding projects, principally PPP/PFI finance projects 
" Benefits funding, centred around fuel poverty 
" Bureaucracy or waste in the public services 
" Tax varying powers and the Barnett Formula 
" Privatisation of public utilities, specifically the water industry. 
All three parties share an ideological belief in the importance of state-funded public 
services. There are aspects of policy they all agree on, or on which they are close to 
each other but there are also notable areas of disagreement. 
The use of PPP/PFI projects as a method of public funding is a good example 
of the degrees of agreement and disagreement on some policy areas between the 
centre parties. PPP/PFI funding projects cut across many policy areas and are most 
closely associated with large scale public infrastructure investment such as building 
schools, hospitals, prisons and motorways. Whether one refers to the projects as PPP 
or PFI indicates either support or hostility towards this system of public funding 
provision. PPP clearly indicates the `public' aspect of the funding projects; this term 
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was adopted after similar earlier funding projects called Private Finance Initiatives. 
The SNP, who are against PPP/PFI funding projects, use the latter term which more 
clearly indicates the `private' sector involvement in public funding initiatives. Both 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats state a commitment to PPP but they do so in 
rhetorically different ways. For example, Labour actually give very little space to 
discussing PPP, but when they do it is entirely positive9, framing the use of PPP in 
terms of value for money in public expenditure, and contrasted with what they denote 
as 18 years of underinvestment by the Conservatives. PPPs are said to bring `results' 
and `quality' to public projects. The Liberal Democrats dedicate more space to 
discussing PPPs and begin by addressing `the debate' on the involvement of the 
private sector in public service provision. 
The debate about public as opposed to private provision is often misleading: 
there are some services that are best delivered by the state while others may be 
better delivered by private, voluntary or mutual organisations. (2003: 12) 
The Liberal Democrats go on to stress the public and non-profit (i. e. voluntary and 
charitable organisations) aspects of the PPP provision, explicitly connecting this with 
`efficiency'. For example, 
It is important that people get the best services in the most financially efficient 
way. We will: 
" Encourage greater choice in the provision of new capital for public 
services, by supporting the development of mutual organisations and 
non-profit distributing organisations to build and maintain public 
assets. 
" Seek to change Treasury rules to allow public authorities to borrow 
money and issue bonds, and ensure that rules relating to Public Private 
Partnerships enable different types of funding to compete on equal 
terms. This will create a range of options for public authorities 
considering capital investment, including traditional public 
procurement'. (Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference 2003: 
12) 
9 our responsibility is to get the best value from every public pound we spend. For over 18 years our 
public service infrastructure was under-funded and run down. We have invested through Public Private 
Partnerships in a way that brought results in new and refurbished infrastructure. Quality rebuilding that 
minimised the risk to public money and delivered projects on time and on budget. Labour will continue to support PPP and other innovative models. ' (Scottish Labour. on your side, 2003: 15) 
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Foregrounding public bodies, like the Scottish Executive and local authorities (2003: 
27) and non-profit organisations in the discussion of PPP, rhetorically stresses the 
`public' facets of Public-Private Partnerships. 
The SNP do not share a positive attitude towards PPP/PFI projects, portraying 
them as `privatisation' (2003: 5). Rather than these projects being value for money 
and efficient as Labour claim, the SNP define them as `an expensive privatisation 
project' (2003: 5). Here the `private' as opposed to the `public' aspects of the funding 
projects are emphasised, for example, 
Under this scheme, schools and hospitals are no longer owned by the public 
sector - they are transferred to a private consortium. Consequently, they are 
run for profit rather than the public good. By this route, money intended to 
pay for public services leaves the system to pay excess private profits... We 
reject this notion of PFI-privatisation. Scotland deserves better, and we will 
pursue polices that put public service before profit. (2005: 5) 
There are explicit contrasts made between public and private, where `the public good' 
is disposed of at the expense of `excess private profits'. Instead of being a method of 
producing efficiency in the public sector the SNP believe PPP/PFI is the cause of 
inefficiency and poor service' 0. Whereas Labour present PPP/PFI as a means to an 
end in terms of producing the public good, the SNP characterise is as a bar to it. The 
SNP's alternative policy is Not for Profit Trusts". Therefore, the two main parties of 
the centre disagree on this policy initiative, whereas the Liberal Democrats support 
the policy but more clearly espouse the policy framed in terms of public and non- 
profit aspects. 
There is a consensus in the centre over government intervention to reduce fuel 
poverty. All three parties commit themselves to an extension of schemes brought in 
during the Scottish Parliament's first term under the Liberal-Labour coalition. As 
discussed above, demographically Scotland is more disposed to government 
10 'PFI-privatisation is one reason why the number of NHS beds has fallen -but it is a trend we are 
committed to reverse'. (SNP: Release our potential, 2003: 8) 
11 'We reject this notion of PFI-privatisation. Scotland deserves better, and we will pursue polices that 
put public service before profit. We propose the use of Not for Profit Trusts for the provision of public 
sector assets. These would allow the main issues of ownership, control and finance to be addressed. 
Under our proposals, the assets would not be owned by a private consortium, whose first motivation 
was profit, but by a trust, whose first priority was public service. This would ensure that the asset was 
run for the benefit of the community. It would also mean that instead of being creamed off to pay 
excess profit, public money was channelled back in to the provision of services. ' (SNP: Release our 
potential, 2003: 5) 
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intervention to reduce poverty; therefore all three parties of the centre are in line with 
public opinion. They differ in regard to the focus of policy: Labour intend to target the 
elderly (2003: 34); the SNP also target the elderly as well as the disabled and families 
with young children (2003: 25) while the Liberal Democrats also aim at those with a 
disability (2003: 40). 
It was asserted in the previous section that the Scottish electorate are more 
hostile than their English counterparts to the privatisation of public utilities. In 
connection to Scottish Water the three centrist parties appear to be in tune with their 
electorate and each other. Although Labour is the only party to explicitly state they 
will not privatise Scottish Water 12, the Liberal Democrats13 and the SNP14 make 
supportive policy statements with regard to the publicly run utility, which suggests 
that they would oppose privatisation. Over how the utility would be run and financed 
the parties do differ, with the SNP opposing PPP/PFI models and proposing to 
`amalgamate the offices of the Water Commissioner and the Water Regulator' (2003: 
23), while the Liberal Democrats suggest the implementation of the Environment and 
Water Services Act to `ensure the sustainable management and integration of all 
policies affecting Scotland's water environment' (2003: 31). 
All three parties of the Scottish centre address bureaucracy in government in 
their manifestos. Bureaucracy could have come under policy issues connected with 
democracy because the issue might be discussed in terms of effective and accountable 
government and/or access to services. However, the issue is often framed in terms of 
financial waste, which also produces the democratic deficiencies. Bureaucracy is 
conceptualized by the centre parties' manifestos as an issue which cuts across many 
areas of government, including health, children's services, community support, 
government and its agencies and education. As such, policies to combat bureaucracy 
are found throughout the manifestos, in various policy sections. They have been 
drawn together as one area of discussion here because bureaucracy or waste seems to 
12 'We will not privatise Scottish Water and we will support it with the resources necessary to invest in 
our public water and sewerage services so that they meet health standards' (Scottish Labour: On your 
side, 2003: 35) 
13 `Implement the water Environment and Water Services Act to ensure the sustainable management 
and integration of all policies affecting Scotland's water environment... ' (Scottish Liberal Democrats: 
Make the Difference, 2003: 31) 
14 'Infrastructure investment is needed, yet the current models for investment (including PFI- 
privatisation) have failed to deliver the level of improvement needed and have hit consumers hard in 
the pockets. Consumers in Scotland need a tough new champion to protect their interests. We will 
amalgamate the offices of the Water Commissioner and the Water Regulator to give consumers 
protection'. (SNP: Release our potential, 2003: 23) 
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form a general issue, which like funding programmes (like PPP/PFI), is reducible to a 
general ideological principle to reduce bureaucracy in the system of government. The 
SNP identifies bureaucracy as affecting front-line services in the NHS (2003: 6-7): 
academic assessment in schools (2003: 11): and in the public sector and government 
where bureaucracy is claimed to produce a democratic deficit and affect the use of 
public services 15 . 
Educating children with special needs (Scottish Labour: On your side, 2003: 
20), patient care in the NHS (Scottish Labour: On your side, 2003: 26) and drug 
addiction support (Scottish Labour: On your side, 2003: 29-30) are some of the issues 
affected by bureaucracy which Labour propose to address in the next parliament. Like 
the SNP, Labour also recognise the need to act against bureaucracy in government for 
example they state, `we will act to end duplication, buck-passing and waste wherever 
it exists - whether it is in Scotland's devolved government or in its agencies' (2003: 
40). Patient service, specifically hospital waiting times is noted by the Liberal 
Democrats, like Labour and the SNP, as unduly subject to bureaucratic constraint. 
They, the Liberal Democrats, propose to abolish hospital trusts to remove a layer of 
bureaucracy giving more power to primary health care providers (2003: 5,7). Liberal 
Democrats agree with the SNP that bureaucracy affects academic assessment in 
schools (2003: 19) and they concur with the other two parties of the centre on the 
need for government to limit bureaucratic waste16, but also suggest that `the 
bureaucracy of government has adjusted rapidly to devolution' (2003: 11) and that 
governmental bureaucracy is really the fault of Westminster and Whitehall (2003: 11). 
A great deal of similarity can be seen between the parties of the Scottish centre 
over the need to cut bureaucracy and which areas of concern it affects. There is, 
however, very little in the way of blame for bureaucracy assigned by any of these 
parties. The Liberal Democrats do criticise external political bodies in London and by 
implication the SNP is critiquing current government policy. However, all three 
15 'We want to make the unaccountable accountable, and we want to reduce unnecessary public sector 
bureaucracy by transferring powers from unelected quangos to democratically elected councillors'. 
(SNP: Release our potential, 2003: 26) 
'We will cut the size of government, starting with a smaller Cabinet and less ministers. And we will 
abolish unnecessary tiers of unelected, unaccountable public bodies and release resources from excess 
bureaucracy'. (SNP: Release our potential, 2003: 26) 
`Cutting government down to size would reclaim our public services for the people'. (SNP: Release 
our potential, 2003: 30) 
16 `Scottish Liberal Democrats believe that government both central and local has a duty to taxpayers 
to spend their money effectively and wisely. (Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference, 2003: 
11) 
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parties are of the centre-left and therefore not traditionally committed to `rolling back 
the state' in the sense Conservatives mean to make government smaller. None of the 
Scottish centre parties really conceive of bureaucracy in the neo-Conservative sense, 
rather they frame it in terms of waste and inefficiency that hinders the delivery of 
public services. 
On taxation policy there is again a great deal of agreement in the centre- 
ground, but also notable disagreement depending on the context in which taxation is 
being framed. As was illustrated above, Scots have been shown to have different 
policy expectations than those in England and that some of those expectations appear 
to fall outside the remit of the Scottish Parliament. The Parliament currently only has 
very limited taxation powers, nevertheless the centrist parties, especially the Liberal 
Democrats and SNP, still present policies on taxation. What is evident from 
comparing the manifestos is that even though many of the powers associated with 
general taxation lie outwith the parliament the parties can still debate on the issues by 
the way they choose to frame the debate. For example, there is a three way consensus 
on not using the limited tax varying powers within the current devolved situation17. 
This consensus is a qualified one for both the Liberal Democrats and the SNP. For the 
Liberal Democrats not using tax varying powers is conditional on there not being a 
change of economic or political circumstances at the UK level (2003: 12). By a 
change of government at Westminster the Liberal Democrats refer to the 
Conservatives who may wish to reduce expenditure on public services and/or cut 
taxes, which would run against the centre-left consensus in Scotland. Non use of 
taxation powers is context dependent for the SNP as well; under the constitutional 
status quo of a devolved Scotland they would not use the powers (2003: 3-4). 
Other similarities over finance exist as both Labour (Labour: On your side: 
2003: 40) and the Liberal Democrats(Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference, 2003: 
11) support the maintenance of the Barnett Formula g; however, the SNP and Liberal 
17 'We will not use the income tax varying power of the Scottish Parliament' (Scottish Labour: On your 
side, 2003: 40) 
`The SNP will not increase income tax. You are already paying higher taxes for public services'. (SNP: 
Release our potential, 2003: 4) 
'We do not propose to use the tax-varying power. ' (Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference, 
2003: 12) 
's The Barnett Formula was developed in 1978 by the Chief Secretary of the Treasury, Joel Barnett and 
came into operation in 1980. Bogdanor explains that the 'formula entails that public expenditure in 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland is driven by the level of public expenditure in England, since it 
is the change in the English Level, agreed by English departmental ministers in Cabinet, which 
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Democrats also differ from Labour on other finance policies. The Liberal Democrats 
and the SNP appear to concur over business rates: the Liberal Democrats advocate 
reform of local government to `allow local authorities power over business rates - 
including the power to reduce them to attract business' (2003: 33): and the SNP state 
`We will reduce Scottish business rates to below the UK rate within the first term of 
our government' (2003: 4). 
A significant divergence over fiscal policy between the parties of the centre 
occurs when the SNP refer to Scottish independence; clearly political and therefore 
fiscal autonomy is a markedly different ideological and policy position between the 
SNP and the other two centre parties of Scotland. Therefore, the parties of the Scottish 
centre, when discussing financial policy at devolved elections, can evoke different 
contexts to discuss policies which are ultra vices. This is particularly so with the SNP, 
who at devolved elections are at least in part campaigning for Scottish Independence. 
In a similar vein Scottish Labour evoke Labour's economic record in the UK political 
context19 even though governance at the UK is not the issue at the devolved level i. e. 
Labour Scottish Executive ministers cannot claim individual credit for measures taken 
in the Cabinet at Westminster. Therefore, over issues to do with taxation, although 
one can observe notable agreement one can equally see that Scotland's constitutional 
status still plays a large role in framing the debate at devolved elections. 
2.4.5 Democracy 
Devolution of power to communities and public services and choice for the public in 
the use of those public services form a large part of all three centre parties' 
democratic agendas. Electoral reform of local authority elections is also shared by two 
of the three parties of the centre. 
determines the sum available to other parts of the United Kingdom' (Bogdanor, 2001: 243). The 
formula is a contentious issue as some view it as Scotland getting its fair share (or more than), while 
the SNP have based much of their argument for Independence on Scotland not getting its fair share, 
`Scotland's oil' being a case in point. 
i9 'We will use the opportunity provided by the strength of the UK economy with the lowest interest 
rates, inflation and unemployment of my adult life, to invest in the future' (Scottish Labour: On your 
side, 2003: 4) and 
'Devolution offers Scottish business the best of both worlds. The sound management of the UK 
economy by Labour and the independence of the Bank of England have shown us that our future need 
not be tied to the roller coaster, boom and bust economics of yesterday' (Scottish Labour. On your 
side, 2003: 6) 
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Labour and the SNP make similar broad statements about the need to devolve 
power in the running of the public services, however, the tenor of those statements 
differs in terms of the nature of the devolution. Labour's commitments focus on 
empowering those who work in education and health care sectors20, whereas the SNP 
concentrate on those who use those services21. The Liberal Democrats propose a 
similar policy to Labour over devolving power in education, stating `[We will] 
Devolve more power down to schools, including more budgetary control for head 
teachers' (2003: 20) and also pledge to empower people and their communities, but 
unlike the SNP this is less specifically for the use of public services but for 
community regeneration 22. 
Proportional representation (PR), for local authority elections, features as a 
policy commitment for both the SNP (2003: 27) and the Liberal Democrats(2003: 33); 
both parties share a longstanding commitment to a reduction of the voting age to 16. 
These positions on PR for local government are not advocated by Scottish Labour; a 
change in the electoral system would enact a tremendous effect on the composition of 
20 'We have taken the first steps to devolve decision making to those at the front line [of public 
services]' (Scottish Labour: On your side, 2003: 15) 
'In our first four years, we have worked hard to devolve responsibility and decision making to our head 
teachers. In the next four years we will do more so that they have responsibility for 90 per cent of the 
school budget through devolved school management. We will introduce greater flexibility for schools 
and education authorities'. (2003: 17) 
'We will enhance the head teacher's role by devolving 90% of decision making on the school budget' 
(Scottish Labour: On your side, 2003: 18) 
'Our commitment to devolving power and decision making to front line public sector staff is seen 
clearly in the approach we are actively taking to modernise our health service and put the patient at its 
heart'. (Scottish Labour: On your side, 2003: 24) 21 `public services should be under the control of the communities who use them'. (SNP: Release our 
potential, 2003: 5) 
'There are also some vital structural reforms to undertake which will strengthen the delivery of 
healthcare nationwide. We want to simplify the structure and create a more accountable and transparent 
service, with devolved powers to allow communities to shape services according to their needs'. (SNP: 
Release our potential, 2003: 8) 
'The SNP does not believe that politicians should have exclusive ownership of education policy. That 
is why we re-affirm our commitment to establishing an Education Convention consisting of 
representatives of teachers, parents, pupils, employers and wider civic Scotland'. (SNP: Release our 
potential, 2003: 12) 
22 'Scottish Liberal Democrats aim to empower people and communities to help themselves to achieve 
their fullest potential... We will: 
" Make people's votes count by introducing the proportional Single Transferable Vote for Local 
Governance Bill. Councils must be far more accountable to the people who elect them. 
" Reform local government finance. Replace council tax with a local income tax related to 
ability to pay and allow local authorities power over business rates - including the power to 
reduce them to attract business. ' (Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference, 2003: 33) 
'Giving people power over their homes and communities. People are the key to community 
regeneration. We will help the homeless and support people in all types of housing tenure to improve 
their homes and communities to suit their needs'. (Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference, 2003: 39) 
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local councils, many of which are currently dominated by the Labour Party. One 
major policy not mentioned here is the SNP's policy over independence which is 
clearly one connected with democracy, but which has been discussed in other areas of 
this and other chapters. 
Labour, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats share a commitment to choice in 
education. Labour23 and the SNP24 focus on choice for children while the Liberal 
Democrats25 also include parental choice. The three parties propose to increase or 
enhance pupil choice in relation to their curriculum, the SNP and Labour specifically 
identifying vocational training in comprehensive education. The Liberal Democrats 
also propose to increase choice in the funding of public service provision (2003: 12, 
33), emphasising the non-profit agents in PPP funding discussed above. 
Powers of international affairs are not devolved to the Scottish Parliament, yet 
all three parties on the centre ground dedicate space in their manifesto to discussing 
Europe. They make positive statements with regard to the European Union, but again 
it is the parties' relative positions on Scottish independence that is of central 
importance in differentiating them. All articulate positive statements about working 
with other EU member states26. The Liberal Democrats and Labour both make 
representations for working positively for Scotland in Europe for business and for 
representing Scottish needs in European legislation: they do this, however, within the 
rubric of constitutional union in the United Kingdom27. In contrast, the SNP argue for 
23 'We will improve the comprehensive system with increased pupil choice' (Scottish Labour: On your 
side, 2003: 17). 
24 'We will initiate a major consultation on extending pupil choice' (SNP: Release our potential, 2003: 
11). 
25 'Enhance education choices and opportunities, involving parents and seeking to empower children 
by involving them in decisions about their personal curriculum, while ensuring that literacy and 
numeracy remain central'. (Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference, 2003: 18) 
'We seek to involve parents more constructively in the education of their children and empower 
children by giving them more choice in a diverse curriculum'. (Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the 
Difference, 2003: 18) 
26 'We support the enlargement Europe and will work with the EU Accession States to develop close 
links between Scotland and the new EU members' (Scottish Labour: On your side, 2003: 42) 
'we will increase our links to Europe and the wider world'. (SNP: Release our potential, 2003: 2) 
'We will: Build on the interest the establishment of the Scottish Parliament has generated by forging 
links with new EU members states and developing countries'. (Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the 
Difference, 2003: 11) 
27 'We will ensure that the Scottish Parliament plays an increasing role in helping to scrutinise 
European legislation. We will work to represent Scotland in the EU, both directly and through the 
strength of the UK government. We will continue to champion Scotland's interests in appropriate 
Council meetings of the EU and inside the UK and will work with Scotland's MEPs to help promote a 
united voice in the European Parliament'. ( Scottish Labour: On your side, 2003: 42) 
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independence in Europe28, which they argue would give Scotland their rightful level 
of representation and a greater opportunity at prosperity. In this respect, the SNP are 
off public opinion as a majority of Scots do not favour further European integration. 
As noted above, slight majorities in each ideological group are opposed to the Euro 
and of ceding further powers to the EU (Curtice et al., 2002). The Liberal Democrats 
are also off public opinion over the Euro; they are more clearly committed than 
Labour to the introduction of the Euro29. 
2.4.6 Agriculture/Aquaculture 
The decline of rural fishing communities became a notable campaign issue during the 
2003 election campaign, and related strongly to the above issue of Europe and the 
associated Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Again, one can see striking levels of 
similarity between the centre parties is over how they propose to deal with the 
problems of rural fishing communities; and again where there are differences they can 
be drawn from ideological differences over Scottish independence. All three parties 
call for reform of the CFP. Alongside reform of CFP, all three argue for more local 
management of offshore fishing, creating a sustainable industry and support for the 
fishing industry and its coastal communities. On support Labour notes they are 
already delivering short term aid but also that they will assist in part by aiding fishing 
in diversifying the economy of the local communities. They state, 
To aid the sustainable diversification of these communities and meet public 
health demands we will support the development and marketing of 
commercial salmon market and the emerging markets of shellfish and new 
marine fin-fish (2003: 14) 
Labour speak of a move to a `sustainable diversification' of the local fishing economy 
along side sustainable (preferably) local management of fish stocks. The Liberal 
28 'Other small European counties have the power to compete on their own terms. They are led by 
politicians whose utmost priority is creating a better future for their people and their country. They 
have the advantage of sitting at Europe's top table and of arguing for their own interests and 
industries'. (SNP: Release our potential, 2003: 4) 
`Independence in Europe is our gateway to the representation we deserve. With independence, our 
Ministers will sit at the top table in Europe fighting for the best deal for Scotland'. (SNP: Release our 
potential, 2003: 24) 
7' 'We will: Encourage Scottish business, large and small, to accept the Euro where appropriate, prior 
to its introduction in the UK'. (Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference, 2003: 16) 
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Democrats have a similar agenda; however, the focus is different: they too note the 
financial support already given by the Liberal-Labour Executive and also link local 
management with sustainability. The Liberal Democrats articulate sustainability in 
terms of managing fish stocks, rather than the economic diversification of local 
communities (2003: 32). The SNP also call for the development of local management 
and direct financial support for the industry and local communities. On the second 
point the SNP give more detail that Labour and the Liberal Democrats, outlining plans 
for fleet management, business rates relief, and financial aid30. The SNP go on to 
comment that the fault for the `current crisis' lies with the UK government, stating 
that Scottish fishermen have received `second-class treatment... under successive UK 
governments' (2003: 24). 
2.4.7 Environment 
This comparison is done across Labour, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats' main 
manifesto documents. The Liberal Democrats also produced a separate Environmental 
Manifesto which is a more detailed document on this subject, which they point to as 
an indication of their commitment to environmental issues. Over environmental issues 
again there appear to be large areas of consensus in the centre-ground. All three 
advocate a green jobs strategy: Labour state `we will work with business to develop 
and implement a green job strategy' (2003: 8); the SNP provide a little more detail in 
their commitment, `A Green Jobs Strategy will be placed at the heart of our economic 
policy - offering employment growth in areas such as waste recycling, renewable 
energy, agriculture and public transport' (2003: 14); the Liberal Democrats state 
30 `To tackle the current crisis facing our fishing communities, an SNP government will take five 
immediate steps. 
First, we will implement a Recovery Plan that will include a range of fleet support measures, 
including tie-up schemes, allowing the industry to retain its critical mass in the face of current quota 
cuts. Although there may be a case for a limited voluntary decommissioning scheme, the wholesale 
decommissioning of the Scottish fleet will be rejected. 
Second, we will provide a package for onshore businesses including rates relief for fishing- 
related businesses adversely affected by the current restrictions, and further provide a support scheme 
to offset the loss of harbour dues caused by tie-ups. We will seek to take full advantage of EU financial 
support and demand assistance from the UK Treasury given that the UK Government signed up to the 
Brussels agreement. Specific measures will be provided to support the fish-processing sector. 
Third, we will move immediately to renegotiate the current EU fisheries deal and insist that 
Scottish ministers lead the UK delegation from now on. 
Fourth, we will use European and bi-lateral negotiations to begin tackling industrial fishing. 
And fifth, we will take steps to prevent quota falling into the hands of foreign fleets or being 
retained by individuals not actively fishing. ' (SNP: Release our potential, 2001: 17) 
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Our programme for government includes a strong focus on measures to protect 
and replenish the environment. Many of these, particularly recycling of waste 
and development of renewable energy, offer new opportunities for enterprise, 
innovation and business. Studies have suggested that more than 5,000 jobs 
could be created in developing renewable energy from wind, wave and tidal 
power. (2003: 16) 
The Liberal Democrats provide more detail than the other two parties on how the 
green job strategy would be achieved (2003: 16). Waste management features in all 
three parties' policy agendas. 
Labour (2003: 35) and the Liberal Democrats (2003: 38) propose action to 
address environmental justice, particularly in urban areas; and both, as part of their 
green jobs strategies, propose supporting business in the research and development of 
renewable energy sources and the SNP commit themselves to reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions in line with the Kyoto Protocol (2003: 14), and improving air quality 
(2002: 15). And the SNP31 and Liberal Democrats32 propose policies of energy 
efficiency, particularly in new buildings. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the policies that function as an expression of the 
ideological centre of Scottish politics. In doing so, it situated the political parties 
within a Scottish political culture, which was defined as being different from the 
political culture in England. More left of centre in attitudes and policy preferences, 
both the Scottish electorate and the party political makeup was shown to be markedly 
different to England. These differences have resulted in the Conservative Party being 
politically and ideologically isolated in the governance of a devolved Scotland. The 
other three parties, Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the SNP hold the popular 
political centre. In the context of the devolved parliament, where no party is likely to 
gain a majority, and three of the parties are ideologically centre-left, coalition politics 
31 'We will examine regulations to ensure the highest standards of insulation and construction methods 
deliver improved energy efficiency in all sectors. We will also encourage energy efficiency by setting 
targets and by consulting on the inclusion of a system of Energy Ratings for buildings in any schedule 
for sale or let. ' (SNP: Release our potential, 2003: 14) 
32 'We will: Define a new energy banding system to classify houses according to energy efficiency, 
offering tangible benefits to homeowners for energy conservation improvements they make to their 
homes'. (Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference, 2003: 41) 
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is more likely. McCrone (2001: 126) has commented that `In an important sense, 
Scotland's politicians are all Nationalists now' and along with public opinion Scottish 
national identity is politicised in a way that it is not South of the border. All three 
parties of the centre are seen as pro-Scotland by the general public. This nationalistic 
trend was shown to be a defining feature of Scottish political culture, and the centre- 
left parties have successfully linked national identity with centre-left social 
democratic ideals, effectively isolating the Conservatives and helping propagate the 
opinion that the Conservatives are a pro-England party. However, the three parties' 
differing positions on the constitutional status of Scotland play a determining role in 
the potential patterns of coalition. As Labour and the SNP are the two largest parties 
in the Scotland Parliament, with Labour the most unionist and the SNP the most 
separatist, a coalition between the two in the current political climate is unlikely, 
therefore the federalist Liberal Democrats, the fourth largest party in devolved 
elections, hold the balance of power. 
The latter section illustrated that while by no means identical in their policy 
programmes, the three parties of the centre in Scotland share a great deal across a 
broad range of issues in terms of both ideological goals and policy preferences. 
However, where there was significant difference the nationalist agenda could be seen 
at play. Labour contextualised arguments within a `successful' UK framework, while 
the SNP framed issues in terms of a need for independence. The economy and Europe 
were two such examples where the constitutional status of Scotland was brought into 
play. An extract of Jack McConnell's introduction to Labour's manifesto was used to 
illustrate that Labour at least felt a need to claim that politicians and parties `are not 
all the same'. This claim is important in light of this investigation which illustrates 
that the centre in Scotland is indeed crowded. The later part of McConnell's 
introduction further demonstrates the importance of framing the nationalist debate in 
Scottish politics, 
It is a choice between two futures. We can build on what we've started, inside 
the UK, using the powers of devolution to take our country forward or we can 
rip it all up and start again with the Nationalist's plans for a separate Scottish 
state and risk all the upheaval and uncertainty that would create at this difficult 
and challenging time in Scotland and elsewhere. (2003: 5) 
53 
This chapter has mapped the ideological centre in Scotland and spotlighted the 
importance of both a centre-left consensus and nationalist agenda to Scotland's 
political culture. This begs many more issues, which the following discussion will try 
to address. For example, now that more has been established about the content of the 
centre parties' ideologies, the thesis will explore the discursive strategies employed 
to: negotiate centre-left and nationalist ideological positions; project an image of 
themselves and their ideologies; and construct their opponents. In short, the thesis will 
further explore the discursive negotiation of the ideological landscape of devolved 
Scottish party politics. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONSTRUCTION AND NEGOTIATION OF IDEOLOGICAL 
IN AND OUT-GROUPS IN ELECTION MANIFESTOS 
3.1 Introduction 
As the previous chapter explored the content of Scottish party political ideology, this 
chapter will investigate the ways in which these ideologies are rhetorically 
constructed (portrayed in discourse) and negotiated (argued for in a competitive 
electoral environment). This is important because, as will be evident, the content of 
ideologies is not necessarily the same as how they discursively interact as instances of 
competing systems of group belief. In addition to these observations, the effects of the 
new devolved Scottish electoral system on the campaign discourse of parties will be 
considered. Where new systems of governing and competing for power have arisen, 
corresponding systems of discursive negotiation and competition for that power will 
be investigated. Initially, this chapter will provide an account of the environment, or 
rhetorical context, in which electoral discourse occurs. The importance of the context 
in which an utterance occurs and how this affects an analysis of political discourse 
will be emphasized and a framework of analysis will be suggested. Once established 
the methodology will then be employed to investigate examples of devolved Scottish 
electoral discourse from the 2003 manifestos. 
3.2 Rhetorical Context 
Elections are argumentative contests, with the electorate as final judge. Electoral 
campaigns form a significant part of the rhetorical context and the rules of their 
operation are heavily regulated by legal statute. How frequently elections should 
occur, rules of conduct and campaign financing, access to and balance in media 
coverage are all rule governed in the UK, with quasi-public bodies set up to oversee 
and regulate fair play (e. g. OfCom and the Electoral Commission). The regularity of 
elections is an important factor in the rhetorical context because it allows for parties to 
be judged on their performance. Those in power are judged on their actions and 
achievements, while those in opposition are evaluated on their success at critiquing 
and holding the government to account. This electoral context predisposes parties' 
arguments to `take place in a rhetorical context of justification and criticism' (Billig, 
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1996: 124). That is to say the rules of the game predispose the game to be played out 
as an argument. The nature of that argument is about attacking and defending one's 
own position, so that at the end of the game an external judge (the electorate) decides 
who has won. 
The reader with an interest in semantics will have noticed the conspicuous use 
of a gaming metaphor in the previous sentence. Chapter five will go on to discuss the 
importance of metaphor in conceptualising political competition, illustrating how 
`conflict' is intimately related to our understanding of political elections, and that this 
is constructed through the intertwining use of metaphors from the target domains of 
war, pugilism/sport and argument. For now the pertinent issue is that the process and 
context of argument is central for understanding the discursive performances of 
politicians. 
In his book Arguing and Thinking (1996) Michael Billig discusses the 
importance of the context in which an argument occurs to the explication and 
understanding of its meanings. He comments that the meaning of words is not fixed 
and that `the same word, or even sentence, may possess different meanings when 
applied in different contexts' (Billig, 1996: 121). This focus on the context of 
utterances resonates with the British linguistic tradition from J. R. Firth (1957) 
through Halliday (1978 and 1985) to the present day discourse and critical discourse 
analysts, such as Chilton (2004; 2005), Fairclough (1995a; 1995b; 2001) van Dijk 
(2002; 2006b) and Wodak (2001 and Wodak et al 1999). Register (context of 
situation) and genre (context of culture) are essential analytical perspectives of this 
tradition of linguistic analysis. Investigations situate instances of language as social 
products, which have connection to present and past texts; and are, especially in the 
CDA methodology, examples of social action. To fully explore the meanings in 
electoral discourse its texts must be viewed in relation to their context of situation and 
culture. In a CDA analysis, such as this, instances of electoral discourse are explored 
from the tripartite perspectives discussed in the introductory chapter, combining the 
social perspective of the previous chapter with a cognitive approach. That is, the 
investigation describes the linguistic features of texts, seeking to relate its features and 
meanings to the texts' context of production and reception, and the cultural 
significance of those meanings. The argumentative tradition in political discourse is 
an aspect of culture, and therefore central to appreciating the form of the discourse. 
Also, the time (election), mode of production (written manifesto) and current social 
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concerns (devolution, bureaucracy, youth crime etc... ) as features of register, are 
important for understanding the content and arguments. 
An obvious factor in the context is that participants in elections argue from 
different positions. The positions as indicated in the previous chapter can be 
ideological. In addition, parties' positions are to do with their relationship with 
institutions of power: whether they are in or out of government. In Scotland this is 
complicated by the fact that there are major and minor members of the executive. A 
smaller party holds the balance of power between two larger parties. There is also a 
superordinate context, the UK government, which is drawn on in arguments. The 
different positions are ideological, in that different parties have different sets of 
beliefs which inform and guide their arguments. In exploring the nature of electoral 
discourse, contributions to the argument must be put in their appropriate rhetorical 
context, be that in terms of a party's position in relation to holding power or their 
ideological beliefs. The following analysis will continue to add detail to this initial 
precis of the rhetorical context. 
The following analysis seeks to explain ideological discourse in terms of its 
patterns and structures. This is achieved through a critical discourse analysis and it is 
therefore very much a linguistic investigation of ideological discourse. It would be 
inconvenient to become bogged down in the vast canon of literature, ancient and 
modern, available on rhetoric - as interesting and engaging as that work is. 
Occasionally, insights may be drawn upon where appropriate and useful to this 
investigation. The use of the term `rhetoric' is twofold: firstly it is difficult to get 
away from the similarities between the work done here and the insights of the 
rhetorical tradition, particularly in treating political orations as systematic and 
persuasive instances of language; and secondly `rhetoric' is a word so closely 
associated in the popular vernacular with the discourse of contemporary political 
parties (though admittedly with quite pejorative connotations) that it would perhaps 
be perverse not to use it. `Discourse' might be the preferred term of some, particularly 
when exploring the operations of `ideology' and `hegemony'. `Rhetoric' carries 
suitable party political meanings for the analysis of political discourse, functioning 
like a sub-category of discourse with its wider social meaning. Unlike the context that 
inspired Fairclough's critique of the marketization of public discourses (1995), in 
election contexts the protagonists are quite clear and present in a way which makes 
the use of `rhetoric', with all its connotations of explicit persuasion, more appropriate 
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for describing inter-party competition. `Discourse' and `rhetoric' are, therefore, used 
quite interchangeably throughout this investigation; however the former will often be 
prefixed with `political', `party-political' or `electoral' where appropriate for 
clarification. This modern study of political rhetoric differs from the classical 
approach in that its interest also lies outwith the text (Fairclough: 1997: 87). This 
study is interested in how language interacts with context and attempts to make `clear 
links between linguistic choices and strategic functions' (Chilton and Schaffner, 1997: 
215) of electoral locutions. 
3.2.1 Exploring the rhetorical context 
Thus far it has been argued that when investigating party political and electoral 
rhetoric that discourse must be socially and culturally situated, and that these are 
important perspectives from which to analyse texts, in order to glean their meanings 
effectively. An investigation also requires tools to perform this analysis. The rest of 
this section will introduce the tools of analysis for this chapter, which will also form 
part of the analytical framework for further investigation. There are two main 
approaches employed, augmenting more traditional semantic and systemic functional 
approaches: the first is van Dijk's (1998) `ideological square'; the second is drawn 
from Chilton's (2004) deictic axes. 
In Ideology (1998: 263-276) van Dijk summarises the ways in which 
ideological discourses are ordered and constrained at both cognitive and social levels. 
Rather than just offering an investigation of the content and history of particular 
ideologies, van Dijk suggests a model to account for how ideologies in general are 
communicated internally to ideological group members, as well as to external groups 
and audiences. Most notably he postulates a cognitive strategy by which group beliefs 
are organised in competitive communication, referring to it as the `ideological square' 
(1998: 267). Prefacing this strategy is the notion that ideology functions, in part, to 
maintain group identity and solidarity and that group identity is contextually 
important in situations where groups are competing for scarce resources or power. 
Therefore, in competitive environments discursive strategies, derived from `mental 
models', will have a semantic effect in terms of the selection (or non-selection) and 
representation of information. Mental models are: `representations in personal 
memory of events or... of episodes' (van Dijk, 1998: 79); these models are also 
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subjective, derived as they are from personal experience (whether direct or indirect) 
of the world. Therefore discursive strategies, founded on subjective mental models, 
operate with the `function of expression or suppression of information in the interests 
of the speaker/writer' (van Dijk, 1998: 267) in competitive scenarios. This strategy is 
the `ideological square', and is formulated as follows: 
1 Express/emphasize information that is positive about Us 
2 Express/emphasize information that is negative about Them 
3 Suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about Them 
4 Suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about Us. (van Dijk, 
1998: 267) 
The model represents a general principle in the organisation of competitive 
ideological communication: positive self representation and negative other 
representation. 
This investigation is interested in the above model because it provides a 
framework for examining the discourse of political parties as instances of inter-group 
competition. Or to use previously adopted terminology, to account for party rhetoric 
in terms of the dynamics of group cognition and communication. These dynamics 
form significant aspects of the rhetorical context, as well as other contextual features 
which are not directly associated with group belief and communication, such as 
constraints on the field (e. g. election debate on the economy versus parliamentary 
debate on income tax) and mode (e. g. manifesto versus televised interview) of 
communication. 
As ideologies are shared systems of belief, van Dijk links his work on 
ideology to theories of group identity. Given his `socio-cognitive' approach it is 
perhaps unsurprising that van Dijk finds theories emanating from social psychology 
the most useful, particularly Social Identity Theory and latterly Self Categorisation 
Theory. These theories are most appropriately represented by the studies of Tajfel 
(1981,1982) and Turner (1984), Hogg and Abrams (1988) and Abrams and Hogg 
(1990). For the purposes of van Dijk's work, as well as this thesis, Social Identity 
Theory and Self Categorisation Theory are important because they stress the 
significance of categorisation in the formation of groups and their identities. Billig 
observes of these approaches to group behaviour that `[t]he theory stresses that 
categorization is divisive, because categories segment the world... to be a member of 
an `ingroup' entails a categorical distinction from an `outgroup" (1995: 66). In 
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defining and labelling who `we' are, a group necessarily creates a boundary (mental 
or otherwise) between themselves and others. The motivation for creating and 
maintaining groups is driven, so the theories suggest, by an individual's need for a 
positive social identity which is satisfied by group membership (Tajfel, 1981). 
Positive identity is then maintained by encoding the in-group in positive terms which 
can then be re-inforced by inverse comparisons with out-groups. At this point one 
more clearly sees the connection between Social Identity Theory and Self 
Categorisation Theory and van Dijk's (1998) ideological square. The need for group 
membership to achieve a positive social identity, in conjunction with the necessity of 
categorisation to demarcate group identity, underpins the operations of the ideological 
square: principled distinction between in and out-group memberships, with strategies 
for positive self and negative other representation to maintain a positive social 
identity. 
Language plays a large part in the process of categorisation as it is one of the 
primary resources available to individuals by which they can signal their differences 
(this may also be achieved through other semiotic means, such as choice of clothing, 
or by physical means, such as building a wall to divide a community). Categorisation 
is most obviously achieved through the use of nouns, adjectives, collective pronouns, 
such as `we' and `them', and possessive determiners such as `ours' and `theirs'. These 
are the small words which point to the in-group `us' and the out-group `them'. In 
collectively labelling groups, utterers implicitly and/or explicitly construct audiences 
for their locutions. They speak for proximal groups and against distal groups. This 
brings the investigation to the second of its analytical tools: deictic analysis. 
Paul Chilton asserts in Analysing Political Discourse that utterances are 
`generated and interpreted in relation to the situation in which the utterer(s) and 
interpreter(s) are positioned' (2004: 56). The word `positioned' here can be 
understood (in this political study) in similar terms to the left-right ideological cline 
discussed in the previous chapter, where `left' and `right' describes parties' 
ideological differences through a spatial metaphor. According to Chilton, utterers and 
audiences can use three axes on which an utterance and its subjects (actions, actors, 
events, and audience) can be plotted: constructing spatial metaphors to orient 
interlocutors between features of the text, text production and text reception. These 
features may be understood as: 
9 where an utterance occurs or is received 
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" what an utterance is about 
" where interlocutors are in the proceedings of the utterance 
" what is happening at the time of the utterance's production and reception 
" what the social relationship is between interlocutors and the subjects of the 
utterance. 
This mapping is achieved through the use of `deictic expressions' or `indexical 
expressions' which are the `linguistic resources used to perform deixis' (Chilton, 
2004: 56). Deixis functions to orientate an utterance to situational features of an 
interlocutor's environment, or rather it anchors an utterance to particular aspects of 
the context of situation of the utterance (Brown and Levinson, 1987). 
There are three main types of deixis in English. Personal/social deixis marked 
pronominally by `I', `me', `you', `he', `she', `us' and `them' and by possessive 
determiners `my', `yours', `ours' and `theirs'. In English, personal deixis makes a 
distinction between first personal (singular and plural), second person and third 
person and most clearly indicates individuals and groups as distinct entities. Then 
there is temporal deixis, where adverbs ('here', `there', `now' and `then'), determiners 
('before'), prepositions ('after' and `since') point to temporal positions in the 
discourse world" of an utterance. And there is spatial deixis, in which the definite 
article `the' and the adverbs `here' and `there' can denote a spatial position. From the 
perspective of ideological group discourse, the deictic centre i. e. the point from which 
the utterance emanates is the `we' of the group, situated in the spatial `here' and the 
temporal `now'. All other subjects are plotted in relation to this centre. 
Chilton's (2004) analysis proposes three dimensions of deixis, which he calls 
`axes'. The spatial and temporal dimensions are probably most familiar to readers and 
are representative of the above examples. The spatial axis plots an antithetically distal 
position relative to the `here' of an utterance: for example `here in the West we 
believe in democracy, unlike in the Middle East', deictic expressions `here', `in' and 
`the West' point to the physically present context, whereas `in' and `the Middle East' 
plot distal points for subjects removed from that physically present context. Similarly, 
the temporal axis plots points relative to the `now' of an utterance, where subjects are 
encoded as either in the past or of the future. These two axes also facilitate the 
encoding of personal/social deixis, where individuals or groups are plotted and 
33 That is the discursive representation of the world created by an utterance, which is not the same as, though it stands in relation to, the `real' world. See Chilton (2004: 54-56). 
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conceptualised as being sometimes temporally, but more often spatially distal from 
the `I' or `we' of the utterance. Chilton does not separate personal/social deixis out 
from the spatial or temporal axes (though he does note that they usually are) probably 
because `them' or `you', realised as psychologically distal, implicitly encodes 
separateness from `I' or `we'. This is to underline a more general point about all the 
deictic axes: they are all conceptually realised through spatial metaphors (or in Lakoff 
and Johnson's (1980) term `orientational metaphors'). 
Chilton then adds a third axis: that of `modality'. This third dimension proves 
particularly interesting in an analysis of political discourse as it plots relative positions 
of truth and rightness. Chilton explains, 
The general idea is that Self is not only here and now, but also the origin of the 
epistemic true and the deontic right. The m [modality] axis seems to involve 
several strands. For instance, there are close connections between epistemic 
modality (having to do with degrees of certainty), and deontic modality 
(having to do with permission and obligation) and negation. (2004: 59) 
This dimension is therefore closely connected to morality and ideology; and again this 
is conceptualised in terms of proximity to the deictic centre. Expressing rightness and 
trueness in terms of physical locations appears to be borne out by familiar 
expressions, for example, `he is way out in left field on this issue', `you are a long 
way off the mark', `the parties are far from reaching an agreement', `the Minister's 
answers could not be further from the truth', or `the Greens are closer to us on this 
issue than the Tories'. Therefore, the morality of `rightness' and `trueness', in 
ideological terms, is expressed as proximal to the in-group, whereas antithetical 
positions appear as relative degrees of distance from that point. Chilton asserts, 
The polysemy of `right' and `wrong' supports the idea that epistemic and 
deontic scales are closely related: what is right is both truth-conditionally 
`right' and legally or morally `right', and correspondingly for `wrong'. (2004: 
60) 
The further away from the deictic centre one moves the further from the truth and less 
righteous one is. Closed class words such as modal verbs are most typically cited 
(Simpson, 1993) to represent deontic and epistemic modality e. g. should/shouldn't, 
will/won't, can/can't and must/mustn't. Open class word choices (or paralinguistic 
features like intonation in spoken discourse) may also perform the same function e. g. 
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`good/evil', `honest/dishonest', which are opposite values and therefore represent 
cognitively separate positions. Chilton then postulates that political discourse in 
particular tends to construct notions of truthfulness and righteousness as being values 
associated with the in-group party whereas the opposite values are characteristics of 
other out-group parties. This cognitive and discursive strategy appears to fit very 
closely to the socio-cognitive approach of van Dijk (1998) and Social Identity Theory 
and Self Categorisation Theory outlined above. Chilton's deictic axes expand well on 
van Dijk's initial framework, so that one can map the relative positions given to in 
and out-groups by in-group utterances. Taken together this framework provides not 
only principles by which ideological discourses are motivated and ordered but also 
how their meanings are constructed. 
t past 
t future 
Figure 3.1 Deixis Axes (From Chilton 2004: 60) 
One can represent the three dimensions of deixis schematically, illustrated by 
Figure 3.1. The purpose of this discussion is to suggest those who create discourses 
and those who receive and process them will try to mentally `locate arguments and 
predicates by reference to points on the three axes s, t and m' (Chilton, 2004: 60-61), 
which are indexed by textual features of the discourse. Interlocutors identify 
coordinates on the three axes and use them to navigate and find meaning in the 
discourse as it progresses. 
However, it should be noted that Chilton uses additional linguistic features to 
plot positions on the deixis axes. Going beyond the traditional markers of deixis 
outlined above, also included are linguistic items drawn from open class words that 
still perform a similar pointing or anchoring function. For example `our' would be a 
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traditional deictic expression and could be employed by whatever hue of political 
party to point to the in-group, but `Labour', `Conservative' or 'SSP' are lexical 
choices that still deictically point to the political in or out-group. Similarly, the 
difference between traditional deixis and the expanded sense could be summed up by 
the distinction between the closed class word `here' and the open class word 
`Scotland', both of which could be used to deictically point to the same space 
(assuming the speaker is in Scotland). These latter examples are similar to what 
Higgins (2004a) refers to as `location lexical tokens'. In addition, months of the year, 
days of the week or numerals can perform this pointing or anchoring function within a 
text. 
This does not mean that meaning is fixed and predetermined and that the 
coordinates which the utterer uses are read and interpreted in the same way by 
receivers of the utterance. On the contrary, audiences are not passive and the 
meanings they potentially read are many and varied. There is a wealth of material 
available on meaning and audiences and it will not be regurgitated at great length 
here34. For the purpose of this argument, nevertheless, something of the subjectivity 
of meaning should be broached. Fiske suggests that, 
The production of meaning from a text follows much the same process as the 
construction of subjectivity within society. The reader produces meanings that 
derive from the intersection of his/her social history with the social forces 
structured into the text. The moment of reading is when the discourses of the 
reader meet the discourses of the text. When these discourses bear different 
interests reading becomes a reconciliation of this conflict. (1987: 82-83) 
While the meanings of a text are constrained by contextual features (partly in terms of 
contexts of situation and culture touched on earlier) but also in the representations an 
utterer selects, each individual reader brings an equally unique set of `diverse cultural 
resources' (Lunt and Livingson, 2001: 590) to the decoding of a text. In this 
understanding meaning is negotiated quite actively, with individuals using their 
different knowledge, experiences, histories and opinions to decode meaning. 
Members of the same social group, who share similar social experiences and 
beliefs, might then be expected to produce similar meanings from a reading (still 
allowing for individual variability). Correspondingly, an alternate social group with 
34 Good overviews of the text reception literature are available in Fiske (1987: 62-83) and more 
recently in Lunt and Livingston (2001). 
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different shared experiences and beliefs would produce a different reading. Therefore 
a word like `privatisation' might be read as a positive predicate by a Conservative 
Party supporter and plotted as proximal to the deictic centre on the m axis. However, 
the same word might receive an inverse reading by a traditional Labour Party 
supporter and as such the predicate would be plotted as distal on the m axis. The 
variability of the social position and experience of discourse participants is essential 
in explaining the subjectivity and vacillating nature of meaning. Social variability of 
individuals explains how meanings can change over time: as society moves on its 
changes inevitably affect the positions from which discourse participants encode and 
decode their discursive representations of the world. This is how a party can advocate 
a policy at one point in time but then change its support for it at a later date, in light of 
new experiences: for example, as the evidence of climate change has mounted 
mainstream political parties have begun to prioritise environmental policies. 
This chapter now has a framework with which to explore the party political 
rhetoric of manifestos. The framework includes: socio-cultural explanations of the 
rhetorical context of argumentative election campaigns; cognitive linguistic tools for 
the analysis of political discourse as a phenomenon of competitive group behaviour; 
and explanations of how the meaning of those group discourses is encoded and 
decoded. This chapter will now turn from general discussion of the analytical tools to 
their practical application. 
3.3 Rhetorical strategies for inter-group competitions 
If manifestos in parliamentary elections are the site of ideological conflict there 
should be evidence of the various party political protagonists trying to curry favour 
with the electorate. In line with the ideological square one would expect parties to 
make positive claims of their ideological in-group, while seeking to discourage 
support amongst voters for out-group opposition parties, by constructing negative 
claims about them. What follows will investigate how the ideological square is being 
negotiated in the manifestos of the devolved Scottish elections. There appears to be 
evidence for a material effect on the devolved political discourse practices because of 
a change in social practices, i. e. campaigning under a mixed and more proportional 
electoral system. The adversarial arguments are still in evidence but they exist 
alongside more co-operative rhetorical stances. Different strategies are dependent on a 
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party's position in the political field. Whether a political party is likely to be able to 
form political coalitions and with whom determines the nature and focus of 
ideological attacks. 
This analysis will be subdivided into three sections: the first will investigate 
the construction of positive in-group representations and the mitigation of in-group 
criticisms; the second focuses on rhetorical strategies employed by political parties for 
identifying with the electorate; and thirdly, discursive techniques for negative 
portrayal of out-groups will be considered. The first two sections deal with the 
construction of the deictic centre of the ideological in-group whereas the latter section 
considers deictically distal positions of out-groups. 
3.3.1 Constructing positive in-group representations 
Positive rhetorical construction of the in-group will be described by reference to 
particular features. A group can be described in terms of its attributes, actions and 
achievements, and these are encoded as being in the past, present or future. Positive 
rhetorical stances might involve combining multiple representations of attributes, 
actions and achievements, at different points in time: for example, `we believe in 
honesty and fairness (attributes-present continuous time) that is why we did X and Y 
(achievements-past time), and why we will go on to do A and B (actions-future 
time)35. In describing in-group representations in this way, contextual reasons for 
particular choices will be given. However, as Billig (1996) points out in his discussion 
of rhetoric, common sense is a valuable attribute for the rhetorical analysis of 
persuasive discourse. That is not to say that pointing out what might to some appear 
obvious is not a productive part of analysis, as from sometimes simple propositions 
interesting conclusions may be deduced. 
35 Chilton (2004) does not elaborate his description of the temporal axis to include aspect. This may be 
because as Quirk et al assert, 
`[A]spect is so closely connected in meaning with tense, that the distinction in English grammar 
between tense and aspect is little more than a terminological convenience which helps us to 
separate in our minds two different kinds of realization: the morphological realization of tense and 
the syntactic realization of aspect' (1985: 189) 
While tense is deictic, aspect is not; instead aspect encodes the way verb action is experienced or 
viewed in relation to time (Quirk et al, 1985: 188). For these reasons the temporal axis is a sufficient 
descriptive tool in terms of the cognitive representation of temporality. Aspect, however, provides an 
additional tool of the linguistic description of time in discourse, but it does not alter the nature of the 
continuum of the temporal axis, running from the past, through the present, to the future. 
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In the following example Labour constructs a positive representation of itself 
in terms of past achievements, `In our first four years we have secured the highest 
ever levels of participation in higher and further education - abolishing tuition fees 
and introducing a new Graduate Endowment' (On your side: Scottish Labour's 
Manifesto 2003: 8). Through the possessive determiner `our', Labour ascribes positive 
achievements to the in-group. The noun phrase in the initial clause `the highest ever 
levels', indicates a positive assessment of Labour's achievements, applying an 
orientational metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 14-21), to the numbers of 
individuals participating in higher and further education. The verb `abolishing' has 
positive connotations as it refers to the ending of what, at the very least the Scottish 
Labour Party and the Liberal Democrat Party, consider a negative levy on students. 
This extract is an example of a party indicating positive achievement, which carries 
the implication that if they have previously performed good actions, they will do so in 
the future. A party of government has the rhetorical advantage of being able to draw 
on actual achievements from their time in office. However, an important point to bear 
in mind is that two parties shared power prior to this election and as such two parties 
potentially campaign on the same policy record. Both Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats cite abolition of tuition fees and the establishment of the Graduate 
Endowment as positive policies of the in-group. 
A key aspect to Labour's construction of the ideological in-group, is how it 
portrays the relationship between Labour in the Scottish Parliament and UK and 
Westminster Labour Party. As might be expected the relationship between the two is 
depicted favourably, for example, 
With the benefit of Labour's sound management of the UK economy, we have 
made historic levels of investment in health and education. In the next 4 years 
we are committed to a further increase of 30 per cent in health spending and to 
taking our investment on education to over £4 billion. We have set national 
standards for quality and introduced inspection to maintain those standards 
and we have begun to take action to tackle poor performance where it exists. 
(On your side: Scottish Labour's Manifesto, 2003: 15) 
The in-group is portrayed positively through the representation of actions and 
achievements of the past, present and future. The preposition phrase `With the 
benefit' indicates positive value, while `Labour' in the first clause assigns that 
positive value to the wider British party, of which the Scottish party is clearly a 
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constituent. The next two clauses illustrate both a modulation between UK Labour 
and Scottish Labour and representations of past present and future actions and 
achievements. With `we are committed to' (attribute-present) and `our investment' 
(action-present continuous) of the second sentence, and the `We have set' (action- 
past) and `we have begun to tackle' (action-past) of the third sentence refers to 
Scottish Labour in the Scottish Parliament, though the pronominal usage is slightly 
ambiguous. Ambiguity adds to the construction of a positive and close relationship 
between the two levels of UK governance under Labour, at least in this context. As 
noted in chapter 2, Scottish Labour draws on the achievements of the UK Labour 
government, even though decisions taken at that level lay outwith the Scottish 
Parliament. 
The relationship between Labour in the Scottish Parliament and Labour in the 
UK is made more explicit in the following examples, `The work we have embarked 
on with our partners in the UK government, to guarantee a minimum wage of £5.18 
an hour for NHS staff... ' (2003: 25) and `Working in partnership with the UK 
government we have already made real progress in tackling poverty in Scotland' 
(2003: 33). Labour in government at Westminster is metonymically referred to as `the 
UK government', and the relationship between the two levels of government, and 
indeed the party at those two levels is described as a `partnership' (implying equality 
rather than a constituent or subservient relationship). This `partnership' is positively 
characterised by attributed achievements, such as a guaranteed minimum wage and 
`progress in tackling poverty in Scotland'. Therefore, both Scottish Labour and the 
Labour government at Westminster are defined as the ideological in-group. This 
demonstrates the point made in the previous chapter; the limited powers of the 
Parliament do not constrain the frames of reference drawn on in making political 
arguments, when the parties discuss policy in the devolved elections. Therefore, in 
this example Labour draw on perceived UK successes/strengths in the positive 
discursive construction of the in-group. Unionism is therefore ideologically at play 
here in the identity of the in-group. 
The SNP employ strategies which differ from Labour because they are the 
main party of opposition in the devolved assembly. Because they are not in power it is 
difficult for the SNP to construct representations which encode achievements, 
therefore, one would expect a greater emphasis on attributes and future actions (if 
they obtain power). Early on in their manifesto the SNP explicitly state what it 
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considers to be attributes of the ideological in-group, `Our values in government will 
be fairness, honesty and equality of opportunity' (Release our potential: SNP 
manifesto: 2) and `Our decisions will be determined by fairness not cronyism, honesty 
not fiddled figures, and equality of opportunity not jobs for the boys' (Release our 
potential: SNP manifesto: 2). Both examples state that `fairness', `honesty' and 
`equality of opportunity' are part of the SNP's attributes not just now but also in the 
future. The implication these statements carry is that the opposite is true of the SNP's 
political opponents, therefore, negatively characterising the out-group, consistent with 
the operation of the ideological square. However, it will be shown below, in the 
discussion of mitigations, that the SNP have found ways around this problem of not 
having concrete policy achievements to draw on. 
In positively characterising the in-group the Liberal Democrats occupy a 
position currently unique in devolved Scottish politics. They are the only party to 
have been minority partners in a formally established and stable peacetime-coalition 
in UK politics, and are the only party then to go into an election campaign likely to be 
in coalition with either main party. One might expect rhetorical strategies to adapt to 
the demands of this new situation. 
As minority partners the Liberal Democrats may suffer from the potential 
perception of ineffectuality and therefore in positively constructing the in-group they 
attempt to address this problem, 
From free personal care to the abolition of tuition fees, Liberal Democrats 
have made the difference in the last four years. With bold new plans to 
promote better health, recruit more teachers and cut crime, people can trust the 
Liberal Democrats to make the difference again. (Make the Difference: 2) 
Not only are the Liberal Democrats stating what it is that they have achieved, listing 
two policies in the areas of health and education, but they also explicitly state they 
`have made a difference' (achievement-past) and that they will `make the difference 
again' (achievement-future). When compared to the Labour Party's claims of 
achievements one notices that the addition of the emphatic assertion of achievement 
(which the Labour Party do not do) is not only functioning as a positive 
characterisation of the in-group but also as a mitigation of potential criticisms of the 
in-group. 
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Other positive constructions of in-group by the Liberal Democrats include: the 
projection of the parties' attributes, stating they are `ambitious for Scotland' 
(attribute-present); and actions `[Liberal Democrats] want to improve people's health, 
raise standards in education, make Scotland safer and establish a better environment' 
(actions-future) (Making the Difference: 2). But then they again emphasis their `vital 
role' and their place in the political system, 
It is the Liberal Democrats who are best placed to deliver on the great 
expectations people have for the Scottish Parliament. We played a vital role in 
establishing it and have been responsible for many of its most radical reforms, 
including free personal care, the abolition of tuition fees and land reform. 
Liberal Democrats are determined to change people's lives for the better. 
(Make the Difference: 3) 
The in-group is represented positively by encoding past achievements. A `role' 
implies that there was more than one role and therefore more than one actor in 
establishing the Scottish Parliament, and they feel the need to define their own role as 
`vital'. This is not a comment on the relative goodness or badness of the devolution 
(its goodness is an implied given), it is a comment on the quality of their contribution 
to the policy of devolution. In contrast, Labour as the majority partner in the coalition 
and the party in office at Westminster do not feel the need to state their centrality to 
the delivery of devolution; after all they are the party that delivered the Bill in the 
Westminster Parliament. 
One can see positive in-group statements in the Conservative manifesto (Time 
To Do Something About It, 2003) for example in relation to policies on crime, 
`Scottish Conservative will reduce crime and the fear of crime' (2003: 7): on health, 
`Scottish conservatives are committed to a health service which is universal in its 
reach and available to everyone wherever they live. ' (2003: 11): and on business and 
industry, `We recognise the importance of the whisky industry to the Scottish 
economy and will continue to argue that it should be treated fairly. ' (2003: 19). The 
Conservatives demonstrate a strong commitment to these policy areas through the use 
of epistemic modality such as `will reduce crime'. Then they use the non modalised 
form `are committed' expressing the definiteness of Conservative commitment to law 
and order. The former is encoding a pledge to future action, while the latter encodes 
an attribute in the present. However, there are fewer instances of positive statements 
about the in-group in the Conservative manifesto, as compared with other parties. 
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This is perhaps because of the ideological principles of shrinking the state and 
devolving responsibility to individuals and communities. Therefore, there are more 
instances of the Conservatives pledging to do something which empowers others to 
then achieve particular goals. For example, 
We will scrap these targets and restore to head teachers the ability to set their 
own discipline policies including expulsions, detention and uniforms as well 
as the positive incentives towards good behaviour... This will enable them to 
exclude disruptive pupils and we will reinforce this by giving teachers the 
right to refuse to teach pupils with a record of violence. (Time To Do 
Something About It: 16-17) 
In the first two coordinated clauses the `we' of the Scottish Conservative Party 
pledges to perform certain acts, namely the scrapping of targets to reduce pupil 
exclusions and to give power back to head teachers. Therefore, power is devolved to 
another group and they then have the power to act. In this manner head teachers can 
`set their own' policies on school discipline. The Manifesto then goes on to suggest 
causatively that `This will enable them [the head teachers]' to do x for themselves. 
The verbs `restore' and `giving' both denote the passing of something between agents, 
and it is this language which reflects part of the Conservative ideology of shrinking 
the state and devolving power. Therefore, in making pledges which the Conservatives 
claim will achieve particular goals, they promise to do x or y which then empowers 
others to achieve the goals of the policies and ideologies. One should be careful, of 
course, on the basis of a few examples not to overstate a claim which links certain 
patterns of transitivity to a specific party's discourse. This could prove an interesting 
area of future investigation, but to explore it further here would be to neglect the 
current investigation. 
Positive construction of the in-group by the Green Party can be seen in the 
following examples, `Greens champion locally-owned business... ' (Reach for the 
Future: 5) and `Scottish Green Party policies are geared towards making a lasting 
improvement... ' (Reach for the Future: 7) and `The Scottish Green Party is alone in 
insisting that we must face up to this problem. Our policies are designed to address it' 
(Reach for the Future: 2). The Greens' actions are positively presented in the use of 
verb phrases `champion', `are geared towards making' and `are designed'. These 
represent their present actions as policies which will make `lasting improvement' and 
achieve potential future benefits. 
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There are, therefore, patterns which can be identified running through the 
various parties' rhetorical contributions. In positively presenting the in-group in their 
texts political parties generally encode the deictic centre of `we' in positive 
representations of their actions, attributes and achievements, in either the past, present 
or future. 
Mitigation against negative portrayal of the group, as the ideological square 
indicates, is another aspect of positive in-group representation. These rhetorical 
strategies work in similar ways to the above examples, in that mitigations defend 
against negative perceptions or accusations of in-group attributes, actions and 
achievements. Like positive projections, strategies for employing mitigations are 
determined by the current political context and a party's status in it. 
Contemporary political parties have begun to be criticised for the lack of an 
ideological divide and the increasing personalisation of the political process (Fowler, 
1991 and Stanyer and Wring, 2004: 2). Being seen to be different is important to 
campaigning parties for two reasons. The first is in respect to the rhetorical context of 
the election: voters have to make a choice. Even when the electorate has two votes, as 
in the Scottish Parliament election, a choice which privileges one or more parties over 
others is still necessary. Difference is then a prerequisite of being able to make a 
choice. In a system where there appears to be a lack of choice because the parties are 
perceived to be `all the same', the worry is that voters feel it is not a real choice and 
so choose not to vote at all (Institute of Governance, 2003). Therefore, the criticism of 
the similarity of parties is motivated by a concern over political apathy and declining 
voter turnouts, as much as the lack of difference in and of itself. The second reason 
difference is important to political parties is because of the psychological dynamics of 
group identity. If Social Identity Theory and Self Categorisation Theory are right and 
a positive social identity is bound up in group membership, then political parties need 
to maintain a distinctive identity in order to ensure the utility of party identity to 
individual members. Parties need to make clear their distinctiveness so as to satisfy 
the expectations of their affiliates. 
As noted earlier, Labour certainly felt a need to mitigate the `lack of 
difference' criticism, stating in Jack McConnell's opening statement in their 
manifesto, 
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The choice Scotland faces in the election on 1 May is not a personality contest 
between people with the same priorities, not a potluck between parties who 
have the same policies, and not incidental to the future of our country. 
Politicians are not the same and parties do have different priorities. (On your 
side: Scottish Labour's Manifesto 2003: 5) 
Labour uses this mitigation to establish a positive ideological position for themselves 
and a negative one for their opponents. The final sentence serves to set-up a niche for 
Labour's manifesto, which will stand in opposition to other political parties' 
manifestos. Saying that `parties do have different priorities' evokes the presupposition 
that Labour presumably has the right priorities. However, this claim of difference 
between the parties may seem questionable when considered against the analysis of 
the previous chapter, comparing policy positions of the main political parties. 
An opposition party faces a problem when campaigning; parties of office can 
draw on the laws and actions of their previous term(s), but as the opposition do not 
hold office it can be problematic demonstrating the party's achievements. This is 
particularly so for the SNP which until devolution had no numerical chance of 
holding office. However, there are rhetorical strategies which can be employed to 
assert achievements and therefore positively characterise the actions of the in-group, 
for example, `Since 1999 much of the SNP's drugs policy has been adopted by the 
Labour-LibDem coalition' (Release our potential: SNP manifesto: 8). Ideas of the 
SNP have therefore been `adopted' by the out-group of the `Labour-LibDem 
coalition'. Positively characterised SNP ideas and actions can then be proved to have 
demonstrable effect and validity. However, what this may also illustrate is the 
closeness, in terms of policy, of the three centre-left parties of power in Scotland and 
their compatibility in terms of power-sharing. 
Further mitigations by the Liberal Democrats as ideological in-group are 
illustrated by the subsequent two extracts, 
Scottish Liberal democrats believe the Parliament has achieved a great deal, 
but must be given time to reach its full potential. We campaigned for a 
Parliament that will succeed over the long-term and do not favour hasty or 
destabilising changes in its powers. (Make the Difference: 10) 
Scottish Liberal Democrats believe that the bureaucracy of government has 
adjusted rapidly to devolution but seek to improve it further. (Make the 
Difference: 11) 
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The Scottish Parliament and/or the Executive have faced criticisms of achieving little 
and not living up to the public's expectations. Overspending on the parliament 
building and the Conservative's characterisation the building as `Follyrood' are a case 
in point. Therefore, the Liberal Democrats as part of the coalition and the 
constitutional convention that helped bring about the Parliament, attempt to mitigate 
criticism of the institution and themselves. That is why they state they `believe the 
Parliament has achieved a great deal', but then go on to say it needs more time to 
achieve its potential. The metonymical use of `the Parliament' is a further mitigation 
of the ideological in-group as it obfuscates the party's role in the perceived legislative 
shortcomings of devolution. The Liberal Democrats also claim that the `bureaucracy 
of government' somewhat ambiguously `adjusted to devolution', however they `seek 
to improve' the situation. However, the point remains here that the Liberals seek to 
mitigate a potential criticism of them as a party of government. There is a 
presupposition that there is bureaucracy and an implication that devolution is 
something that one would expect to effect bureaucracy. It is the personified 
bureaucracy which has `adjusted rapidly' which again contributes to making unclear 
the Liberal Democrats' responsibility for bureaucracy in government 
As a party of coalition in Scotland one might expect to see the Liberal 
Democrats create space discursively for the possibility of partnerships and this is 
indeed the case, for example `We will: Develop partnerships with the UK 
Government where appropriate' (Make the Difference: 11). This example states the 
Liberal Democrats desire to `Develop partnerships' with an out-group the 'UK 
Government', illustrating an instance of a more co-operative discourse between two 
competing political groups. However, the manifesto still contextualises this 
accommodating position with the ambiguous qualifying adverbial phrase `where 
appropriate' - what amounts to an appropriate situation remains unstated. The Liberal 
Democrats' more co-operative rhetoric will become more apparent when the 
antonymic side of the ideological square is discussed below, in the investigation of 
out-group characterisation. 
3.3.2 Identifying with the electorate 
Parties are not necessarily campaigning to persuade electors to become prototypical, 
6 card carrying' party members, but instead to convince them to identify with the party 
74 
enough to give them their support, or to vote tactically in the party's favour. To this 
end, the campaign discourse of mainstream political parties is aimed at broad national 
audiences (as per the discussion of the centre ground in the previous chapter), as well 
as more specific groups or sections of the electorate. These targeted groups tend to 
reflect policy areas, in which those groups might have the most interest. Therefore, in 
campaigning on the business rates small business men would be addressed, whereas 
on equal opportunities policies women, homosexuals and/or ethnic minorities would 
be focused on. One would expect Scottish parties to address electors in a variety of 
different ways, and in doing so attempt to inculcate those groups with the interests of 
the party in-group. Indeed this is evident but what is also notable about the Scottish 
electoral context, as indicated in chapter 2, is the prominence of a nationalist agenda. 
How national audience(s) and party political in-groups are conceived in relation to the 
UK state differs in accordance with separatist and unionist doctrines, and this 
conception correspondingly effects how electoral audiences are addressed. This is 
apparent in both the construction of in-group's deictic centres and deictically distal 
out-groups. 
In the following example Labour describe the party in positive terms, while at 
the same time identifying those positive attributes or actions with specified groups of 
voters: 
Labour is on the side of people who want to set up their own businesses and 
on the side of those who want their businesses to grow. We will streamline 
support and practical help government offers them... (On your side: Scottish 
Labour's Manifesto 2003: 7). 
Business people are constructed as part of Labour's `in-group', as they attempt to 
discursively construct an ideological position that encompasses a voting group that in 
the recent past might not have been traditional Labour voters. This is achieved with 
the use of a conflict metaphor36 contained in the prepositional phrase `on the side', 
metaphorically including business people on the same army or sports team as the 
Labour Party and, if elected, the same side as the `government'. As expected, there is 
evidence of Labour constructing positive descriptions of itself and also an attempt to 
inculcate their ideology within the minds of voters by constructing their values and 
actions as the values of hypothetical voters. A similar example, which encodes the 
36 See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of metaphors of conflict in Scottish political discourse. 
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values of business and finance in the Labour Party ideology, is as follows 'We will 
build on the success of our financial services sector' (2003: 7). Labour is committing 
itself to future actions with the use of the modalised verb phrase `will build'. The 
`financial services sector' is denoted as `our', which refers to not just the Labour 
Party but the Labour Party and the electorate. Labour is constructing the entire 
electorate and the party as the ideological in-group. 
Parties who already hold office can face two conflicting problems when 
running for an additional term: firstly, they must demonstrate that they have achieved 
things while in office, thus demonstrating that they are effectual and worth voting for; 
secondly, they must create a space for themselves illustrating that there are still things 
they need to do, without looking as though they have failed in not already doing these 
things. That is why Labour asserts, `A lot has been done, but there is so much more to 
do. Together we can build a better Scotland' (2003: 5). The first sentence of this 
example fulfils both the need to demonstrate achievements and that Labour is still 
needed. In making these claims the Labour Party discursively align the electorate with 
the party in-group by use of the adverb `Together' and the pronoun `we', which 
rhetorically partners Labour and people. The people are the Scottish people in this 
instance, but as was noted above Labour can modulate between which national/state 
`us' they are referring to. At times it is a purely Scottish `us', sometimes a UK `us', 
while at other times it may be ambiguous as to which they are referring to. 
In contrast to the Labour Party the SNP have a more centrally Scottish 
conception of their ideological in-group. Like the Labour party, and as one might 
expect, they construct Scotland as part of that in-group, for example, `Only together 
can we release Scotland's potential' (2003: 2) and `Our approach will put Scotland in 
control' (2003 : 3). In the first example, the adverb `together' along with the 
collective pronoun `we' aligns Scottish voters with the SNP as the ideological in- 
group. The second example carries the implication that Scotland is not in control, and 
that the SNP are distinctive in emphasising that Scotland is at the centre of their 
concerns. This point is further illustrated by, `We will give our economy, the engine 
of our prosperity and our future, all the attention that it needs' (2003: 2) and `We will 
get our public services back on track after years of neglect and mismanagement' 
(2003: 2). The possessive determiner `our' refers to Scotland the nation, whose public 
services have been `mismanaged' by implied out-groups, but `we' of the SNP will 
manage the public services properly, therefore, positively characterising the actions of 
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the ideological in-group. In the context of the SNP's separatist discourse the out- 
groups are groups outwith Scotland, UK and Westminster based, as will be illustrated 
below. 
Identifying with the electorate is a rhetorical practice which all the parties 
enact and it would not be particularly interesting or illuminating to catalogue every 
instance of the strategy here. Needless to say, one can briefly summarise examples 
from the other campaigning parties. For example, here the Liberal Democrats speak as 
advocates for patients in healthcare, `We will put the patient at the centre of the NHS' 
(2003: 4). The Scottish Socialist Party constructs the in-group, often in terms of the 
nation and the people, for example `the SSP reflects the diversity of modern 
Scotland. '(2003: 1). The SSP even list all those they consider to be part of their in- 
group. The SSP as a socialist party claim to represent the working class; who is 
considered part of that class is defined quite broadly, 
Our members span the whole range of working class Scotland: fire fighters, 
nurses, call-centre workers, students, lone parents, shipyard workers, 
pensioners, ancillary workers, teachers, construction workers, clerical workers. 
(2003: 1) 
All these various professions are presented as paratactic, equivalent in their status as 
`working class'. A list such as this is rhetorically trying to extend the normal 
definition of what might normally be considered the working class (for example to 
include students and teachers), and demonstrate a broad appeal to potential voters. In 
similarly broad terms, the leader of the Scottish Conservatives identifies with an 
inclusive national electorate with 'I want the best for Scotland - for all of Scotland 
and its people' (2003: 2). 
3.3.3 Constructing negative out-group representations 
This section will explore how the various parties rhetorically construct their 
opponents, applying the analytical framework outlined earlier. Out-groups are 
constructed as deictically distal and consequently analysis has been broken down to 
illustrate the use of the three axes (spatial, temporal and modal) and presented in 
tables which demonstrate the construction of each party's out-groups. Tables are 
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presented with three columns: `Out-groups', indicating the type of group(s) identified 
by the uttering party; `Statements', giving a specific textual example from the party's 
manifesto; and `Deictic Axes', subdivided into spatial, temporal and modal columns, 
which illustrate the linguistic cues which construct the out-group(s) as distal. The 
initial column `Out-groups' is subdivided in three on the horizontal axis into `Party 
Political', `Non-Party Political' and `Locational', indicating three different types of 
groups. The first two are self explanatory, being the difference between `Tories' and 
`big business', whereas the third type of group needs a little introduction. `Locational' 
groups are those which are specifically identified as being located outside Scotland. 
The location of out-groups represented in the persuasive orations and rhetorical 
arguments of parties appears to be an important facet of Scottish political discourse. 
The data in the tables below is not exhaustive; examples have been chosen from the 
corpus of manifesto documents, for their illustrative purposes. 
Table 3.1 illustrates the SNP's construction of out-groups in their manifesto 
and the evidence here demonstrates important aspects of the SNP's separatist 
ideology, as well as the nature of the party political debate they are engaged in at the 
devolved election. Note that the modal column represents moral degrees of 
righteousness and truthfulness, so that an out-group's `piecemeal approach' marks 
out-group actions as morally distal. 
SNP 
Out-groups Statements Deictic Axis 
Party Political Spatial Temporal Modal 
Labour We have suffered because 'successive `We have 
successive Tory and Labour Tory and suffered' 
& governments have taken a Labour 
piecemeal approach to governments piecemeal 
Tory Scottish transport. (2003: 21) have taken' ipproach' 
New Labour The Tory de-regulation of has not been 
buses has not been a success success and 
& and neither has New Labour's either 
attempts to deal with the as... ' 
Tory situation in Parliament. (2003: 
22) 
Tory For too long our public sector `For too at best has been neglected. The needs long' mismanaged 
Labour of services, staff, and and at worst infrastructure have been at `successive ignored' 
& best mismanaged and at worst Tory, 
ignored by successive Tory, Labour and 
Labour-LibDem Labour, and now Labour- now Labour- 
Coalition LibDem coalition policies. LibDem 
(2003: 4) coalition 
olicies' 
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Labour-LibDem The PFI-privatisation policy of `beginning' PFI- 
Coalition the Labour-LibDem coalition rivatisation' 
is beginning to unravel. (2003 
8) is beginning 
to unravel' 
Non-Party Political. 
N/A 
Locational 
London government London government regards `London 'successive' 'their only 
the south east of England as government' economic 
the only powerhouse in the priority' 
UK economy, with successive 'UK 
Chancellors regarding it as economy' 
their only economic priority. 
2003: 3 
Westminster The Westminster-driven 'Westminster' 'The 'has been 
fragmentation and Westminster- damaging' 
& privatisation of our railways the UK riven 
has been damaging for our Government' ragmentation 'has been 
the UK Government economy.. . The privatisation d acknowle- 
of railway and signalling has rivatisation' dged as a 
been acknowledged as a failure even 
failure even by the UK by... ' 
Government. (2003: 21 
Table 3.1 SNP out-group deixis 
The above table shows that the SNP identify three other party political out- 
groups. Labour, the Tories and the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition are the 
unfavourable out-groups, opposed to a positive formulation of the SNP. In one of the 
tabulated examples `our' is used to formulate the ideological in-group as both the 
SNP and the voters, with `our public sector' denoting that the public sector is 
important to the in-group. Note that this is also an example of identifying with the 
electorate discussed previously. On the temporal axis these groups are constructed as 
having done things in the past and up until the present. These negative actions are also 
plotted distally on the modal axis, negatively characterising the Conservatives, Labour 
UK governments and the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition's management of the 
public sector as `mismanaged' with its needs `ignored'. Figure 3.2 further illustrates 
that the `us' of the SNP and the Scottish nation is portrayed as deictically proximal on 
both the s and m axes while out-groups and their actions are distal from the deictic 
centre of the in-group. 
79 
. .............. ..................... successive 
.. """Töry and 
Labour 
.......... . """ ................... ""........ """" governments 
m 
. _...... _........ . piecem 
........... 
we have sü,, 
Scottish transport 
r future 
Figure 3.2 SNP out-group deixis: Tory and Labour governments 
The SNP were the main party of opposition before the election and so quite as 
expected they criticise the current administration, identifying the `Labour-LibDem 
coalition' as one of their out-groups. In addition to PFI and public sector criticisms in 
the examples in Table 3.1 the SNP also identify the coalition as being at fault in the 
following: `[t]he Labour -LibDem coalition has ignored these views and continues to 
press ahead with dangerous and unwanted GM field trials' (2003: 16); and `[u]nder 
the Labour-LibDem coalition, Council Tax has risen by one third, yet local services 
have been pared to the bone' (2003: 26). The SNP label Private Finance Initiatives 
which contribute to public sector funding as `PFI-privatisation'. `Privatisation' 
connotes negativity in the discourse of the SNP, which is illustrated by verb phrase 
which further negatively characterised the actions of the policy as `beginning to 
unravel' - connoting failure and lack of control. The negativity which `privatisation' 
connotes here is context dependent, as noted earlier. One would expect Conservative 
readers to derive more positive meaning from the word. Labour and the Liberals do 
not describe PH or PPP (public, private partnerships) as `privatisation', as that word 
carries negative connotations in the political vernacular of the left37. The coalition 
37 How political parties discursively accommodate shifts in political position would be a fruitful area of 
analysis. As a party moves left or right in the political spectrum, which involves adopting policies and 
ideologies of previously unaccepted positions, they must reconcile this with their membership. Norman 
Fairclough discusses changes in the language of New Labour in New Labour, New Language? (2000). 
Particularly, in chapter 3 `The making of the language of New Labour', he discusses the effects of 
Thatcherism and Neo-Liberalism on the language of Labour. The Labour leadership has often tried to 
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`ignored' public views on GM field trials, which are further described as `dangerous 
and unwanted'. Where taxes have risen, services have not improved; in fact they have 
metaphorically been `pared to the bone', describing a result which negatively 
characterises their opponents. Therefore, the coalition's policies and actions in these 
areas are located distally on the m axis, away from the SNP and public's deictic 
centre. 
At first this rhetorical behaviour appears quite normal and expected; however, 
on a closer look at the manifesto the Liberal Democrats do not feature once as a 
singular object of criticism. In relation to the negotiation of the ideological square the 
Liberal Democrats are not labelled as an out-group by themselves; only in coalition 
with Labour are they an out-group. This is regardless of the fact that the Liberal 
Democrats are also a unionist party; yet they do not receive the negative criticism for 
this ideological position that the other two unionist parties of British politics do (see 
below). This is not in accordance with van Dijk's conception of the ideological 
square. In this instance one might postulate that a lack of direct criticism is most 
likely functioning as a tacit mitigation of the Liberal Democrat out-group's beliefs 
and actions. A rhetorical accommodation of this type is most likely due to features of 
the rhetorical context, created by the mixed, proportional system of voting, which 
makes the Liberal Democrats the most likely coalition partners for Labour and the 
SNP. The latter parties must be careful not to alienate the party which holds the 
balance of power; neither can they embrace it wholeheartedly. 
Van Dijk's ideological square cannot account for such an eventuality and 
therefore the ideological square requires some adaptation. In a competitive 
environment which is likely to require at least two competing parties to cooperate, to 
obtain and maintain power, then potential partners cannot be characterised negatively, 
as the normal functioning of the ideological square would demand. Such 
circumstances create, for want of a better term, a quasi-in-group, which is afforded 
some of the latitude of the in-group without being fully conceptualised as the in- 
group. Language here plays a key role in mediating these new identities. By referring 
to the coalition through a superordinate term like the `Labour-LibDem coalition' the 
Liberal Democrats can occupy a rhetorical space in SNP discourse which avoids 
criticism and doesn't block potential future collaborations. The importance of re- 
reconcile the adoption of free market policies and ideological principles by claiming they ultimately 
succeed in achieving `social justice', a central ideological principle of the left in British politics. 
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categorisation in reducing inter-group prejudice is supported by work such as 
Gaertner et al (2001)38. The SNP, however, can still claim they have been critical of 
the Liberal Democrats as the conditions of the ideological square and electoral 
competition require. This is an important rhetorical process which will be explored 
further in chapter 4. 
As a nationalist and separatist party, the SNP look upon those who hold 
political power over Scotland but reside outside it as out-groups. Modal and spatial 
axes coalesce as out-groups are both spatially and morally distal from the in-group. 
The spatial location of out-groups within the UK bears a direct correlation to their 
moral remoteness. Therefore, `London', `Westminster' and `the UK Government' are 
all objects of negative out-group characterisation. The metonymy of `London 
government' in Table 3.1 emphasises the theme of the sentence that the `south east of 
England' is the priority of UK governments based at Westminster, and therefore 
Scotland is not their priority. `Westminster' is deployed as a negative epithet to an 
undesirable policy in `The Westminster-driven fragmentation and privatisation'. 
London and Westminster are locations that function as metonymies for out-group 
governments that pursue policies which are not in the interests of Scotland. Similarly, 
`Tory and Labour governments', which are London governments, have their actions 
negatively described as taking a `piecemeal approach' to a Scottish matter. However, 
Brussels, Europe or the EU, although spatially distal, do not feature as out-groups. 
The lack of criticism is most obviously because this is not a European election, but 
then neither is it a Westminster election. Another reason is that the SNP's stated 
policy was for independence with full EU membership. 
Therefore, for the SNP ideological out-groups are defined as those political 
powers residing outside of Scotland, but within the UK, such as `Westminster', `the 
UK government' and `London government'. In addition to those out-groups defined 
by location, the SNP identify party political out-groups, including the `Tories', 
`Labour/New Labour', and the `Labour-LibDem coalition'. For the SNP, whose most 
pointed criticism is directed at the unionist Labour and Conservative parties, it is 
unionism that remains the main criterion for an ideological out-group. The unionist 
38 This work follows on in the tradition of Self Categorisation Theory and Social Identity Theory. 
Gaentner et al (2001) postulate that `With a one-group representation, bias should be reduced primarily because the social distance with former out-group members has decreased and the social distance with former in-group members has remained relatively close' (2001: 357) 
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parties are defined as promoting the interests of London or the South East of England 
and not Scotland. 
Labour's manifesto contains relatively few attacks on their opponents; this 
may be because they were the main party of power and the incumbent administration. 
Manifestos in general appear to contain fewer direct attacks on opponents than party 
election broadcasts. This is probably because manifestos' rhetorical purpose is more 
geared towards laying out the in-group's intentions. However, Labour does make 
several notable attacks, which clearly indicates who they see as their political 
enemies. 
Labour 
Out-groups Statements Deictic Axes 
Party Political Spatial Temporal Modal 
The Nationalists/SNP We can build on what we've 'inside the 'at this 'We can 
started, inside the UK, using UK' difficult and build on 
the powers of devolution to challenging what we've 
take our country forward or `our country' time' started... or 
we can rip it all up and start we can rip it 
again with the Nationalist's 'a separate all up and 
plans for a separate Scottish Scottish start again' 
state and risk all the upheaval state' 
and uncertainty that would 'risk all the 
create at this difficult and 'in Scotland' upheaval 
challenging time in Scotland and 
and elsewhere. (2003: uncertainty' 
Tories No service suffered more 'our 'under 'No service 
under eighteen years of Tory National eighteen suffered 
rule than our National Health Health years' more' 
Service. Turning the tide on Service' 
almost two decades of under- 'two decades' 'Turning 
investment and neglect has the tide 
been one of the biggest 'first four on... under- 
challenges Labour has faced in years' investment 
our first four years. (2003: 21) and neglect' 
The first term of the 'The first 
Parliament has also given a term' 'that was 
voice to Scotland's civic missing' 
society in a way that was 'during the 
missing during the Tory years. Tory years' 
(2003: 40) 
Non-Party Political 
N/A 
Locational 
N/A 
able 3.2 Scottish Labour Party out-group deixis 
The first opponent in the Scottish context is the SNP. In Table 3.2 Labour and 
the electorate, partnered pronominally in the use of `we', are positioned positively in 
the ideological square, metaphorically building Scotland; whereas the Nationalist's 
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want to `rip it all up', destroying the collective `we' of the nation's good work39. The 
`we' of the nation is also functioning, as Billig (1995) would say, to deictically mark 
the homeland. The `Nationalists' plans' on independence are negatively characterised 
as a `risk' to Scotland and this risk would cause `upheaval and uncertainty' at a 
`challenging time', plotting the SNP distally on the m axis. This attack on the SNP's 
policy on independence is a recurrent theme in the Labour campaign and chimes with 
other attacks, for example in one of their PEBs (see Appendix Text C), conference 
speeches and press releases. The Labour party as a unionist party refers positively to 
the UK, placing the constitutional arrangement on the positive side of the ideological 
square and closer to the deictic centre of `our country' Scotland. Labour make a 
contrast in the above example, between positive actions `inside the UK' and potential 
negative outcomes in `a separate Scottish state'. The two sides of the ideological 
square are used to contrast unionist and separatist ideologies, unionist concepts are 
deictically proximal whereas separatism is distal. 
The second ideological out-group explicitly identified in Labour's manifesto is 
the Conservatives. Table 3.2 cites all the explicit attacks on the Conservative Party in 
the manifesto. There is one other less explicit example below in which the one can 
infer that the Conservatives are the object of a rhetorical sortie. 
I still feel angry about all those wasted years when Scotland suffered under- 
investment and decline, and we did not have the opportunity to make our own 
decisions to change life in our communities. (2003: 3) 
These attacks are constructed as part of Scotland's past. Jack McConnell reminisces 
about `those wasted years', in which `Scotland suffered underinvestment and decline'. 
Although the Conservatives are not mentioned they form part of the global coherence 
of `those wasted years', `underinvestment and decline' being the progeny of 
Conservative rule at Westminster. In Table 3.2, the suffering of the NHS `under 
eighteen years of Tory rule', is the period of time since the last Labour government in 
Westminster. On the t axis the proximal positive present of Labour administrations 
in Westminster and Scotland has given a `voice' to `Scotland's civic society', 
39 The building metaphor is a recurrent theme of Labour's election discourse and appeared to be used 
without irony, despite the controversy over escalating costs of the parliament building at the Holyrood 
site. 
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proximal on the m axis. This is contrasted with a modally and temporally distal Tory 
past. 
Describing the Conservative Party only in terms of a historical period, as 
`those wasted years', `years of Tory rule' and `during the Tory years', renders them 
archaic, serving to contrast a positive Labour present with a negative Conservative 
past on the ideological square. The Tories are constructed as part of a negative past 
which was endured by the people of Scotland, a meaning conferred by the 
orientational metaphor `under' in `under eighteen years of Tory rule'. The metaphor 
of being `under' something implies oppression, and the negativity of lowness (Lakoff 
and Johnson, 1980: 15). Placing them in the past not only contrasts the Conservatives 
with Labour but relegates them to history: Tories are not the direct object of criticism 
but `Tory' is a pejorative epithet to describe a period of the past which carries 
negative connotations, functioning as a metonymy for the events of that period. 
What is significant by its omission is the lack of criticism of other parties, 
most notably the Liberal Democrats. Labour conceptualise both the SNP and the 
Conservative Party as their ideological opponents, though the SNP is perceived as a 
more serious threat, being the second party in the devolved parliament and opinion 
polls. Smaller parties might not be viewed as a threat to Labour's vote and therefore 
not worthy of attack; however, the Liberal Democrats as a centre left party and of 
significant electoral standing is a threat to the Labour vote, but is not the object of 
attack, indicating the mitigation by omission of an ideological out-group. The 
implication of this is again that the Liberals are past and potential coalition partners 
and so a direct or indirect attack on them may affect further opportunities to 
successfully obtain power. This parallels the SNP's rhetorical strategy towards the 
Liberal Democrats and on this initial evidence amounts to something out of the 
ordinary for traditionally adversarial British political discourse. 
As the minority partner of coalition with Labour and a potential partner for the 
SNP the Liberal Democrats are constrained by this context in their production of 
election discourse. The SNP receive only one attack, early on in the manifesto, which 
plots their policy on independence as modally distal, i. e. that it is morally wrong to 
put independence above education and health policy. In this example the t and m axes 
converge as the modal auxiliary helps construct the potential future actions of the 
SNP, which are also characterised in terms of epistemic certainty. Similarly, the 
Conservatives receive only one rhetorical attack, which rehashes the traditional 
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argument of the left against the right that tax cuts will be at the expense of public 
services. More interesting is the Liberal Democrats' treatment of their coalition 
partners Labour and of agents external to Scotland. 
= Liberal Democrats 
Out-groups Statements Deictic Axis 
Party Political Spatial Temporal Modal 
SNP `The SNP will put will put' will put 
independence as a priority independ- 
before schools and hospitals. ' ence as a 
(2003: 3) priority 
before... ' 
Conservatives 'The Conservatives only 'only 
propose to cut services to pay propose to 
for tax cuts. ' (2003: 3) cut services 
to pay for 
tax cuts' 
Labour 'We have scrapped tuition fees 'Labour... 'Labour 
and brought back grants. We in England' have 
have made personal care free blocked 
for the elderly. Labour have '... can't these' 
blocked these things in trust Labour 
England. People can't trust ruling on 'People 
Labour ruling on their own. their own' can't trust 
The more votes we get, the Labour... ' 
more difference we can make. ' 
(2003: 2) 
Non-Party Political 
Whitehall We are sceptical of the value 'by 'has been set 'We are 
of proliferating government Whitehall' up' sceptical 
targets. A whole industry has of... ' 
been set up by Whitehall to 'the UK 
measure the performance of Govern- 
the UK government. (2003: 
11 
ment' 
Locational 
London Labour The choice is clear. Labour's 'London 'has not 
London government has not government' scrapped ' 
scrapped tuition fees or ... 
introduced free personal care. 
(2003: 2) 
Table 3.3 Scottish Liberal Democrat out-group deixis 
The out-group, Labour, are defined here as `Labour's London government, 
which is negatively characterised as not having done things which the Scottish 
Executive have claimed to have achieved, i. e. the abolition of higher education 
student tuition fees and the so called `free personal care' for the elderly. London 
Labour is, therefore, both spatially and modally distal from the in-group. Labour is 
`London' Labour, and not necessarily Scottish Labour, as the third example in Table 
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3.3 illustrates. Who Labour is in this extract is somewhat ambiguous; one might 
assume that it is Labour in general, with the prepositional phrase `in England' 
providing specific spatial deixis for non action by the party. Therefore, there appears 
to be mitigation, or avoidance of criticism of Scottish Labour. 
The `We' of the first clause, in the third tabulated example, denotes the 
Liberal Democrats as achieving certain policies. Other statements in the manifesto 
include `People can't trust Labour ruling on their own. The more votes we get, the 
more difference we can make' (2003: 3) and `Labour, on their own, would have been 
a disappointment' (2003: 43), which carries the implication that people should vote 
for the Liberal Democrats as coalition partners. The Liberal Democrats seem to 
accept, without explicitly stating so, that they will not be the largest or majority party 
after the election. From this position they then argue for as many votes as possible to 
make them effective (that is influential) coalition partners. There is no outright attack 
on the Scottish Labour Party but rather on Labour in general or with an 
English/London focus. Like the SNP whose attacks on the Liberal Democrats were 
mitigated by including them with Labour in the coalition, the Liberal Democrats' 
attacks on Labour are in terms of their behaviour in distal England and London. 
Therefore, the Liberal Democrats are discursively creating an ideological position 
which includes coalition, and then do not directly attack one of their potential 
coalition partners in the Scottish Labour Party. Their statements here suggest that 
they do not expect an outright win but rather seek greater influence in the coalition. 
`Whitehall' and the 'UK government' are also out-groups, negatively 
characterised as creating bureaucracy. Again the s and m axes converge, constructing 
out-groups that reside outside Scotland; this is a rhetorical strategy for developing an 
ideological position that appears to foreground Scotland, which is also to be expected 
in a devolved election where Scotland is more proximal to voters. The Liberal 
Democrats criticism of external (from Scotland) political agents is not from a 
constitutional perspective. Criticism of `Whitehall' is denouncing only a small part of 
the overarching state, not the system as a whole. Though they favour a federal system 
for the entire UK, the bureaucracy criticism is not used as an argument for it. If 
anything, holding power in Scotland has added legitimacy to the Liberal Democrats at 
Westminster elections. They can now parry attacks which claim they can promise 
anything because they will not win office. 
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Applying the deictic analysis one can identify that, like the other three 
mainstream political parties of Scotland, the Conservatives construct the alternative 
mainstream parties as out-groups. In addition, the Scottish Executive is also subject to 
rhetorical attack as Table 3.4 below illustrates. 
Conservatives 
Out-groups Statements Deictic Axis 
Party Political Spatial Temporal Modal 
Labour Labour's return to tax and 'Labour's 'return to its 
spend and its obsession with return to tax tax and obsession... 
piling on new regulations and spend' spend' threatens to 
threatens to impoverish us all. impoverish 
(2003: 19) 'us all' us all' 
Labour This has happened because 'This has 
Labour, the Liberal Democrats happened 
Liberal Democrats and the SNP all believe that because... 
greater government control, all believe 
& higher public spending and the that... They 
increased taxes and are wrong' 
SNP regulations that follow are the 
answers to all our problems. 
They are wrong. (2003: 2) 
Non-Party Political 
The Scottish The Scottish Executive is 'The 'they are 
Executive spending more on the health Scottish entitled to a 
service, but the people of Executive' better 
Scotland have paid the extra service' 
taxes to finance this and they 
are entitled to a better service 
in return. (2003: 11 
Locational 
N/A 
Table 3.4 Scottish Conservative Party out-group deixis 
The first and most obvious out-group is the Labour Party. The first example in Table 
3.4 of `Labour's return to tax and spend' besides being a typical criticism of the left 
by the right in British politics, is interesting deictically because it plots Labour as both 
spatially distal but roots the criticism as temporally in the here and now. For a 
Conservative reader, tax and spend is ideologically wrong (in this instance, the 
implication of the utterance) and therefore plotted ideologically distal on the m as the 
negative actions of the Labour out-group. The metaphor of `returning' characterises 
Labour as travelling through space, back to an old position on the ideological road, 
but simultaneously anchors the negative behaviour of the out group in the present. 
Labour as the object of criticism modulates in specificity; the distinction between 
Labour at the UK and Scottish level is sometimes unclear. In this respect the 
Conservatives mirror Labour, as the most unionist of Scotland's parties, in 
obfuscating the distinction between parties operating at different levels of 
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government. As the party of power, Labour do so to construct a positive picture of the 
in-group, whereas the Conservatives employ the opposite side of the ideological 
square. 
Under the Scotland Act 1998, although the Scottish Parliament does not have 
fully devolved economic powers, it does have the ability to vary the basic rate of 
income tax by three percent and it has control of local authority finance and business 
rates (Bogdanor, 2001: 205); therefore at first sight Labour in either political location, 
Westminster or Holyrood, could be the object of criticism. Whichever form of the 
Labour Party is the out-group, the Conservatives firmly identify themselves with the 
in-group of the electorate with the collective pronoun `us' in `threatens to impoverish 
us all'. The ambiguity between UK and Scottish identification is furthered as one 
reads on. The manifesto goes on to castigate Gordon Brown with the generic `it is the 
taxpayer who is funding the Chancellor's excessive spending spree... ' (2003: 19), 
referring to a Westminster politician, before returning the focus to Scotland with `in 
the coming year the average family in Scotland will be paying an extra £225 a year' 
(2003: 19). 
The Conservative manifesto also identifies the Liberal Democrats and the 
Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition as an out-group, referred to as the metonym of the 
`Scottish Executive' in the third example in Table 3.4. The coalition is negatively 
characterised by `they [the people of Scotland] are entitled to a better service in 
return', which carries the presupposition that the electorate are not receiving a good 
service for the taxes they are paying. This presupposition is therefore distal on the m 
axis as the negative and wrong actions of the out-group. Therefore, actions the 
coalition performed badly are subject to criticism. The Liberal Democrats and Labour 
are directly referenced for criticism with the relational clause `Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats are responsible' (2003: 4) for the public's negative impression of the 
Scottish Parliament. The negative characterisation of public waste by the coalition is 
reinforced by the use of the pun `Follyrood' for the Parliament building at the 
Edinburgh Holyrood site. 
Along with Labour and the Liberal Democrats the SNP are also an out-group, 
constructed negatively as all being ideologically similar; the second example of Table 
3.4. The adverb `all' denotes that the three parties are alike in their belief, a belief 
which the Conservative manifesto emphatically disagrees with and negatively 
characterises with `They are wrong', plotting them distally on the m axis. Therefore, 
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the Conservatives' ideology is positioned positively on the ideological square with the 
ideology of the three main centre-left parties of Scotland on the opposite side of the 
square. 
The Greens in their manifesto break with the rhetorical conventions of the 
above parties and do not directly label any other Scottish party political out-groups. 
Scottish Greens . 
Out - rou s Statements<<,: ' -` .- Deistic Axis 
Party Political Spatial Temporal Modal 
N/A 
Non-Party Political 
National Local councils have either `national' `have either 
governments been undermined or been 
undervalued in the past, undermined 
despite their far greater impact or 
on day-to-day life than the undervalued 
national government. ... despite' (2003: 9) 
The car lobby Too often attempts to `Too often' 
introduce greener transport 
policies are blocked by the `attempts... 
powerful car lobby. (2003: 12) are blocked 
b' 
Shareholders This would produce a `This would 
transport system geared produce... 
towards the needs of rather 
passengers rather than the than... ' 
profits of shareholders. (2003: 
12 
Locational 
N/A 
Table 3.5 Scottish Greens out-group deixis 
In Table 3.5's first example `national government' must represent current and 
previous Labour and Conservative administrations, but who is responsible for 
undermining and undervaluing local government is left unstated in an agentless 
passive clause. `National' provides a spatial anchor for the utterance, which is the 
antithesis of `Local councils'. The national government's actions are ordered on the 
negative side of the ideological square and, therefore, plotted as distal on the m axis, 
having `undermined' and `undervalued' local government. 
Although the Greens do not construct many political out-groups, this is not to 
say that they do not construct any identifiable out-groups, it is just that they are non- 
party political in nature. Business, particularly the `car lobby' and `shareholders', are 
the out-groups of the second and third tabulated examples, who negatively block 
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`greener transport policies', and who reward `shareholders' rather than passengers. 
The Greens construct their version of the ideological square with environmentalism 
(including social and environmental justice) on the positive side, while Western 
consumer capitalism is on the opposing negative side of the ideological square. 
Correspondingly `business's' actions and attributes are modally distal as they `block' 
positive action by the in-group. These antithetical positions, of positive and proximal 
in-group versus negative and distal out-group are discursively plotted in example 
three of Table 3.5, where the adverb `rather' grammatically sets in opposition the two 
sides of the Greens' ideological square. 
Finally, unlike the Greens, the SSP link big business and what they term 
`establishment' parties. As such the in-group is defined in opposition to the out- 
groups of establishment parties and big business or the `godfathers of global 
capitalism' (2003: 2). Establishment parties are identified as `the big four' (2003: 3) 
of Labour, the Conservatives, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats, and this negatively 
characterised orthodoxy is also referred to as `jaded mainstream politicians' (2003: 3) 
and by the metonymy of the `Scottish establishment' (2003: 2). As the in-group 
therefore the SSP is anti-establishment and as such they state that they will not follow 
the practices of those parties, `Our politics are not dictated by electoral pragmatism. 
We do not sanitise our principles in pursuit of media respectability' (2003: 1). 
Therefore, the in-group is positively constructed by defining it in opposition to the 
out-group(s). 
As a nationalist party, the SSP like the SNP identifies holders of political 
power outwith Scotland as ideological out-groups. Metonymies of external political 
power such as Westminster, London, Washington and Brussels mark those out-groups 
as both spatially and modally distal. The establishment parties and their interests are 
linked to those agents of global-capitalism, whose power and influence is an 
antagonism to the in-group. One sees evidence of constructing a link between big 
business and establishment parties in the third example of Table 3.6. Not only in the 
eyes of the SSP is there a consensus in favour of big business but the proximal `we' of 
the party is said to be up against antithetical and distal `wealthy opponents, bankrolled 
by rich business interests' (2003: 3). Therefore, wealth and business interests are 
values and attributes of the out-group, the antonyms of which are the values and 
attributes with which the `we' of the working class in-group can identify. The SSP go 
on to state explicitly that if they win power they `will stand up to the economic power 
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of the multinationals and the political power of Washington, London and Brussels' 
(2003: 6), clearly defining the opposing sides of the ideological square. 
SSP 
Out-groups Statements Deictic Axis 
Party Political Spatial Temporal Modal 
Establishment parties 'Some of these policies will 'the Scottish 
provoke palpitations at the establish- 
heart of the Scottish ment' 
establishment. ' (2003: 
The Big Four 'In this election, we are up we are up 'In this we are up 
(Labour, against wealthy opponents, against election' against 
Liberal Democrats, bankrolled by rich business wealthy wealthy 
SNP & interests. As a young, rising opponents' opponents' 
Conservatives) party which is rooted in the 
working class we cannot hope 'we cannot 
to compete financially with hope to 
the big four' (2003: 3) compete 
financially 
with the big 
four' 
Non-Party Political 
Big Business 'The Pro-big Business 'establish- 'has generated 
consensus of the establishment ment' widespread 
parties that has generated disillusion- 
widespread disillusionment in 'widespread' ment in 
politics' (2003: politics' 
Multinationals 'The SSP has the ambition of 'multi- 'will stand up 
winning power and nationals' to the 
establishing an independent economic 
socialist republic that will 'Washing- power of the 
stand up to the economic ton, London multinationals 
power of the multinationals and and the 
and the political power of Brussels' political 
Washington, London and power of... ' 
Brussels' (2003: 
Godfathers of global 'Entire continents are being 'Entire 'turned into 
capitalism turned into gigantic slave continents' gigantic slave 
labour camps, their natural labour camps' 
resources stripped bare by the 'global' 'their natural 
godfathers of global resources 
capitalism' (2003: stripped bare' 
Locational 
Washington 'will stand up to the economic 'multi- 'will stand up 
London power of the multinationals nationals' to' 
and the political power of 
& Washington, London and 'Washing- 
Brussels Brussels' (2003: 6) ton, London 
and 
Brussels' 
Westminster 'Nonetheless, as it stands, the 'the Scottish 'are heavily 
Scottish Parliament is a PG Parliament' censored by 
certificate parliament whose the grown- 
powers are heavily censored 'in West- ups' by the grown-ups in minster' 
Westminster' (2003: 
ante s. e Sir out-group aeixis 
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3.4 Conclusion 
The findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows. Firstly, it can be seen that 
not every party has the same vision of who their ideological opponents are, as this 
varies considerably across the political spectrum. For the four dominant parties of 
Scottish politics (Labour, the SNP, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats) 
their out-groups are predominantly party political in nature. However, even among 
those parties there are differences. Labour and the Conservatives tend to construct 
their out-groups mainly as Scottish in location, though the Conservatives are 
occasionally ambiguous as to whether they are referring to Labour as a UK party or 
just as the Labour Party in Scotland. These two parties are the most pro-union of the 
Scottish parties. Labour is the party of UK government at the time of campaigning, 
therefore they are less likely to construct out-groups which would politically 
compromise the union. The SNP, the Liberal Democrats and the SSP also add a 
locational facet in defining ideological out-groups. Both the SNP and SSP parties are 
pro-independence for Scotland (as are the Greens) and therefore identify political 
agents outwith Scotland as ideological opponents. Although ideologically federal- 
unionists in nature, the Liberal Democrats also define out-groups locationally. As the 
minority coalition partner that is not in power in the UK government, the Liberals try 
to characterise government without them as negative, i. e. `People can't trust Labour 
ruling on their own' (2003: 2). The final major difference is illustrated by the two 
minority parties of Scottish politics. Both the SSP and the Greens identify non- 
political out-groups, namely agents of global capitalism, such as `the car lobby' and 
`multinationals'. This is unsurprising from parties with either socialist or 
environmentalist ideologies. The Greens, however, do tend to be less pejorative in 
their characterisations and ambiguous when defining political out-groups, which 
reflects their stated desire to run a positive campaign. 
Devolution as the political system forming the context for these displays of 
ideology can be seen to effect those ideological utterances. For the Labour Party 
describing positively a `partnership' between Scottish devolved government and UK 
Westminster government necessarily optimistically draws on the newly established 
constitutional context, between national and devolved parliaments. Therefore, the 
Labour Party, in government north and south of the border and as ideologically 
unionist, defines the party in both locations as the in-group. For nationalist parties like 
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the SSP and the SNP, defining ideological antonyms to Scotland positively identifies 
the in-group with Scottish voters and constructs political foes that have no immediate 
relevance to the groups participating in the devolved elections. 
The chapter further demonstrated how the campaigning parties rhetorically 
constructed in and out-groups. This construction is affected by the ordering processes 
of the ideological square, which were demonstrable in manifesto discourse. In 
addition to the ideological square ordering groups on an antithetical basis, it was 
shown that in and out-groups are plotted discursively as being in proximity to and 
distant from the deictic centre of a discourse. Chilton's (2004) deictic analysis 
illustrated that the in-group was plotted as deictically proximal, whereas out-groups 
were deictically distal on the basis of at least one of three axes: spatial, temporal and 
modal. Proximal positions tend to correspond to positive sides of the ideological 
square, whereas distal positions plot the negative sides. However, the descriptive 
power of van Dijk's (1998) ideological square was found to be inadequate when 
applied to certain aspects of devolved Scottish electoral discourse. The ideological 
square is discussed further in the next chapter. 
The mixed proportional electoral system in particular can be seen to have a 
material effect in the discursive construction of ideological in and out-groups, 
especially for the three parties most likely to form a government. Labour do not 
strongly identify the Liberal Democrats as an ideological out-group, whereas the SNP 
only ever define the Liberals as an out-group in conjunction with Labour, as in `the 
Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition'. Labour as an out-group for the Liberals 
generally focuses on Labour as a UK party, ruling alone at Westminster; no direct 
criticism of Scottish Labour is made. Although the SNP are defined negatively as an 
out-group, it is only once in the entire manifesto. The negative comment occurs 
within the UK Party's leader's comments, at the beginning of the document and not as 
part of the Scottish leader's comments. The constitutional arrangements of devolution 
can therefore be seen to have a material effect on the ways in which parties 
discursively negotiate the political field. As the two dominant parties of Scottish 
politics and the two parties most likely to be either in office or the main opposition 
party, Labour and the SNP construct adversarial positions in relation to each other. 
This antagonism reflects old adversaries, which are traditionally played out in the 
Single Member Simple Plurality (SMSP) system of the Westminster elections, and 
also reflect the benefit both parties receive from the `first vote' in the mixed system 
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used at the Holyrood elections. However, because of the proportional `second vote' 
neither party is likely to obtain a majority in the Parliament. The Liberal Democrats 
obtain more seats than they would under a purely SMSP system and as they are 
centre-left ideologically they are more natural bedfellows for both Labour and the 
SNP (unlike the Conservatives). Therefore, because of the conditions created by the 
devolved constitutional arrangements, there are less than antagonistic positions 
constructed between the two main parties and the Liberals, discursively leaving room 
for the possibility of coalition. The ideological square requires augmentation to 
adequately account for discourse which involves instances of out-group 
accommodation and compromise. In such conditions, a quasi in-group category is 
necessary, where an out-group can be constructed in terms similar to the in-group: an 
allied out-group's negative actions/attributes/achievements can then be discursively 
mitigated on their behalf, either directly or by omission. This is another point 
explored further in the following chapter. 
The proportional aspect of the electoral system confers a more tangible 
opportunity for minority parties like the Greens and SSP to obtain elected 
representatives. These minority parties can obtain seats despite them being typically 
seen as being peripheral to the traditional mainstream of British politics. They can 
campaign more effectively on ideological ground either neglected or long since 
abandoned by the four dominant parties in Scottish politics. The `second vote' 
encourages voters to make an additional choice and although nothing prohibits voters 
from marking two votes for the same party, a second vote does afford an opportunity 
to make a distinct second choice. The minority parties, and the Liberal Democrats, 
have been quick to realise the potential of the second vote for their electioneering. 
Both the Greens and the Liberal Democrats ran a `use your second vote' campaign 
message in the 2003 campaign to encourage voters to make a different choice than the 
first vote. The presupposition of a `use your second vote' is that voting for the same 
party twice is somehow not using the second vote. This message implies that a voter 
should make an alternative choice, which is a very different method of voting than in 
Westminster SMSP elections. A voter can more easily vote tactically for a 
multiplicity of voices in Parliament, rather than bipartite division between a 
government and an opposition party. It was suggested that this situation has also 
affected the type of rhetorical proposition which the Liberal Democrats employ in 
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campaign discourse, with them proposing to be a balance to Labour governing on 
their own. 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the material effect on the linguistic 
construction of party political positions in the manifestos by the constitutional 
arrangements of devolution in Scotland for the Scottish Parliament Elections of 2003. 
The detail contained in the manifestos afforded an opportunity to look in some length 
at the ideological negotiation of the political field in these elections. This 
investigation illustrated that the familiar battleground of nationalism and unionism 
still plays a part in the fight for democratic representation in Scotland. However, 
because of the contextual conditions of the electoral system the two opposing sides of 
the argument have to construct potential alliances, i. e. between the unionist Liberal 
Democrats and the nationalist/separatist SNP. The parties' conceptions of what the 
nature of the relationship between Scotland and the UK is and should be still affect 
the manner in which ideological positions are constructed. Unionist Labour constructs 
a position of partnership, while the Conservatives tend not to draw heavily on 
negative comparisons between Scotland and the UK. The Conservatives in utilising a 
large degree of ambiguity when employing referential labels to Labour obfuscate the 
distinction between Labour in Scotland and Labour in the UK. Conservatives present 
UK Labour and Scottish Labour as a unitary body and in doing so illustrate the unity 
of their constitutional conception of Scotland's relationship with the rest of the UK. 
Therefore, nationalist parties defined locational non-Scottish out-groups, such as 
`Westminster' and `the UK government'. The exception to this was the Liberal 
Democrats who because of their need to demonstrate their effectiveness in a power- 
sharing executive constructed the 'UK government' and `London Labour' as out- 
groups. And finally, the electoral system for the Scottish Parliament has given 
minority parties a greater voice, as they can utilise the `second vote'. The SSP identify 
the traditional parties of UK politics as `the establishment' and link them with non- 
traditional political out-groups of capitalist industry. Whereas the Greens, similarly 
identify industrial organisations as out-groups they do not directly criticise other 
political parties. 
The following chapter will further explore the rhetorical strategies which are 
in evidence in the 2003 manifestos, particularly those of which mediate the 
relationship between the centre parties of Scottish devolved politics. However, these 
strategies will be investigated in relation to their manifestation in party election 
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broadcasts, another of the main texts of election campaigns. It will become apparent 
that these strategies are repeated across different modes of electoral discourse, 
reproducing aspects of the rhetorical form and content of ideological discursive 
strategies. 
97 
CHAPTER 4: RHETORICAL STRATEGIES IN PARTY ELECTION 
BROADCASTS: REDEFINING THE IDEOLOGICAL SQUARE IN THE CENTRE 
OF DEVOLVED SCOTTISH ELECTIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
Party election broadcasts (PEBs) like manifestos are a major set of campaign texts in 
a party's electioneering arsenal; so it is those texts that will now be addressed. This 
chapter will investigate rhetorical strategies voiced through the broadcasts. In doing 
so this discussion will expand on the analysis of ideological negotiation carried out in 
the previous chapter. The initial observations made concerning the operations of van 
Dijk's (1998) ideological square will be further investigated. Both chapters 2 and 3 
indicated that adversarial and cooperative rhetorical strategies are in operation in 
devolved Scottish elections; and that of particular interest were the three centre-left 
parties, Labour, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats. As such, specific attention will 
be paid to the ways in which the three centre-left parties of Scottish politics negotiate 
and construct positions in relation to each other, in the rhetorical space of Scottish 
political discourse. It will be shown that these observations add support to the 
previous chapter's call for a redefining of the ideological square; the implication of 
which is that the character of Scottish devolved electoral politics is somewhat 
different to the traditional adversarial paradigm of British politics (Bogdanor, 2001: 
285-286). 
Like manifestos, PEBs have received little scholarly attention; instead research 
has tended to focus on the impact of campaign reportage in the media (Pattie and 
Johnston, 2002: 334). However, of the work that has been carried out there are some 
noteworthy investigations. Pattie and Johnston (2002) assessed the impact of party 
broadcasts on voting behaviour in the 1997 British general election, finding that there 
were effects on those who viewed them. Broadcasts were shown to make voters more 
favourably disposed to parties and their leaders. Although there was no impact on 
Labour and Conservative supporters' voting intentions for that election, there was a 
positive swing towards support for Liberal Democrats after viewing. Pearce (2001 and 
2005) has taken a CDA approach to analysis, investigating personalisation and 
informalization in party broadcasts. Most interestingly, Pearce (2005), in a corpus 
stretching form 1966 to 1997, found an increase in informality over time. Rosenbaum 
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(1997: 41-77) provides the most comprehensive historical account of PEBs from their 
inception in the early 1950s through to the late 1990s. His study is situated within a 
wider discussion of the development of British campaigning methods. Many of 
Rosenbaum's observations supply the background detailing of the genre illustrated 
below. 
The work of Pattie and Johnston, and Pearce is relevant to this thesis because 
it has begun to investigate PEBs as texts involved in persuasive discourse. The latter 
explores some of the processes involved in persuasive public discourse while the 
former deals with effects of that discourse. The studies represent a meagre, but 
fruitful, beginning to the investigation of PEBs. More work is still to be done to build 
on Pearce's initial sorties into investigating the rhetorical strategies used in these 
largely under-researched political texts. This chapter will attempt to add to this work, 
by investigating some of the argumentative strategies employed in broadcasts by 
competing parties. At the time of writing there appeared to be no published research 
on PEBs for devolved Scottish Parliament elections; therefore this chapter will also 
begin to fill that gap. 
The first televised PEBs were broadcast during the 1951 general election 
campaign, with Labour, Conservatives and the Liberals all receiving one 15 minute 
broadcast. Rosenbaum (1997) divides the evolution of PEBs into three phases. The 
first phase, 1951-68, was characterised by their length, their monopoly on electoral 
broadcasting and a lack of sophistication. Broadcasts' simplicity were constrained by 
both the newness of the medium and the limitations of technology i. e., large, 
unwieldy cameras and expensive, time consuming editing. Broadcasts tended to 
consist of a leading party member(s) (not necessarily the leader) often talking straight 
to camera, reading from prepared notes, a so-called `talking heads' format still seen 
today. Other formats included a scripted interview and staged press conferences. 
Before 1959 general elections received no TV or radio news coverage and, therefore, 
PEBs occupied a monopoly of election broadcast material. Phase two, 1969-78, 
benefited from improvements in technology, which allowed for cheaper and non- 
studio based filming. This period also saw a greater degree of creativity in production, 
with soap-opera, TV advert and broadcast news formats being used, and in general a 
greater use of visuals. By phase three, 1978-present, Rosenbaum notes that `talking 
heads [were] decreasing' (1997: 59). Broadcasts became part of more integrated 
advertising strategies, coordinating with other party campaign materials. This more 
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commercial and integrated approach is often credited as beginning with the 
Conservative appointment of the advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi (Bruce, 
1992; Rosenbaum, 1997). By this later phase broadcasts are shorter and now range 
between 3 and 5 minutes in length. Reductions in length and the use of advertising 
agencies have led to accusations that PEBs amount to political adverts, though in the 
UK, broadcasts are still longer than their U. S counter parts. Unlike adverts political 
broadcasts have little regulation in terms of content and fairness. They are regulated 
by OfCom and the Electoral Commission regarding allocation of scheduling slots, 
which is decided by previous electoral representation. In practice the regulators rarely 
get involved, negotiations are carried out between broadcasters and parties. 
Although, PEBs are rarely considered examples of fine political programming, 
they still reach a mass audience, broadcast during prime-time scheduling, as well as at 
other times of day. Unlike manifestos, their audiences can be in the millions. The 
2001 and 2005 UK general elections saw Labour's initial broadcast receive 10 and 
11.9 million viewers respectively, the Conservative's 8.9 and 12.8 million, and the 
Liberal Democrats 8.9 and 13.2 million (http: //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/ukcpolitics, 
03.07.2006). Although Scotland is roughly one tenth of the population of the UK, 
proportionate viewing figures would still represent a notable mass audience for any 
party's broadcast. Since their post-war beginnings PEBs have been thought to have 
reduced in importance. Rosenbaum comments, `[t]his is due not so much to their own 
content as to a major change in the broadcasting environments - the fact that other 
political broadcasting has greatly increased' (1997: 74). This shift to more emphasis 
on campaign reportage may well negatively affect the primary importance and impact 
of PEBs in directly reaching voters. However, broadcasts still have an important place 
in the overall campaign strategy of political parties. Party broadcasts represent free 
airtime unaffected by journalistic questions or interpretation, an opportunity to 
communicate a message in precisely the way a party wishes it to be portrayed. And 
like manifestos, PEBs are political set pieces from which spin-off media coverage 
occurs, something discussed in the following chapter. Due to their shorter length 
PEBs have a much narrower focus than manifestos, perhaps only dealing with one or 
two issues. In general, of the broadcasts investigated here, they also tend to be more 
adversarial and negative in style; a point explored further below. 
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4.2 Argumentative Strategies 
This section will focus on how politicians structure their arguments to advocate their 
party's position. The structuring effects of van Dijk's ideological square, as in the 
previous chapter, will be shown to be at play. However, also as with the discussion of 
the previous chapter, evidence will be presented to suggest a reformulation of the 
ideological square to account for instances of cooperative discourse. In exploring 
these argumentative strategies the linguistic tools employed will be investigated. 
This analysis has categorised four main types of argumentative strategy in the 
texts analysed: firstly, those with an adversarial structure, which constructs the 
addressing party and its policies in positive terms and the opposition and their policies 
in negative terms; secondly, single-sided positive arguments, where only the positive 
side of an argument is presented without making negative comparisons with 
opposition parties; thirdly, mitigating arguments made against negative accusations; 
and fourthly, rhetorical strategies for discursively negotiating power sharing and 
shared policy achievements in an adversarial campaign. This is not intended to be an 
exhaustive list of rhetorical strategies. Instead, these particular strategies have been 
investigated because they relate to the negotiation of parties' ideological positions in 
relation to each other, rather than strategies for presenting various policies. Placing 
these argumentative strategies within the wider context of the devolved Scottish 
political environment will facilitate the interpretation of their meanings. Reflexively, 
this interpretation will further elucidate understanding of the nature of post devolution 
political discourse. 
Data in this study is referenced from transcripts of each party's broadcasts. 
Texts are labelled A through to F and a complete transcript of each is located in the 
Appendix. 
4.2.1 Adversarial strategies 
This strategy most comprehensively reproduces the structural properties of van Dijk's 
ideological square. That is to say, it structures arguments around the positive 
representation of in-group actions, attributes and achievements and correspondingly 
equivalent negative representations of out-groups. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, whether a party does or does not hold power when the election is called 
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affects the type of arguments parties can make: it is easier for those in power to 
legitimately point to achievements over the preceding term of office. Similarly, for an 
opposition party their rhetorical position allows them to point to the actions and 
achievements of the government, which they would necessarily characterise 
negatively. Nevertheless, adversarial strategies reproduce both sides of the ideological 
square, whether adopted by the opposition or governing party. 
The positive side of this strategy may be summarised with the following 
possible moves (where X represents a positive value and Ya negative value): 
" We have done X 
" We will continue to do X 
" We are doing X 
" We will do X 
" We believe in X/We are X 
The first four moves can apply to actions and achievements i. e. `we have reduced 
waiting lists' (achievement), `Scottish Labour continues to fight poverty' (action), `we 
have introduced harsher sentences and continue to speak out against racism' 
(achievement and verbal action). The fifth move encodes in-group attributes, as in `we 
believe in honesty' or `we are whiter than white'. A statement such as `we believe in 
our actions on child poverty' could be interpreted as embodying several moves. It 
could be an assertion of belief or an attribute, where actions/achievements have 
ideological connotations, and/or as an assertion of action/achievement. The point is 
that the above represent possible functional moves that necessarily require 
contextualised interpretation. As discussed in chapter 3, tense and aspect also play a 
role in representing actions, attributes and achievements, for example, in the encoding 
of past, present and potential future actions. As in the difference between the 
following assertions `we have put more money into the NHS' (present tense - perfect 
aspect) and `we are reducing waiting lists' (present tense - progressive aspect). The 
former claims to have achieved something (past action with a positive present 
consequence), while the latter encodes an action which is ongoing. As per the 
previous chapter, aspect would be used to encode the future. 
Similarly, the negative side of this strategy may be formulated in the following 
potential moves such as: 
" They will not do X 
" They did not do X 
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" They have done Y 
" They will do Y 
" They will continue to do Y 
" They believe in Y/They are Y 
" They said/promised they'd do X but did Y 
" They said/promised they'd do X but did not 
The second, third, seventh and eighth points would probably, though not exclusively, 
be found in the discourse of opposition parties, where they are critiquing the actions 
and achievements of those in office. Again these represent potential functional moves, 
rather than surface representations; and this is not meant to represent an exhaustive 
list, but represents examples from the forthcoming discussion. A more extensive 
study, focusing on the categorisation of potential rhetorical moves, could be carried 
out. However, what is of interest to this investigation is not the cataloguing of 
strategies but how and why strategies are used, and the meanings they produce when 
interpreted in context. That is, the focus on interpreting and understanding the 
implications and meanings of the presence or absence of particular strategies. 
In sum, adversarial argumentative moves are a formulaic discursive strategy 
employed in PEBs (and other spheres of political discourse), which presents a party's 
policies as a positive alternative to an opposition's negatively presented policies. The 
above, essentially, reduce to the propositions `vote for us because of X' and `do not 
vote for them because of Y'. It is a rhetorical device designed to persuade an 
audience. That audience is presented with two alternatives: a positive and a negative 
choice, as in, `Scotland faces a choice' (Text A), `you have a simple choice' (Text D), 
`a massive choice (Text B) and `there is a choice' (Text Q. In constructing this 
argument, linguistic tools are used: modality to emphasise obligation and duty or a 
lack thereof, and a desire or degree of commitment; transitivity to realise agency and 
responsibility in events; grammatical repetition and lists, expressing emphasis, 
equivalence or formulating contrasts (Atkinson, 1984); and similes, metaphors and 
puns to construct complex meanings. This adversarial rhetorical strategy mirrors the 
adversarial tradition of British politics and is used by Labour, the SNP and the 
Conservative and Unionist Party in their PEBs for the 2003 Scottish Parliamentary 
Election. The Conservatives and Labour are traditional adversaries in Westminster, 
whereas Labour and SNP reflect the main adversaries on the Scottish scene. The way 
these parties choose to construct their relationship in language (their rhetorical 
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strategies) reflects their adversarial relationship. However, as has been previously 
discussed, the electoral system and resulting make-up of the Scottish Parliament 
somewhat complicates the traditional paradigm of adversarial British politics. 
Nevertheless, this strategy provides some familiar ground from which to further the 
investigation begun in chapters 2 and 3; and it is to specific examples of the 
adversarial strategy that this chapter now turns. 
This first example is drawn from Labour's broadcast (Appendix Text Q. The 
nationalist agenda has already been identified as a salient and defining issue in 
Scottish politics. Therefore, it may be fitting to begin with a representation of the 
adversarial strategy which focuses on this issue. Labour asserts, `If Scotland votes 
SNP on May 151, on May 2"d the Nationalists will begin the process of breaking up 
Britain. ' In this extract the SNP's policy of independence for Scotland is formulated 
as a negative value by metaphorically referring to the process of creating an 
independent Scotland as `breaking up Britain'. Using conditional `If... ' helps 
construct a possible future action; and `Scotland' is the Actor in this hypothetical act. 
The listener is the potential voter but the negative connotations of voting for the SNP 
are not formulated in a direct address to voters, as in `If you vote SNP... ' using the 
second person pronoun `you'. Voters are collectively referred to as the nation, with 
the metonymical use of `Scotland'. Possibly, `Scotland' is used here to evoke 
nationalistic responsibility or pride and an implied set of responsibilities to the nation. 
In the main clause `the Nationalists' fill the role of Actor and are then responsible for 
the destructive process of `breaking up Britain'. An SNP policy is characterised as a 
negative value by portraying the SNP as the Actor carrying out a destructive process. 
Therefore, voting for the SNP ('If Scotland votes SNP') would result in the 
implementation of that `negative' policy. 
The hypothetical future constructed by `If Scotland votes SNP' indicates a 
strong prediction of result. Through the epistemic use of the modal auxiliary verb 
`will' in `the Nationalists will begin the process of breaking up Britain' a complex 
policy is represented in more definite terms. Alternative realisations such as, `the 
Nationalists would/could/may/might begin the process of breaking up Britain' 
certainly express a weaker prediction of result. The SNP's stated policy at the point of 
the election was to hold a referendum (if obtaining office), which would ask the 
electorate whether or not they wanted an independent Scotland. However, this SNP 
policy, is transformed into a more certain (`will') process. 
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After some more detail of the possible negative effects of independence, 
Labour presents itself as the positive electoral alternative with, `In Scotland today, 
there are more people in work and unemployment is at a record low'. Labour's 
responsibility is left implicit; their role forms part of the global coherence of the 
discourse, with Labour in office north and south of the boarder. That is, Labour's 
position as the power-holding party is a defining characteristic of the rhetorical 
context of their and other parties' utterances. Instead, the discourse in situated in both 
time and place. (The following analysis is in the Systemic Functional tradition of 
grammatical analysis. See Leech, Deuchar and Hoogenraad (1982) for a more detailed 
guide to the nature and use of transitivity labels employed in this analysis. ) 
circ: loc/place circ: loc/time 
[ (In Scotland) (today)... 
PP pr n AvP av 
This provides the context -'here' and `now' - for the following positive values of 
`more people in work' and `unemployment is at a record low'. Low unemployment 
and economic success are salient policy issues in election campaigns, with governing 
parties claiming economic success and opposition parties attempting to criticise the 
government's economic success and suggest alternative solutions40. 
Labour's role in the positive reality is implicit throughout. `Scotland' either 
forms a circumstance of location, as above, or fills the role of carrier/possessed, as in, 
carrier/possessor pr: possession attribute: possessed 
{[(Scotland) (has) (the lowest mortgage rates)... 
NP n VP v NP d adj nn 
Labour, in leaving itself implicit in the positive propositions of Scotland's proposed 
economic success, is closely associating itself with Scotland, the nation and its 
successes, implying the proposition, `voting for labour is a vote for economic 
success'. It should be noted, though, as was illustrated in the previous two chapters, 
Labour is more explicit in its manifesto in relating itself with UK and Scottish 
economic success 
ao Ipsos Mori is one of the UK's largest pollsters. From 1995-2005 they record issues related to 
education, health, law and order and the economy as consistently the most salient issues to voters (http: //www. ipsos-mori. com/polls/trends/importance-of-key-issues. shtml). 
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Constructing Labour policies and achievements in positive terms, contrasted 
with negative formulations of the SNP, forms the overall pattern in the discourse of 
Labour's PEBs and typifies the adversarial structuring of campaign arguments. 
`Scotland', with Labour implicit, is portrayed in positive terms ('Scotland has the 
lowest mortgage rates ever' and `In Scotland, we are building new schools, cutting 
class sizes, investing in education') and then the SNP's policy on independence is 
depicted as putting `all that at risk'. This strategy, therefore, encodes the rhetorical 
binary contrasts Atkinson (1984) explicates, which matches the discursive strategies 
of the ideological square. Labour choosing to use the unionist/separatist issue in their 
PEBs affirms the importance of the issue in Scottish politics as suggested in the 
previous two chapters. 
The SNP's PEB (Text D) use the same rhetorical strategy as the above Labour 
example. In a short film where the audience sees an old man waiting for treatment in 
the NHS and eventually dying, intermittent messages are flashed on screen, before the 
then party leader John Swinney directly addresses the viewers. The argument begins 
with negative assessments of Labour's policies on health. 
Labour said they'd reduce waiting lists. They haven't. 
Labour said they'd deal with bed shortages. They haven't. 
Labour said they'd tackle staff shortages. They haven't. 
In all three propositions Labour is said to have promised something, encoded 
by the projected clause with a verbal process `said' and a modalised form `would' or 
`they'd', which indicates strong commitment, from the epistemic system of modality 
(Simpson, 1993: 50). This forms the first half of an adversarial strategy; however, in 
this variation (Text D) instead of an opponent's position being constructed in terms of 
negative policies which they have done or will do, it is in terms of positive policies 
they promised to do but failed to deliver. Later in the broadcast, John Swinney goes 
on to reinforce the negative propositions of Labour policies in a direct address with 
informal syntax and a modalised categorical statement, `Vote Labour and you'll wait 
and you'll wait'. As with the previous example from Labour, this strategy encodes a 
cause + consequence, i. e. `if you do X, Y will happen', as in `Vote Labour and you 
will wait' versus `Vote SNP and they'll begin breaking up Britain'. Waiting for 
hospital treatment on long waiting lists is formulated into a pun on waiting for change 
under a Labour administration. This message recalls the preceding short film as well 
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as the SNP's first PEB of the election which showed people singing `Why are we 
waiting', in a pastiche of the black and white headshots of a United Colours of 
Benetton advert. 
The positive side to this strategy mirrors the negative formulations, putting 
forward the positive SNP proposition, `Vote for the SNP... and you'll see a 
difference'. Instead of `and you'll wait' it is `and you'll see a difference'. This time 
the use of deontic modality with `will', emphasising commitment to a positive 
position, employing the metonymy of `a difference'. The metonymy functions as an 
abridgement of `we will reduce waiting lists, we will deal with bed shortages, we will 
tackle staff shortages'. 
In this adversarial rhetorical strategy Labour is the object of the SNP's 
criticism. However, The SNP do not focus their criticism on Labour's power sharing 
partners the Liberal Democrats. As suggested in the previous chapter, this is possibly 
because of the Liberal Democrats' position as a probable coalition partner for the 
SNP. Therefore, both Labour and the SNP's omission of criticism of the Liberal 
Democrats in their PEBs seems to support the assertion made in the previous chapter. 
This point will be developed further below, as more evidence is considered. 
4.2.2 Non-adversarial positive strategies 
Unlike the previous strategy, the single positive case does not seek to persuade by 
presenting the voter with positive and negative alternative choices. Instead, only the 
positive case of the addressing party is constructed. The moves, therefore, are the 
same as those available on the positive side of the adversarial strategy above. The 
actions or existence of other competing out-group parties are not evident, they are left 
unmentioned. The Liberal Democrats provide an example of this type of rhetorical 
strategy in one of their election broadcasts (Text F). In this PEB the in-group party's 
position is set out in positive terms. For example, `Jim Wallace takes particular pride 
in what the Scottish Liberal Democrats have done for older people'. Using present 
perfect aspect, the Liberal Democrats refer to achievements in the recent past, with 
present consequences. This statement is personalised and anchored in the present by a 
statement in the present tense simple aspect `Jim Wallace takes particular pride', 
which models the party leader's feelings (now) on a presupposition of a particular 
policy achievement (of the recent past). 
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A similar positive formulation, from the same broadcast, constructs Liberal 
Democrat ethos and policy again in terms of the experience of its leader. The 
broadcast asserts, `With teenage daughters Jim Wallace knows the importance of 
education. He was determined to get university tuition fees abolished and he 
succeeded' (Text F). Here Jim Wallace, `he', is a Carrier assigned an Attribute, 
`determined to get university tuition fees abolished'. Jim Wallace did not just plan to 
do something but he was `determined' to do something and in addition `he succeeded' 
in the abolition of tuition fees, where `he' (Jim Wallace) is the Actor in the clause and 
`succeeded' a material process. The Liberal Democrats through Jim Wallace, 
according to this construction, tangibly achieved a policy objective; and it is an 
education policy, which along with crime and the economy are mainstays of election 
campaigning in Britain. 
The broadcast does not need to go into a detailed explanation of tuition policy 
for it to be used as a persuasive tool. This again underlines the point made in chapter 
3, that a feature of ideological persuasion is that detailed content of an ideology need 
not be communicated for it to be persuasive. For example, the Labour Party's 1997 
general election slogan `education, education, education' was not a detailed 
explanation of education policy but an expression of its value and importance. The 
educational mantra is also a three part list, the rhetorical force of which Atkinson 
(1984) explored at some length. Referring back to the Liberal Democrats claim on 
tuition fees, `abolition' might normally be associated with the ending of some 
negative practice, particularly a law or regulation, such as the abolition of slavery, or 
the abolition of apartheid. Use of `abolition' therefore confers meanings of negative 
restriction and oppressiveness onto that which is being abolished, in this case the 
`upfront' payment of university fees by students. Therefore, abolition from tuition 
fees implies freedom from paying fees; freedom carries particularly positive 
connotations which are conferred onto the tuition fee issue. Lakoff (2002) has 
commented on the power of language to evoke cognitive schema and persuasively 
frame policy issues. Meanings from one, perhaps unrelated, source domain are 
transferred onto a target domain, in a semantic process typically understood in 
metaphor. A similar process may be seen at work with the tuition fee issue. It is true 
that Scottish students do not have to pay tuition fees, and in practical terms that means 
at the point of delivery. Students, or rather graduates still have to contribute 
something to the cost of university education, only this is now after graduation rather 
108 
than at matriculation. The Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition also assert that 
graduates are paying to support the education of undergraduates from less well off 
backgrounds, rather than retrospectively repaying the cost of their own tuition. 
The most notable point about non-adversarial positive strategies, in relation to 
competitive political discourse, is the absence of criticism of competing parties. The 
following chapter discusses how `negative campaigning' became a salient issue 
during the 2003 campaign. Non-adversarial discourse may well be a campaign 
strategy to present a positive image to voters. However, it could also be a method of 
negotiating potential power-sharing relationships with other parties. This point will be 
developed in a subsequent section. Both the adversarial and non adversarial strategies 
discussed above relate to the construction of positive in-group representations 
introduced in chapter 3, as do mitigation strategies which will now be discussed. 
However, as will be shown, evidence points to the use of mitigations beyond the 
positive representation of the in-group party, which suggest a need to amend van 
Dijk's ideological square. 
4.2.3 Mitigation strategies 
In van Dijk's (1998) ideological square those constructing a discourse that involves 
conflict between groups in society, will not only emphasise their in-group's good 
qualities/actions but, when necessary, also try to mitigate their bad qualities/actions. 
Thus far the first two functional moves of van Dijk's ideological square have been 
focused on, in relation to the rhetorical strategies of PEB discourse, concentrating on 
positive in-group description and negative out-group description. The second half of 
the ideological square is now explored: the mitigation of negative in-group and 
positive out-group actions, attributes and achievements. Parties in power might well 
be associated with negative policies, actions or events, or opposition parties would 
characterise them as such. It is not in a party's interest to highlight its errors or 
perceived faults, but, with opposition parties (and the media) constructing criticisms 
on the basis of perceived or actual errors and faults negative criticism must be dealt 
with. It is sometimes necessary for these faults to be downplayed or mitigated in order 
to achieve their overall purpose to persuade voters. 
The three parties of the Scottish centre all have different critical issues they 
mitigate, due to their different rhetorical positions in the political field. The previous 
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chapter introduced several negative issues which the parties appeared to be mitigating 
in their manifestos. These observations are supported by evidence from the party 
broadcasts. The appearance of the same issues, mitigated in two different political 
texts, both of which are important in campaigning terms, indicates the validity of the 
previously stated deductions. The first example, illustrated here, is from the Labour 
party on the issue of the perceived lack of success of the parliament (Paterson et al., 
2001: 92-100). Second is the SNP's mitigation of their policy concerning 
independence for Scotland. And third are mitigations of critical issues concerning the 
effectiveness and credibility of the Liberal Democrats. 
4.2.3.1 Labour 
Heading into the 2003 election Labour faced claims that the Parliament in Scotland, 
or at least its Labour led administration, had achieved little. Such claims were 
formulated in the Scottish media and in opinion polls monitoring voter opinion 
(Paterson et al., 2001). These claims were significant enough for Labour to attempt to 
address and mitigate them in two of their election broadcasts (Text A and B). 
In first broadcast Text A their mitigation begins as follows, 
Sensor Pr: material Proj Token Pr: intensive Value 
{[ (You) (might think) 11 (the Scottish Parliament) (has been) (a disappointment). ]} 
NP pn VP av NP d adj n VP av NP dn 
Sensor Pr: material Proj Actor Pr: material Range Pr: material 
{[ (You) (might think) II (it) ('s achieved) (nothing). ]) {[(Setting up) 
NP pn VP aV NP pn VP av NP pn VP phrasal v 
Range Pr: intensive Attribute/Cir: accomp x Circ: extent 
( (the Scottish Parliament) (hasn't been) (without its challenges) but [ (in (just 
NP d adj n VP a neg v PP pr dnc PP pr AjP av 
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Actor Pr: material Range 
four) short years) (Labour) (has laid) (strong foundations). ] ) 
adj adj n NP n VP av NP adj n 
Labour foregrounds two proposed criticisms, placing them at the start of the PEB's 
discourse. The mitigation is negotiated through several linguistic means. Firstly, 
through transitivity, the metonymy of `the Scottish parliament' hides Labour's role. 
Secondly, Labour constructs the criticisms as a possible mental phenomenon of the 
listener/viewer, directly addressed with the second person singular `You'. The face 
threatening effects of this accusation are mitigated by employing the modalised form 
`might think', where `might' indicates weaker possibility. Formulating the criticisms 
`the Scottish Parliament has been a disappointment' and `it's achieved nothing' as 
potential projected opinions instead of material facts makes such criticism easier to 
refute. `You might think X' evokes a contradictory response `but you are 
wrong/mistaken' in argumentative discourse: this response might be perceived as 
face-threatening, and therefore Labour avoids constructing a contrasting clausal 
relation (Winter, 1977) such as `but you are wrong'. Labour does not construct a 
direct challenge to the proposed beliefs about the Scottish Parliament; instead they 
move to refuting the propositions without the use of a clause relational `but' e. g. `You 
might think it's achieved nothing. Setting up the Scottish Parliament hasn't been 
without its challenges'. This is a qualified acknowledgment of the criticism; however, 
bearing in mind that Labour was the main proponent of devolution, one sees little 
evidence of them as responsible agents in the establishment of the parliament. In the 
two projected mental clauses above, it is the parliament that is `a disappointment' and 
`achieved nothing'. Therefore, Labour's role is grammatically obfuscated. 
The Labour broadcast (Text A) then goes on to state, `Setting up the Scottish 
Parliament hasn't been without its challenges'. Any problems the Scottish Parliament 
or the executive have had are euphemistically referred to as `challenges'. Again there 
is no evidence of Labour as agents of the `setting up', or of them taking responsibility 
for the `challenges' of the parliament. Finally, Labour appear as Actors in a clause, 
framed in positive terms, 
Actor Pr: material Range 
(Labour) (has laid) (strong foundations) 
NP n VP av NP adj n 
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Not only have they `laid strong foundations' but they have done it `in just four short 
years' (a Circumstance of Extent) which precedes the claims to have laid `strong 
foundations' in the clause complex. Transitivity analysis clearly reveals Labour's 
absence when referring to criticism that could easily be formulated as Labour's 
responsibility. Faults are presented as criticisms of the parliament; Labour's 
responsibility for the perceived negative actions or inactions of the parliament is not 
evident. In obscuring their role, Labour is attempting to mitigate criticisms that might 
be levelled at them. 
In terms of semantic moves, the two initial negative propositions in Text A are 
local moves constructed as potential criticisms which are then refuted by subsequent 
propositions. Van Dijk comments on such rhetorical strategies, `The very strategies 
on which local moves are based are intended precisely to manage opinions and 
impressions, that is, what our conversational partners will think of us' (1998: 40). 
Taking the text as a whole, Labour mitigates criticism by initially foregrounding it 
and formulating it in terms which obscure their role. The rest of the PEB refutes the 
initial negative propositions, laying out in positive terms Labour's achievements, 
demonstrating that things have been achieved and presumably therefore these are not 
things to be disappointed in. In a further attempt to mitigate and refute criticism the 
broadcast (Text A) goes on to list achievement after achievement, `Whether it's a free 
nursery place for every three and four year old, whether it's free bus travel for all 
Scotland's pensioners'. Labour's responsibility in the clause is positively 
foregrounded, where they are the Carrier in the following, `Labour is also committed 
to helping Scotland's hard working families' and an Actor in, `Scottish Labour has 
worked everyday to make every Scottish community safer for our children and 
families'. 
Labour follows a similar strategy in the second broadcast Text B. The main 
criticism dealt with is that `nothing has changed' in Scotland. Jack McConnell 
formulates the criticism as follows, 
Phenomenon ------------------------------------ 
Senser Pr: Mental Proj. x Cir: Frequency Dummy subject 
{[ (I) (know) (that) (sometimes) (it) 
NP pn VP vc AvP av NP pn 
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Phenomenon ----------------------------------------- 
Pr: Mental x[ Cir: Location Actor/Neg Pr: Material ] 
(seems) (that) (in Scotland) (nothing) (has changed). ]} 
VP vc PP pr n NP pn VP av 
As in Text A criticisms are formulated as a phenomenon. The Phenomenon in the 
main clause is given, i. e. we know that it is true, given the authority of the speaker. 
The embedded Phenomenon is less certain, it `seems' (to the implied viewer) and is 
likely to be refuted. McConnell linguistically constructs himself as an authority who 
can distinguish fact from occasional illusion. The strength of the criticism is softened 
by using a circumstance of frequency `sometimes', so that it is not `I know that it 
seems... ' but `I know that sometimes it seems'. If it is only sometimes it is not all the 
time, hence it is a weaker formulation and easier to refute. The rest of McConnell's 
contribution to the broadcasts goes on to refute the initial negative proposition, setting 
up a binary contrast within the structure of the text (negative proposition versus 
positive refutation of the negative proposition). In this way, mitigation as a rhetorical 
strategy is built into the overall global coherence of the text. 
4.2.3.2 SNP 
The SNP mitigate criticism of their policy of independence, which Labour attacked in 
both the 1999 and 2003 campaigns and the Liberal Democrats mention in the 
introduction to their 2003 manifesto. The SNP's mitigation strategy is constructed 
differently to the above Labour mitigations. Instead of formulating the negative 
proposition at the beginning of the text or section of text, to then be refuted by 
forthcoming propositions, the mitigation forms an aside at the end of the PEB. The 
reason for this positioning in the text, in contrast to Labour, may be a reflection of the 
parties' differing circumstances. Labour has a record in office to draw on to refute 
negative claims. The SNP in contrast are not in office and the focus of their discourse 
is on attacking the party in office and stating what they would do differently - the 
inverse of the party in power. For the SNP, therefore, foregrounding criticism(s) of 
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themselves may not serve their purpose of demonstrating their opposition's 
weakness41. 
The first half of the SNP broadcast (Text D) is a short film following an old 
man waiting for treatment on the NHS. The second half is a piece-to-camera by John 
Swinney, sitting in a chair in what looks like a smart home office. Towards the end of 
his address Swinney leans in to camera, before cutting to a close-up, indicating a 
change of tone to a more personal address. Swinney then says the following, 
And as for independence, I think it will be good for Scotland. I want it but it's 
not for me to decide, that decision lies with you. Our priority as a party is to 
prove ourselves to you... 
Independence is framed in terms of John Swinney's individual belief `I want it' and `I 
think it will be good for Scotland', in contrast to Swinney's preceding discourse which 
employs `we' as in `we the SNP' or `we the Scottish people'. Independence is 
personalised, `I think it will be good for Scotland' or `I want it'. Personalising the 
issue might be a strategy intended to draw on Swinney's personality as either a tool 
for mitigation or persuasion. Individuals are perhaps easier to trust or are less 
threatening than groups or institutions. 
Two further points should be noted in this mitigation. The first is that Swinney 
characterises the SNP's policy on independence as a decision that `lies with you', 
referring to the referendum which the SNP pledged would precede any decision on 
independence for Scotland. The second point is that the issue of independence is 
introduced with a phrase that marks the following discussion as an aside, even a 
minor issue in that, `And as for independence'. This downplays the importance of the 
issue, indicating its mitigation and positioning it marginally within the structure of the 
text. Independence is not a policy at the vanguard of the SNP's electioneering, 
appearing at the end of the PEB and dealt with briefly. 
To emphasise that independence is a marginal issue (at least in the 
representation of the SNP's broadcast) within the mitigation there is a clause which 
shifts the focus of the PEB to the relationship between the party and `you' the public, 
`Our priority as a party is to prove ourselves to you, that we can make a difference to 
41 A longer term study of election discourse, contrasting the discourse of parties in office and in 
opposition would be able to better bear out this point concerning rhetorical strategies of mitigation. 
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your lives, here in Scotland'. The SNP's `priority' is not independence but to `prove' 
themselves to the Scottish public. In mitigating criticism of a policy of independence 
the SNP make a semantic move away from criticism to a broader political agenda. 
4.2.3.3 Liberal Democrats 
The Liberal Democrat mitigation strategies differ from that of both Labour and the 
SNP. Whereas criticism of Labour and the SNP focused mainly on policy issues or 
events (potential or otherwise), the Liberal Democrats face criticism that they are 
ineffectual and lack credibility as a party of government. Liberal Democrats at 
Westminster elections have faced similar criticism that they lack experience and that 
because they are not likely to be voted into office their policies are not practical. 
The Liberal Democrat mitigation differs from Labour and the SNP in that it 
does not form a definite semantic move. Instead, the whole of the Liberal Democrat 
broadcast is a discourse intended to establish credibility. As such, at first sight the 
example below, from the Liberal Democrat broadcast (Text F) does not appear to be 
mitigating criticism. 
Actor Pr: Material Range 
{[(The Liberal Democrats (in Scotland)) (have made) (a big difference)]) 
NP dn PP pr n VP av NP d adj n 
But this statement may function as mitigation against criticism that the Liberal 
Democrats are ineffectual as a minority coalition partner. Contextualised in this way, 
then other positive statements on in-group achievements may be viewed in a different 
light. For example, 
Actor Pr: Material Range 
( (They) (`ve increased) (coverage (by GPs))] 
NP pn. VP av NP n PP pr n 
In both examples above the Liberal Democrats are the Actor in the clause and use 
Material Processes, their responsibility for actions and events in the clause are not at 
all obfuscated. They are clearly stating that they were responsible for improvements 
to GP services; their coalition partners are not mentioned at all. 
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As previously discussed the Liberal Democrats construct their achievement of 
the abolition of tuition fees, in terms of the personal qualities of their leader Jim 
Wallace, who was `determined' to achieve the policy and `succeeded'. This 
rhetorically demonstrates that the Liberal Democrats can achieve objectives as 
minority partners in a coalition. This point is then emphasised by a young woman 
claming, `they have done a lot for students' and confirming that she will be voting for 
them. The use of'have done', an intensive process, demonstrates the definiteness of 
the Liberal Democrats' achievements. There are then three quite hyperbolic claims 
made by unidentified participants in the broadcast. Male 1 asserts, `Jim Wallace, of 
course, has been the guiding force behind all these changes', which implicitly 
characterises the Liberal Democrats as a `force' causing `changes'. Therefore, things 
are achieved under the Liberals. Female 2 then claims, `The Liberal Democrats in 
Scotland have made a big difference'. Claiming to make a `big difference' again 
challenges any notion of ineffectiveness. 
Another aspect to this mitigation strategy is found in the following example 
which sees the Liberal Democrats construct not a policy achievement but a list of the 
political qualities they wish to demonstrate. For example, `It is the Liberal Democrats 
who have the ideas, the energy, the credibility and the track-record'. Fairclough notes 
of lists, `In traditional grammatical terms, lists are `paratactic' (their elements are 
equal, one is not subordinate to another. Items in lists are equivalences' (2003: 162). 
A `track record' is something which is more tangible or demonstrable than `energy', 
`ideas' and `credibility', but in listing them as equivalences they are represented as 
equally tangible and demonstrable. Expressing these qualities in the present tense also 
indicates their immediacy; they are not something of the past or future but here and 
now. 
Labour and the SNP, therefore, use quite different mitigation strategies from 
the Liberal Democrats. Labour construct their mitigation as a negative premise at the 
beginning of the text, setting up an opportunity for the subsequent refutation: this is a 
definite semantic move from a negative proposition to a positive refutation. The 
SNP's mitigation over a policy of Scottish independence is carried out by situating the 
mitigation at the end of the text. They place the contentious issue just before the 
closing remarks, marginalising and isolating the issue from the rest of the discourse. 
The audience is addressed in more familiar tone and the issue framed as, an aside, an 
issue of less importance than the rest of the party's policy agenda, and as a personal 
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belief of the party leader. In contrast, the Liberal Democrats use the whole of their 
broadcast (Text F) to establish their credibility, sometimes, in exaggerated terms. 
Both Labour and the SNP mark textually what the criticism of them is, the Liberal 
Democrats do not. 
4.2.4 Strategies for negotiating power sharing, shared policy achievements and 
potential coalition partnerships 
The centre ground of Scottish politics and the new devolved apparatus of Scottish 
governance, which the previous two chapters began to explore, raise interesting issues 
concerning the manner in which political discourse manifests itself in devolved 
elections. 
This section will further explore how a coalescence of centre-left parties and 
potential and actual coalition partnership affect campaign discourse. Chapter 2 
compared the details of party ideology in the centre; and chapter 3 investigated the 
ways in which party ideology and identity are constructed and communicated in 
manifestos. This section will expand on the investigation of those chapters in order to 
further our understanding of how the relationships between the parties of the Scottish 
centre are constructed and negotiated. 
During an election campaign Labour and the Liberal Democrats run on 
separate tickets but because of power-sharing they both campaign on the same policy 
record. This raises questions of how the two parties negotiate responsibility for the 
same policy achievements, how they maintain a separate identity, and how they 
discursively position themselves in relation to each other. In other words, how do they 
refer to each other (if at all) in an election campaign when they could potentially have 
to share power together again after the election? For the Liberal Democrats this is a 
particularly important campaigning point as they are the most likely partner in a 
power-sharing executive for both Labour and the SNP. From the alternative 
perspective, how Labour and the SNP rhetorically position themselves in relation to 
the Liberal Democrats is equally important to investigate. 
Like most party election broadcasts by parties which hold office both Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats make claims about policy achievements from their time in 
office. The achievements of the 1999-2003 administration are the achievements of 
both parties in the coalition. The executive is a joint venture, working in partnership 
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as one administration and therefore the results of the administration are the 
achievements of both parties. Various policies may have come from one side or the 
other, for example, the abolition of tuition fees for university students in Scotland is 
widely credited to the Liberal Democrats (Paterson, 2002). However, as has already 
been mentioned, elections are not run on a joint ticket, with Labour and Liberal 
Democrats as running mates, like a presidential and vice presidential candidate 
campaigning on the basis of a joint package. Rather, a potential coalition forms part of 
the context and sub-text of the election, not explicitly stated but still negotiated in the 
party discourse of the election campaign. The policy achievements of the Labour- 
Liberal Democrat coalition form part of this negotiation. 
In their broadcast (Text F) the Liberal Democrats claim four policy 
achievements: free personal care for the elderly; abolition of tuition fees for university 
students; an increased coverage of GP services; and pre-school/nursery places for 
three and four year olds. Three of these four achievements are also claimed by Labour 
in their three broadcasts (Texts A, B and C), however Labour omit the abolition of 
university tuition fees as an achievement. 
Not claiming responsibility for tuition fees policy is a significant omission for 
the Labour broadcasts to make, especially when it is a popular policy which falls into 
the holy trinity of electioneering issues, health, crime and education. Also 
conspicuous by their absence, in the Liberal Democrat broadcasts, are achievements 
relating to crime; they fail to make claims about crime, either as past achievements or 
in terms of future plans. Law and order issues are dealt with by the Liberal Democrat 
manifesto, as illustrated in chapter 2. Law and order was a major campaigning issue 
for Labour and it is an issue which is often central in election campaigns for parties 
competing for power. Crime may have been left to Labour, at least in the PEBs, with 
the Liberal Democrats left to claim responsibility for the abolition of tuition fees. It is 
difficult to assert with any confidence whether these omissions were coordinated by 
the two parties. Because of the salience of the issues it is worth noting. However, it is 
claims which both parties do make that will now be discussed. 
In the example below from their broadcast (Text A), beginning `Whether it 
is... ' Labour lists its achievements embedded within a metaphor of `building' in the 
initial long sub-clause. This sub-clause functions as the Theme that contextualises the 
main clause, i. e. establishing a frame in which the main clause is to be understood. 
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The Labour party is clearly the actor in the clause, responsible for these policies. The 
Liberal Democrats are not mentioned. For example, 
x Cir: extent Actor Pr: material Range 
{[ (in (just four) short years) (Labour) (has laid) (strong foundations. )]} 
PP pr AjP av adj adj n NP n VP av NP adj n 
x Token Pr: Relational Value 1 Cir: Beneficiary --- x 
Whether {[ (it) (`s) (a nursery place (for every < three) and 
c NP pn VP v NP dnn PP pr adj nc 
x Value 2 --- x 
(four years old>) or (<free nursing) and (personal care>) 
NP dn adj c NP adj nc NP adj n 
x Cir: beneficiary Actor Pr: material 
(for Scotland's older people)]... [ (Scottish Labour) (has worked) 
PP pr adj adj n NP adj n VP av 
Cir: location in time Cir: Reason Range 
(everyday) [ (to build) (a better Scotland)]} 
AvP av VP av NP d adj n 
`In just four short years', a circumstance of extent emphasises time is important, 
illustrates that things were achieved in a short period of time (expressed by the adverb 
`just'). These policies are metaphorically a `strong foundation' to then `build on' and 
it is Labour who is doing the building. For example, `Labour has laid strong 
foundations', where `Labour' is the actor in the clause who `has laid' (material 
process) the `strong foundations' (Range). 
After listing its achievements, including nursery places and free personal care 
for the elderly in a co-ordinated sub clause, again Scottish Labour is the actor which 
`had worked' (material process) to `build a better Scotland' presumably by achieving 
its previously stated policy goals. A direct relationship between policy achievements 
and Labour being responsible for them is not constructed; Labour's responsibility is 
suggested by the building metaphor. The subordinate clause, indicated by `whether', 
expresses contextualising topics to which the viewer is invited to relate the main 
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clause, which characterises Scottish Labour as a `builder'. The Liberals are elided 
from responsibility for policy achievements. 
In accordance with the ideological square and the PEB typology we discussed 
earlier, Labour's broadcast (Text A) represents achievements in the Scottish 
Parliament in positive terms, ideologically foregrounding Labour whilst obfuscating 
the Liberal Democrats' role. Using the `building' metaphor, Labour does not, at least 
at the level of the clause, take direct responsibility for policies. This way of 
representing Labour's achievements is a rhetorical strategy for ideologically 
foregrounding Labour positively. At the same time the Liberal Democrats' role is 
obfuscated in a non adversarial manner, avoiding either directly crediting them (for 
nursery places and free personal care for the elderly) or directly criticising them. 
Crediting the Liberal Democrats might raise questions about the point of 
differentiating between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, providing opponents with 
an opportunity for a discursive attack. Equally, criticising the Liberal Democrats 
might cause problems when trying to negotiate a coalition partnership after the 
election. 
The Liberal Democrats in their election broadcast (Text F) also lay claim to 
`making personal care free for the elderly', as in the extract below, 
(Unseen female narrator) 
Jim Wallace takes particular pride in what the Scottish Liberal Democrats 
have done for older people. If they are no longer able to wash, feed or dress 
themselves they no longer have to pay for care. It's a big worry lifted. 
(Jim Wallace) 
It seems very odd that if you were say suffering from cancer there are certain 
care packages that you got free but if you were suffering from Alzheimer's 
you didn't. And that seemed to be totally arbitrary and that's what we've 
addressed in what we did by making personal care free for the elderly. (Text F, 
2003). 
Wallace presents an argument of justification, delivered in a more informal style. 
Wallace's use of conditional 'if' lause expresses a hypothetical scenario in which 
cancer sufferers receive free `care packages'. The conjunction `but' signals the 
alternative negative scenario, where Alzheimer's sufferers do not receive free care 
packages. This forms local grammatical coherence in the text as well as creating a 
contrasting argumentative structure, facilitating the elaboration of the policy 
achievement. The disparity between the two propositions is then asserted to be 
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`arbitrary', an illogical and negative evaluation. Wallace's logical argument is 
prefaced by a perception `seems' (an intensive process) that mitigates the forthcoming 
argument with a more personal informality. Such informality is also expressed by the 
Value `very odd', which contrasts with more formal, professional lexis such as `care 
packages, `Alzheimer's' and `what we've addressed'. The use of `arbitrary', 
mentioned above, is intensified by a more informal usage of `totally'. 
Jim Wallace and the Liberal Democrats are consistently shown as responsible 
actors, e. g. `Jim Wallace takes particular pride' and `the Scottish Liberal Democrats 
have done'. The presumption is that older people (who are target voters) have 
benefited and that there is a track record to point to. As Labour elided the role of the 
Liberal Democrats in the formulation of their policy achievements, so too the Liberal 
Democrats elide Labour from the formulation of their policy achievements. 
In addition to investigating how these two parties refer to shared policies, it 
would also be useful to illustrate some other strategies the Liberal Democrats use 
when advocating their policy goals. The first example below, illustrates how they 
present a past achievement; while the second concerns a method they use to represent 
future policy goals. These are interesting in light of the Liberal Democrats' position as 
an actual and potential coalition partner. 
The first example, is the policy of abolition of university tuition fees, also 
discussed above. The policy is articulated in terms of the Liberal Democrat leader's 
desire. 
Carrier Attribute Pr: material Range 
... Mcl[ 
(he) (was determined) Scl[ (to get) (university tuition fees) 
NP pn VP av VP av NP nnn 
Pr: material x Actor Pr: material 
(abolished)]] and [(he) (succeeded)]} 
VP vc NP pn VP v 
The above extract asserts that Jim Wallace ('he') was successful in what he was 
`determined' to do; but in saying that `he was determined' implies that this was a 
difficult thing to do or that there was some obstacle to achieving the policy. Whatever 
obstacle or difficulty it might have been is left unsaid. Therefore, it may be inferred 
that, for the Liberal Democrats, achieving policy goals is not a straightforward 
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process but a struggle within government. Of course, for the Liberal Democrats it is 
not a straightforward process; theirs is a position of a minority partner in a coalition. 
Therefore, they must negotiate for certain policies with Labour in return for positions 
in office. As such, voting for the Liberal Democrats is not necessarily a vote for their 
whole policy agenda, but a few, selected polices which they can agree on with 
Labour. When claiming a policy achievement it is not only a demonstration of the 
Liberal Democrats' honesty in doing what they said they would do, not just an 
example of an achievement but also a demonstration of their ability to achieve goals 
as a minority partner within a coalition government. Therefore, they are still worth 
voting for and are not just there to make up the numbers for Labour to achieve its 
policy agenda. This is a non adversarial way of illustrating the Liberal Democrats 
effectiveness in government and to demonstrate they are prepared to struggle to 
achieve their goals. However, Labour, the party with whom they presumably struggle, 
remains invisible in the PEB. 
This second example illustrates how the Liberal Democrats represent future 
policy goals, bearing in mind their minority party status. As with the above examples 
from Text F this is a non-adversarial strategy. 
Circ: Location X Pr: Existential ---------------- Existent ------ 
([(In the next Scottish Parliament) (there) ('s) (much more) [(Jim Wallace)(wants to 
PP pr d adj adj n AvP adv VP v AvP av av NP nn VP a 
------> ---------------- Circ: Matter ---------------------------- 
achieve)], [ (free < eye) and (dental checks >) (for a start)]]) 
v NP adj nc NP adj n PP pr dn 
Future policy achievements are not constructed in terms of a strong commitment, 
expressed through the use of the deontic system of modality, such as `we will do V. 
Instead, they are represented as the result of an individual's desire (boulomaic 
modality) e. g., `Jim Wallace wants to achieve' and not in more concrete material 
process `we will do X'. Because of the Liberal Democrats' position as minority 
coalition partner they are not in a realistic position to employ strong deontic 
commitment of `will' and state `we will do V. It is likely they, the Liberal 
Democrats, might have to negotiate a deal with the SNP after the election or re- 
negotiate with Labour Party. The use of the non adversarial strategies might be a 
122 
rhetorical method of negotiating a political position which will be compatible with 
two different parties. Compatibility with either the SNP or Labour could prove 
difficult come the end of the election if too strong a commitment to certain policies 
was asserted throughout the campaign. If a party were to make strong commitments 
and then not implement them they could be accused of a U-turn, of not making good 
their promises or of being ineffectual. These criticisms are certainly something the 
Liberal Democrats are bearing in mind in constructing their electoral discourse. 
Liberal Democrats complicate van Dijk's conception of the ideological square. 
Is Labour an out-group `them' to the Liberal Democrats' in-group `us'? The answer 
is both yes and no because of the reasons outlined above, associated with coalition 
government. In line with the theory of the ideological square the Liberal Democrats 
construct their own achievements and action, attributes and achievements in terms of 
positive values, but they do not refer to Labour or the SNP (or any other party) in 
negative terms. The previous chapters illustrated that in their manifesto the Liberal 
Democrats only criticised the Labour Party in the Westminster context and never just 
as Scottish Labour. The Liberal Democrats' second PEB, not transcribed here, 
mirrored the manifesto, making comparisons between England and Scotland: where 
because of the Liberal Democrats, people in Scotland had free personal care for the 
elderly and the abolition of tuition fees. The Liberal Democrats' strategy is to suggest 
voters `cannot trust Labour on their own' but also not to criticise Scottish Labour 
directly. For Labour and the SNP each is the focus of the other's rhetorical attack. 
Therefore, for Scottish Labour and the SNP the ideological square appears to operate 
just as van Dijk discusses, at least in relation to each other. However, Labour and 
SNP's relationship with the Lib Dems complicates van Dijk's conception of the 
ideological square. Neither the SNP nor Labour mentions the Liberal Democrats. This 
is significant for both Labour and the SNP, as traditionally they are all left of centre 
parties that would be competing for similar sections of the vote. The Liberal 
Democrats were part of the executive responsible for policy initiatives as well as 
Labour, but only Labour receives SNP criticism. Labour, as we have already shown, 
do not mention the Liberal Democrats' role in their achievements. 
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4.3 Conclusion 
In attempting to account for the linguistic behaviour exhibited by the Scottish centre- 
left parties during elections, the effects of a new and (in UK terms) different electoral 
system must be investigated. The mixed form of PR, which is likely to result in 
coalition, is changing the traditionally adversarial discourse of British politics. For 
Labour and the SNP attacking each other discursively marks out their differences; and 
this behaviour fits into the ideological square. That is they positively characterise the 
in-group's actions, attributes and achievements, while negatively characterising the 
out-group's actions, attributes and achievements. Although, ideologically similar on 
many issues, as chapter 2 illustrated, the nationalist issue still divides Labour and the 
SNP, making cooperation extremely unlikely in the current political environment. 
However, Labour and the SNP do not criticise or even mention the Liberal Democrats 
in their PEBs or manifestos. This is unusual in comparison with Westminster 
campaigning. Therefore, the conclusion may be drawn that this behaviour is an 
attempt by both the SNP and Labour to remain compatible with the Liberals, ready for 
a potential coalition. 
For the Liberal Democrats, highlighting their own good points fits with the 
ideological square but not attacking either Labour or the SNP is, as has already been 
demonstrated, a rhetorical move to remain compatible with those parties. Choosing 
not to attack an opponent could be viewed as a tacit mitigation of an opponent's 
negative actions, attributes and achievements, which runs counter to the ideological 
square. This is particularly important as all three centre left parties occupy similar 
ideological space and are therefore often competing for similar sections of the vote. 
Such ideological similarity makes coalition more practical between Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats or between the Liberal Democrats and the SNP. However, in an 
election campaign one might expect all three parties to be aggressively competing for 
each other's votes, which as we have seen they are not. The potential outcome of the 
election, therefore, affects the nature of the discourse of the election campaign. 
Although difference or distinctiveness is important for all parties in appealing to 
voters of different kinds, compatibility is possibly as important to Labour, the Liberal 
Democrats and the SNP. Only through cooperation will the parties be able to form a 
coalition government likely to achieve stable government and able to implement a 
policy agenda. 
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Van Dijk describes the ideological square as, `functional moves in the overall 
strategy of ideological self-interest, which appear in social conflicts and actions' 
(1998: 33). Labour, Liberal Democrats and the SNP are engaged in the ideological 
self-interested social conflict that is an election; however, as shown, there are 
numerous examples of non adversarial rhetorical strategies from all three centre left 
parties. In light of the devolved context, potential coalition partners become (at least 
for the period of an election campaign) `quasi in-group' members. `Quasi in-group' 
members are not afforded the privileges of full in-group status but neither are they 
completely an `out-group'. Therefore, under the conditions considered here van Dijk's 
ideological square begins to break down under a strict application of its properties. 
The ideological square needs reformulating to account for competitive discursive 
ideological contexts where cooperation and compromise form important structural 
features of the context, that is, where competing groups maximise self-interest 
through cooperation. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE MUTUAL CONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE: 
PARTY ELECTION BROADCASTS AND THEIR MEDIA RECEPTION. 
5.1 What is press reception? 
This chapter analyses the manner in which the PEBs of the Scottish 2003 election 
were received in the press. During the four weeks of an election campaign42 more 
airtime and more column inches are given over to politics and, therefore, more 
journalists cover politics than normally would. Garton, Montgomery and Tolson note 
that `The perception that the media play a constitutive role in British political life, 
especially during general elections, is now very familiar' (1991: 101). The media is an 
integral part of election communication; the start of every day in the modern election 
starts with each party holding their own press conference where a room of journalists 
congregate before the party's leading politicians and communicators. Election 
hustings are no longer the mass public address of Gladstone or the soapbox orations 
of local candidates. Opportunities for public addresses have been transformed by 
technology and now reach mass national audiences via newspapers and the 
electorate's televisions, radios and computers. The media play a central role in 
communicating the events of elections; and in turn, these events have become 
increasingly national and media centred in their design and focus. Poster launches, 
election broadcasts, manifesto launches and publicity stunts now form the staple of 
election set-pieces, designed to facilitate media coverage. Rosenbaum (1997: 85) has 
commented that the popular press and television form a `duopoly' in provision of 
political information to the public. Parties do not communicate directly with the 
electorate for much of the campaign; their messages are mediated through the organs 
of the media before they reach the public. Any assessment of contemporary election 
discourse should therefore attempt to investigate the impact of the media on those 
discourses produced. Therefore, this chapter will attempt to address issues such as: 
how campaign events and messages are reproduced; whether messages are 
transformed or altered in any way; and if there are any effects on the reproduction of 
political messages, what the possible implications might be for the nature of public 
debate in elections. In dealing with these issues this chapter will illustrate two 
42 In the UK official electioneering is limited to a four week period commencing after the 
announcement of an election and the dissolution of Parliament. 
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instances of party messages - one Labour and one SNP - being constructed in the 
press coverage; demonstrating the success of one and the failure of the other. Only 
these two messages and parties are focussed on because in the reportage of all the 
PEBs they were the only parties and issues which received coverage. It is suggested 
below that this selectivity in reporting and comment is a result of cognitive aspects of 
discourse representation of elections and the discourse practices of politicians and 
journalists. 
Because of the importance of the media in politics and elections, political 
parties have become increasingly skilled at using the media. They attempt to design 
their discourse to make their messages consistent throughout the campaign, across 
differing media and between different candidates (Bruce, 1992; Rosenbaum, 1997). In 
doing so, the parties hope to deliver a consistent and convincing message to the 
public, through the filter of the media. It is demonstrable that specific instances of 
language are repeated in conference addresses, PEBs, in press briefings and by the 
press itself. It is also evident that the popular press creates its own discourses and 
sparks its own political debates, which politicians and other media sources are drawn 
into. 
This chapter will demonstrate that the language used by the press and 
politicians to discuss and/or represent elections habitually characterises those 
elections as a war, argument or pugilistic contest, all of which are typified as a contest 
between two sides. The utility of this conceptualisation will be questioned in terms of 
whether the language used can be said to represent appropriately the post-devolution 
Scottish political context. The analytical approach is in keeping with this thesis' 
critical discourse perspective. By exploring the dynamics between the socio-political 
context and discourse practices this investigation will seek to offer alternative 
readings to existing hegemonies. 
A key point of concern to this investigation is the manner in which the press 
cover these PEBs. Coverage is not in terms of the policy issues which the broadcasts 
raise, e. g. issues of devolution and healthcare. Instead, reportage of PEBs is framed as 
a discourse topic of negative campaigning. Negative campaigning as an item of news 
is not an event in itself but an interpretation given to other events (in this instance two 
election broadcasts). The issue then appears to be self perpetuating, no longer 
dependent on the original events but on the contributions of journalists and politicians 
who recursively contribute to the discussion of negative campaigning. Claims and 
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counter claims, from politicians and interested parties, then also become part of the 
basis for the accusation of negative campaigning. This will be shown to be partly due 
to two related phenomena. The first is the similitude of political and journalistic 
discourse practices. The second is that the discourse representations of negative 
campaigning constitute part of a larger schematic representation of politics. Such a 
schema structurally privileges particular parties in the Scottish context. Therefore, this 
investigation will illustrate some of the ways in which ideological dominances are 
reproduced and maintained. 
The corpus for analysis in this chapter is formed from 27 articles (see 
Appendix II) taken from the Scottish popular press. These represent the vast majority 
of coverage of the PEBs from this election in the newspapers concerned. A systematic 
and comprehensive collection was carried out, covering every day of the four week 
campaign. Every article with content associated with the election was archived. The 
newspapers from which the articles came were The Daily Record, The Herald, The 
Scotsman, The Evening Times, The Evening News, The Sunday Herald, Scotland on 
Sunday, the Sunday Mail and BBC News (online). These are the main indigenous43 
publications, which have a uniquely Scottish focus. The 27 texts focus exclusively on 
the PEBs of Labour and SNP and the debate that grew up around them. Articles 
concerning other parties' broadcasts in the election were rare; in fact, only one other 
article could be found in the author's larger corpus of 1,200 articles covering the 
entire election. The one other article only briefly commented on a Conservative 
broadcast. It is difficult to discuss evidence which is not present. However, this 
chapter will discuss the significance of the omission of debating other parties' 
broadcasts. The dynamics of political messages in the print press are complex; in 
order to compare data in a manageable fashion in the space available, this chapter 
concentrates on one issue. Even though the present analysis focuses on the reception 
of PEBs, it will be clear from the discussion below that a myriad of processes are 
simultaneously at work. 
Garton, Montgomery and Tolson (1991: 112) comment that there seems to be 
a3 to 5 day life cycle (which this thesis will call the `reportage cycle') for stories in 
43 Law (2001) in his analysis of the Scottish press, makes a distinction between `indigenous' and 
`interloper' publications. Indigenous titles are those who have historically been based in and focused on Scotland. Whereas interlopers are those publications which have latterly begun to publish Scottish 
versions of their traditionally London and English focused newspapers e. g. The Scottish Sun and The Scottish Times. 
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the press relating to issues of public policy. The evidence gathered in this chapter 
supports their claim, as the majority of the press coverage of PEBs ran for 5 days, 
from 13-04-03 to 17-04-03, although there is one other article relating to the same 
issue that occurred on 20-04-03. Therefore, this investigation focuses on a week of 
press coverage, from roughly the third week of the campaign. 
5.2 Methods and concepts: from metaphor and schemata to recycling 
This chapter will question the representations that language has been used to create. In 
doing so, the relationship between metaphor and mental schemata will be drawn upon. 
The way in which language both reflects and creates representations of reality will be 
explored. The linguistic usages of the press and politicians, in the production of 
political discourse, will be critically commented on in reference to the devolved 
Scottish context. 
The following analysis borrows significantly from the work of Montgomery 
(2005) and Garton, Montgomery and Tolson (1991). Their investigations continue the 
critical tradition, pay particular attention to the mediating role of the press in political 
discourse and emphasise the contemporary similitude of discourse practices of media 
and political agents. Montgomery (2005) and Garton, Montgomery and Tolson (1991) 
also consider schemata and metaphor as significant features of discourse. They relate 
specific instances of linguistic representation to the ideological and cognitive 
processes of agents in the public sphere. Such an approach is highly compatible with 
the work of Fairclough (1992,1995a, 1995b) and van Dijk (1998,2002). Insights into 
metaphor and schemata illustrate the potential power of discourse to construct a 
particular reality, which can then be a determining factor in social action. For 
example, Montgomery (2005) suggests representing reality in some specific way, 
such as a mass terrorist atrocity as an `act of war', implies a different set of values and 
potential responses by social agents than referring to that same event as `mass 
murder'. Even so, the relationship between cognitive-linguistic representations and 
social action is one of influence rather than determination. 
To begin the present analysis, examples of metaphorical use will be given, 
from which two broad topics emerge. The first is characterised as a general campaign 
issue, that of combative campaigning, with a particular emphasis on negative 
campaigning. The election is characterised as a conflict between two sides and that 
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election campaign discourse is accused of being negative in tone. An example of 
negative campaigning is Labour's portrayal of the SNP policy of independence as 
`divorce and separation' from the rest of the UK. These two topics - the 
characterisation of a campaign as a conflict, and the tone of campaign discourse as 
negative - appear divergent in type at first sight; however, there is uniformity 
in the 
use of language and discourse processes which underpin their production. The 
schemata which the metaphors evoke will be explicated, with reference to the 
effect(s) on the global coherence of the discourse produced. After this it will be 
necessary to discuss the similitude of discourse practices of political and media 
agents, which will be a study of the processes of intertextuality and message 
recycling. The features of discourse focused on in this chapter are the party political 
issue of independence, and the campaign issue of negative campaigning. 
Penultimately, this chapter will critically question the hegemonic inferences of these 
metaphors and their associated schemata with reference to the devolved Scottish 
context, before concluding with the possible implications this analysis has for Scottish 
political discourse. 
For clarity it will be useful to introduce some of the terminology and concepts 
which this chapter will use. The first important concept is that of metaphor, which 
will feature as an important focus of this analysis. Metaphor can perhaps be simply 
defined as describing something in terms of another thing: `Metaphors allow us to 
understand one domain of experience in terms of another' (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 
135). That is, the meaning of one concept is explained and understood with reference 
to another (Saeed, 1997: 302-303). A basic linguistic description of metaphors can be 
understood in terms of source and target domains. The target domain is the thing 
being described, while the source domain provides analogous meaning(s). For 
example, `The legal settlement was a slap in the face for justice'. In this example the 
legal settlement is the target domain, it is the thing given meaning by the application 
of a metaphor. The slap in the face is the source domain; the action of physical insult 
confers meaning as to the nature of the legal settlement. 
There are several competing theories of metaphor, including the classical and 
the romantic. The former envisages metaphor as a poetic feature which is situated 
outside normal usages of language. The latter sees it as `integral to language and 
thought as a way of experiencing the world' (Saeed, 1999: 303). This thesis adopts a 
third perspective, a cognitive approach to metaphor, typified by Lakoff and Johnson 
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(1980), Lakoff (1987) and Lakoff and Turner (1989). This theory owes much to the 
romantic tradition; however unlike the romantic tradition room is left for non- 
metaphorical instances of language (Saeed, 1999: 304). The cognitive approach 
affords an opportunity not to view metaphor as a mere rhetorical flourish but as a 
significant property of language and mind. Therefore, metaphor is considered as a 
`cognitive operation'(Chilton and Schäffner, 2002: 28). Language is linked to 
cognitive structures (such as the ideological complex and schemata). Language is 
thereby given a greater role in the representation, mediation and construction of 
ideology and reality. This chapter will discuss metaphor in terms of its role in 
constructing a particular representation of the devolved 2003 Scottish election, and in 
the mediated discourse of the Scottish print press. The election is portrayed as a 
conflict and this meaning is constructed out of three main metaphors, war, argument 
and pugilistic contest. These metaphors are closely related in the language of 
politicians and journalists, and there is a substantial evidence of mixing of these in 
any single text. Metaphors are also an important feature of political discourse because 
they are an integral part of our conceptual systems and as Lakoff and Johnson assert, 
`... our conceptual system is not something we are normally aware of' 1981: 3). 
Therefore metaphors are a potential source of conscious and unconscious 
representations of speakers' and writers' beliefs. Chilton and Schaffner (2002) 
contend that metaphor may provide a systematized ideology with a conceptual (that is 
cognitive) structure. These beliefs may be constructed as taken for granted or 
common sense representations of the world. 
Schemata are conceptual systems for organising knowledge and experience of 
the world. Van Dijk defines schemata as `higher-level complex (and even 
conventional or habitual) knowledge structures' (1981: 141). Brown and Yule 
elaborate, informing us that, `... schemata can be seen as the organised background 
knowledge which leads us to expect or predict aspects in our interpretation of 
discourse' (1983: 248). Therefore, schemata are an aspect of memory as well part of 
discourse interpretation. They are organised mental representations of past knowledge 
which are then triggered by an encountered discourse and drawn on to help construct 
understanding of that discourse (Bartlett: 1932). Metaphors can be important triggers 
for particular mental schemata, implying an organised set of associated meanings. 
This process is in part constructive in nature, privileging one set of meanings in 
preference to other meanings in the reading of a discourse. For example, the use of 
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conflict metaphors such as war, argument or pugilistic contest in the description of 
politics, privileges meanings which imply winners and losers. Agents are represented 
as antagonists, adversaries and rivals. These representations are at the expense of 
those aspects of politics which do not fit the modelling of conflict metaphors, such as 
compromise, negotiation and alliances (Beard, 2000: 22). Non-adversarial meanings 
might be more appropriate in a political system more likely to produce coalition or 
minority governance. Because the focus of this chapter is on instances of metaphor 
and the schematic structures they represent, the terms metaphor and schema are often 
used interchangeably. That is not to say that schemata only occur as a product of 
metaphor, only that other cognitive-linguistic features of schemata are not the locus of 
this chapter's interest. 
This investigation shares an analytical focus with the work of Garton, 
Montgomery and Tolson, centring attention on the role of schemata in the discursive 
reproduction of ideologies. It also agrees with the assertion that schemata have 
implicit presuppositions, `which construct chains of imaginary consequences, and 
which make metaphorical connections which are historically vague and yet universal 
in common-sense terms' (Garton, Montgomery and Tolson, 1991: 115). Garton, 
Montgomery and Tolson go on to suggest that in the public forum of mediated 
political discourse: 
[P]articular ideological assumptions and narrative scenarios occupy a place of 
dominance within this forum, to the extent that their pervasive solidity as 
forms of common sense is very difficult to challenge. (1991: 116) 
The evidence of this chapter supports this assertion. The use of metaphors and their 
related schemata, in the discourse of the press reception of PEBs, have significant 
implications for public debate. These implications relate specifically to the issue of 
interpretation of Scottish electoral politics and generally to our understanding of the 
nature of political discourse in the public sphere. One of the goals of this chapter is to 
question the appropriateness of characterising a multi-party system of election and 
governance as wars, arguments or pugilistic contests. 
The term soundbite has come into common currency in the discourse of 
politics and the media over the last ten years. Rosenbaum defines the soundbite as 
`... a brief, self-contained, vivid phrase or sentence, which summarises or encapsulates 
a key point' (1997: 91). The soundbite is the modern equivalent of a rhetorical 
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flourish, but they are intended to be appropriate for media recycling and not 
necessarily for an immediate and present audience. Rosenbaum explains, 
The key verbal skill for politicians today, or those who write their words for 
them, is not (as it once was) grand and persuasive oratory, but colourful and 
memorable encapsulation. Or - to encapsulate the point - the ability to talk in 
headlines. Publicity-hungry politicians think consciously in terms of 
soundbites. They never give a major speech, interview or statement on the 
doorstep without planning the morsel of their text which they want to be 
gobbled up and regurgitated by the media. (Rosenbaum, 1997: 92) 
Metaphors can be a productive linguistic tool for politicians in producing soundbites. 
Their utility comes from their analogous properties, often poetic character and their 
ability to reduce complex ideas, policies and events to more familiar concepts. 
A central concept in this chapter, in its analysis of press reception, is that of 
recycling and the related concepts of trajectories and intertextuality. Recycling refers 
to instances in the media where language from one discourse domain (text type), a 
political speech, a press release or a PEB, may be reproduced in a different media 
domain, such as a newspaper article or television news bulletin. The language may 
reoccur as an attributed quote, as a paraphrase or it may be reformulated in an 
unattributed fashion in the commentary of a journalist. This inevitably involves a re- 
contextual isati on and transformation of the initial source utterance (Garton, 
Montgomery and Tolson, 1991: 100). Once recycled, an utterance can develop 
trajectories over time, as recycled utterances are continually reused in different media 
and political domains and at different times. The trajectory of an utterance in the 
media and associated discourse domains may see the meaning of the initial utterance 
change as it is re-contextualised within other media discourses over time (Fiske, 1987: 
126). Montgomery discusses the trajectories of `the discourse of war after 9/11' 
(2005: 149), commenting that the sense in which the word war had for government 
officials and the media commentators changed over time after the terrorist atrocities 
of September 11`" 2001. Similar, though obviously less dramatic, instances of 
recycling and discourse trajectories can be seen in the evidence presented in this 
chapter. 
Recycling is also an example of what Fairclough (1992,1995a, 1995b) and 
Fiske (1987) call intertextuality, where the composition of a (media) text contains 
constituents whose origin lies outside the text in question. Examples of intertextuality 
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simultaneously construct and mark the discourse community (Swales, 1990) of the 
author and audience in the articulation of the text. Obscure cultural references might 
be seen as marking a text for a specialised interest group. The jargonised language of 
an academic journal, or the slang of a pirate `drum and bass' music radio station 
create more meanings for their specific discourse communities (see chapter 3 on 
active audience interpretation). That is not to say that a wider audience cannot obtain 
meaning from those discourses; rather, they would not obtain as much meaning. 
More generic cultural references, which might be understood by larger numbers of 
people, mark a text as more popular in focus, for example a TV news bulletin that 
evokes the `Dad's Army' TV series as a metaphor in the discussion of defence policy 
(Garton, Montgomery and Tolson, 1991). In a general election, where politicians and 
journalists alike are trying to communicate with mass audiences, one would therefore 
expect to find more generic instances of intertextuality. 
Fiske (1987) offers a useful typology of intertextuality, distinguishing between 
`vertical' and `horizontal' intertextual relationships. He explains, 
Horizontal relations are those between primary texts that are more or less 
explicitly linked, usually along the axes of genre, character, or content. 
Vertical intertextuality is that between a primary text, such as a television 
program or series, and other texts of a different type that refer explicitly to it. 
These may be secondary texts such as studio publicity, journalistic features, or 
criticism, or tertiary texts produced by the viewers in the form of letters to the 
press or, more importantly, of gossip and conversation. (1987: 108) 
Therefore, chapters thus far have dealt with horizontal intertextual relationships, 
investigating discourses from a small genre of texts. These are the primary texts Fiske 
refers to, the party manifestos and election broadcasts. However, this chapter focuses 
on secondary texts. Vertically related, these secondary `spin off' exts comment on the 
primary texts. They are important to investigate because secondary texts, relating to 
`criticism or publicity, work to promote the circulation of selected meanings of the 
primary text' (Fiske, 1987: 117). The selection and structuring of texts and their 
meanings is, as Fiske (1987) points out, an important aspect of textual and social 
power. That is, the meanings in texts and the texts themselves are structured in the 
interest of the dominant social group and their interests. The operation of particular 
metaphors and schemata will be shown to play an important role in communicating 
meaning across primary and secondary texts. 
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5.3 Metaphor and conceptual schemata in press reception: war, argument, pugilism 
and divorce 
The corpus of 27 articles analysed illustrates the importance of specific metaphors to 
both journalists and politicians alike in the communication of political discourse. The 
corpus displays uniformity in the use of metaphors in describing events, actions and 
participants across texts. The initial event(s) which this collection of articles stems 
from is not just a discussion of the content of broadcasts themselves. The discourse is 
predominantly about the negative nature of election campaigning. Although numerous 
parties were campaigning, this discussion was fixed on only two: Labour and the 
SNP. Three main metaphors occur: the first and most prominent is that politics is 
war; the second is that politics is argument; and thirdly politics is pugilism. This 
analysis will demonstrate the extensive mixing of these metaphors and suggests they 
form an overarching schema, referred to here as the conflict paradigm. The textual 
evidence of this paradigm suggests the meaning of all three metaphors is closely 
related at the cognitive level. Politics is given meaning by its characterisation as a 
conflict between two competing sides. The fourth metaphor considered represents 
Scottish independence as divorce and separation. This is an example from Labour 
Party discourse attacking the SNP's policy of independence from the rest of the 
United Kingdom. 
The three metaphors of the conflict paradigm will be illustrated by the 
following discussion centring on the tabulated results of analysis. The tables represent 
the structure and content of the mental schema produced by the metaphor under 
consideration. Deductions are made on the basis of evidence contained in the corpus; 
a larger sample would, undoubtedly, produce greater delicacy. The tables attempt to 
represent categories and subcategories of the schema. Table headings equate to 
superordinate category branches, the left-hand side indicates co-ordinate branches, 
and the right-hand side provides textual evidence drawn from the corpus. The various 
headings, therefore, act as functional interpretations of the textual data, from which 
the investigative discussion flows. 
135 
5.3.1 Politics is war 
From the corpus a prominent schema emerged. In this model, political events, agents 
and their actions are all understood in terms of militaristic references. The source 
domain provides analogous concepts for politics drawn from names for events in war. 
Elections, manifesto launches, election broadcasts and conference speeches become 
wars, battles, campaigns and phases. Table 5.1 illustrates this, 
Table 5.1 Politics is war schema: types of conflict 
Types of Conflict 
. 
Campaigns:, ' `Labour prepare scare campaign in response', `an escalation of the 
media campaign', `positive campaign', `drawn into a negative 
campaign', `issue-based campaign', `TV campaign' 
Phases. ', ". ''s, `negative phase', `attack phase', `the election campaign will enter a 
n new and 
brutal phase today' 
a d 
tles 
'! Battles 'Battle for Hol ood war', 'fighting dies down', yr 'phoney 'infighting', 
other `a bitter war of words', `a day of bitter clashes', `tired old attacks on 
Clashes: ý, = independence', `parties clash over hospital waiting lists' 
For example, `Battle for Holyrood set to hot up [Headline]... Labour will go on a 
counter-offensive tomorrow, with an anti-independence campaign' (Sunday Mail, 13 
April 2003) [italics added]. Internal disagreement is described as `infighting' as if 
party members are mutinous foot-soldiers and elections themselves are military 
campaigns, presumably with the aim of conquering all others or at the very least 
winning. 
It may be useful to briefly consider the etymology of key terms to establish 
some evidence of the history of metaphors and how metaphorical meaning was 
established. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) records `campaign' as entering the 
English language in the 17th century, from the French `campagne'. Its meanings 
centred on concepts associated with open country or field. Of `campaign', the OED 
comments it was, 
136 
at first occasionally used in all the senses of the earlier campaign, but was at 
length differentiated, and restricted to the military sense, for which it is now 
the proper term. (www. oed. com, 05-06-2006) 
From the mid 1600s `campaign' is used predominantly militaristically. However, 
from the earlier 10 century the OED records `campaign' used politically. In the 
earlier 1800s, then one can see evidence of meaning radiating from the militaristic to 
the political domain. 
The politics is war schema divides campaigns into strategic phases, employing 
different tactics to outmanoeuvre opponents on the battle field. As the following table 
indicates, tactics and strategies, therefore, play an important role in the militaristic 
metaphor. An election campaign as a planned and strategic event is strongly 
congruent with war. In this schema, the events of the campaign can then be 
characterised as weapons that strategically target an opponent's weak spots. Under 
pressure, tactics may have to shift as if to repel an unexpected cavalry charge. In such 
a schema, the military arts of subterfuge are also important; party strategists are then 
said to `disguise their plans', or tactics are employed to `unnerve opponents' and less 
conventional actions can be used such as `terrorism' or possibly guerrilla warfare. 
Stratagems , 
Tactics: 'shock tactics', `tactical shifts', `tactics designed to confuse and fool 
us', `scare tactic' 
'Strategy:, ",,, `the SNP's strategy', `rethink their strategy', 'concentrating attention 
on your opponent's weak spots', `campaign objectives', `negative 
campaign to unnerve opponents', `scaremongering', `if you can't beat 
them, join them' 
Targeting: `Nationalist target... ', `directly targeted Jack McConnell' `targeted , 
resources', `has focused Labour's energies on attacking... ' 
Subterfuge: `attempts to disguise their plans', `the video terrorism', `tactical 
shifts to hoodwink Scotland', `tactics deliberately chosen to fool... ' , 
`tactics designed to confuse and fool us' 
Risk: `the latest desperate move came', `... it represents a hostage to 
`1" fortune', `must enter enemy territory' 
ante : ). L routics is war scnema: stratagems 
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The actions of parties are conceptualised as attacks and defences of positions. As the 
`Types of Combative Action' Table 5.3 demonstrates, statements criticising 
individual politicians are `personal attacks'. Policies are attacked by opponents and 
defended by proponents. For example, `When the SNP launched a series of personal 
attacks on McConnell, Labour said they would not use "negative' tactics' (Daily 
Record, 15`h April 2003) [italics added]. Policies are themselves conceived of as 
positions to attack, as if they were an effective sniper in a bell tower or dominating 
hilltop position. Politicians `dig in' and defend their policy as if it were a vital spot on 
the battlefield which must be held by men in fox holes. They can also launch 
`counter-offensives' as a means of defence, presumably because the best form of 
defence is to attack. Statements can also be a naval broadside, where the speaker 
becomes a cannon, their words potentially lethal shot. An exchange of words between 
differing parties over a policy or campaign strategy is a clash or perhaps a skirmish. 
,a 
Types of Combative Action 
Offensive:,; `prepared tö go on the offensive', `crosses the line' 
ýDefensive: `defended the negative slant', `counter-offensive', `defended', 
. 
ý' `launched a series of personal attacks', `the Nationalists launched their 
"I broadside against Labour's... ' 
Attacks: ,. } `powerful attack', `launched a series of personal attacks', `launching 
vicious, negative attacks' 
Broadside: `the Nationalists launched their broadside against Labour's... ' `the , 
Tory broadside' 
`Jack McConnell yesterday turned his fire on the SNP' 
Out-gun. `out-gun the small calibre snipers' 
Terrorise,;: `terrorise the vulnerable' 
Blast',,:,,, -,, :,; `Labour blast over independence' 
able S. 3 Politics is war schema: types of combative action 
Just as the actions and events are subsumed into the logic of the politics is war 
schema, so are the participants in the election. For example: 
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Agents, & Participants 
Opponents `if the opponent's vote is such it will defect', `if the opposition's vote is 
such' 
: Strategists'. 'SNP strategists', `party strategists' 
Leaders `Tory leader... ' `LibDem Leader... ' 
Snipers . °; `small calibre snipers of the SNP' 
Casualties `first casualty' 
vulnerable. 
`terrorise the vulnerable' 
Table 5.4 Politics is war schema: agents & participants 
Those who plan the campaign are therefore `strategists' trying to out-think and out- 
manoeuvre their opponents. Those that verbally criticise are `attackers', the truth can 
be the `first casualty', and voters exposed to `shock tactics' of controversial PEBs can 
be `the vulnerable' like inhabitants of a besieged town. The public can also `defect' 
like once loyal troops who see their best chances with the army most likely to win, or 
who may have become disenchanted with the strategies of their generals. 
Just as there are agents who perform actions there are results to those actions 
which take on equally militaristic connotations, as in Table 5.5. 
:, Effects & Results of Combative Action 
Physical ° `successfully damaged the SNP', `was brutally effective', `totally out- 
gun ', `if the opposition's vote is such it will defect' 
Mental `terrorise the vulnerable', `tactics designed to confuse and fool us', 
`negative campaign to unnerve opponents', `tactical shifts to hoodwink 
Scotland', `panicked' 
Win/Lose `losing to the Tory broadside', `their defeat' 
Table 5.5 Politics is war schema: effects & results of combative action 
There are bipartite characteristics here, and perhaps the above table could have been 
two separate representations. The first two sub-categories form a pair, demonstrating 
the physical and mental effects of combat. Physically opponents are said to be `out- 
gunned' in an attack on a policy. A party's credibility can be `successfully damaged' 
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by a strategic campaign. The result of a negative campaign can be that voters `defect' 
to the opposition. People and things are materially harmed and damaged by the 
physical effects of war. Equally, one can see the mental effects of war. Those 
affected seem to endure unstable psychological states, after being terrorised. Also, 
individuals can be tricked and fooled by tactics. A logical result of the physical and 
mental effects of war is that they can amount to the war being won or lost. The second 
two sub-categories in Table 5.5 illustrate as much, forming an important bipartite 
distinction: wars are won or lost. It would be a less prototypical representation of a 
war where the protagonists agreed to disagree and decide to call it a draw. A party 
might lose a few battles (equating to several policy issues or key parliamentary seats) 
but still win the war and be elected as the majority party. Therefore, there are two 
sides, the winners and the losers. This last point will prove important, as the schema 
structures the war and politics as a battle between two sides. 
alues' 
Immora 
`courage', `discipline', `he had guts', `what we stand for', `lead a 
nation' 
`crosses the line of decency' 
Table 5.6 Politics is war schema: values 
Finally, Table 5.6 illustrates that the politics is war metaphor evokes the moral 
aspects of armed conflict. Leaders have courage to do what is difficult, they lead and 
they stand for something. The strong party has discipline: the weak party is 
undisciplined and panics. Just as an army's success relies on their troops' ability to 
follow orders and to hold the line in the midst of battle, so is a political party's. If 
war has its moral warriors, its perpetrators can also be immoral and unprincipled. 
They can transgress the rules of engagement to gain unfair advantage. This part of the 
schema relates back to tactical aspects discussed earlier, and as such a campaign can 
be fought positively or negatively. 
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5.3.2 Politics is argument 
The second metaphor which was particularly salient in the press reception of the 
Labour and SNP broadcasts was that politics is characterised as an argument. As 
above, evidence is presented in tables, partly to illustrate the structure of the schema 
evoked by the politics is argument metaphor. As with the previous metaphor the 
agents, actions and events of the political field are transposed to the schematic 
ordering of the politics is argument metaphor. 
Type of Argument 
Informal Tormal - "T 
Rows I-I,, 
I,, 
-I_: 'the row came after', `dirty Critique '. '; w `to launch a prolonged 
tricks row', `apolitical row critique of the Nationalists' 
has erupted', 're-ignited the Dispute, -',,, `embroiled in a bitter 
bitter row', `ad sparks dispute' 
furious row' Debate .'. `deterioration in Labour's 
debate' 
'Arguments `Labour's argument that... ', War J;, `a bitter war of words' 
`the SNP's argument' 
Table 5.7 Politics is argument schema: types of argument 
Elections and the locutions which occur during the campaign appear variously as 
`furious' and `bitter rows', `arguments', `critiques', `disputes' and `debates'. 
Characteristically, argument can be subdivided into the formal and informal, and as 
illustrated by Table 5.8 this has a relational effect on the processes of argument. 
Arguments themselves are also realised as metaphors, such as the combative `war of 
words' where argument is war. This suggests that argument and war metaphors are 
closely related at the cognitive level. Politics as the target of a metaphor can be 
realised in both the source domains of war and argument. In addition argument can be 
the target of a metaphor which can be realised by the source domain of war. The 
interrelatedness of the schematic representation of these metaphors will be discussed 
in greater detail below. 
If politics is argument, verbal processes are obviously an important aspect of 
the schematic representations of the argument metaphor. Table 5.8 demonstrates these 
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processes from the analysed corpus, indicating the manner in which political 
argument can occur. 
Processes'of Argument 
'Accusing : `accused of trying to terrorise... ', `opponents accused', `accusing 
them', `Mr Swinney yesterday accused Mr McConnell', the SNP 
accused Labour', `Labour accused the SNP' 
, Arguing `other political parties argued' , `the Scottish Labour leader argued 
that the SNP' 
; Apologising `Mr Swinney was unapologetic', `the SNP has been forced to admit' 
Admitting,, 
Challenging `John Swinney... challenged Mr McConnell' 
Criticising `slagging each other', `negative personality slagging', `they exchange 
(informally)', insults' 
Criticisingt°°, `The Conservative criticised Labour and SNP', `Liberal Democrats 
(formally),,. ",,, ' poured contempt on both SNP and Labour', `but speak disparagingly 
of `divorce" 
-Lyin `SNP are telling a pack of lies' 
Threatening `threatening' 
Warning; `ý,, r `Tories have warned that... ', `Tony Blair today warned that... ' 
Table 5.8 Politics is argument schema: processes of argument 
Those engaged in political discourse are said to `argue', `accuse', `criticise', 
`challenge', `warn', `insult', `threaten', `lie', `slag', `apologise' and `admit'. There are 
more formal types of argument, such as debating in which people are `criticised', 
`warned' or where contempt is poured on opponents (note the other metaphor, where 
contempt is constructed as a liquid that is then emptied onto something). There are 
also less formal types are argument, such as rows, where people are said to be 
`slagging' and insulting each other tit-for-tat. This schema does not explicitly re- 
categorise those agents involved in the arguing, as happens in the politics is war 
metaphor. Therefore, one does not see `arguers' or `debaters' lexicalised as 
equivalents of `leaders', `strategists' and `snipers' 
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5.3.3 Politics is pugilism 
Next, there is evidence of a metaphor, which recasts politics as an encounter between 
pugilistic adversaries. Typically, the textual processes, both written and spoken, of 
political argument become the physical actions of a boxing match, where words are 
punches. 
Types"of Strikes 
f 
Hitting `hard-hitting Nationalist election broadcast', `Jim Wallace hit out 
g`. at negative campaigning', `Labour hit back by stressing... ', `we 
are simply hitting back', `the SNP didn't know what had hit it' 
'Blaste `Labour blast over independence' 
; Throw your.,. `Mr Blair threw his weight behind... ' 
weight behind 
Boot or put the ,, `refused to put the boot into the opposition' 
boot in 
Rip `ripped the SNP to pieces' 
Thrust `Our thrust will be to give people positive reasons to vote for us' 
Table 5.9 Politics is pugilism: types of strikes 
When leaders support a party's election campaign they are said to `throw their weight 
behind' it. The campaign is the fist at the end of a punch, while the leader lends his 
body weight to his strike as if to add additional force, the purpose of which is to 
knock out his opponent. Politicians' retorts to criticisms of policy or campaign 
strategies are the defensive responses of a boxer under fire, `hitting back' at their 
opponents, or a response in anger or frustration is to `hit out'. 
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zTypes of Fights # ..: 4n 'ti'p Y 
Fair/Clean `refused to put the boot into the opposition', `McConnell is fighting a 
cleaner campaign', `Jim's clean fight plea' 
Unfair/Dirt y, `below the belt', `Nat's gutter-fighting posters... ' 
Bare- `the gloves came off in the election campaign' 
knuckle 
No-holds='', 
- 
`... but sit up and take notice when a fight starts, especially one with 
barred ; FT, ' no holds barred' 
Duels: ý. y-ýv `television showdown' 
Table 5.10 Politics is pugilism: types of fights 
The events of an election become various kinds of boxing encounter, which 
suggest to an audience the character of those events. There can be clean fights but 
increasingly in contemporary elections there are dirty fights, another way of 
characterising negative campaigns. Some encounters, when considered extreme, are 
portrayed as brutal and bare-knuckle, where `the gloves came off'. The origin of this 
well known metaphor may well pre-date the 1838 Rules of the Pugilistic Association 
(commonly known as the Queensberry Rules). Before 1838 boxers would often train 
with gloves or `muffles' to avoid injury, but on the occasion of a set-to in the prize 
ring they would strip to the waist and fight without gloves. Or the metaphor may be 
contrasting the two periods of boxing, divided by the introduction of the 8th Marquess 
of Queensberry's rules44. The rules were introduced to make boxing matches safer 
and the rules clearer. Other metaphors from the bare-knuckle era of prize fighting 
have become fossilised in English, their origin for most speakers opaque. For 
example, a common metaphor used in political leadership races is `to throw your hat 
into the ring', which was the formal way boxing matches would be declared between 
combatants when the two fighters' seconds would toss their hats over the ropes into 
the ring. Another common metaphor, used to express whether someone or thing is of 
44 Before the Queensberry rules it was not the case that formal boxing matches had no rules, far from it. 
The Broughton Rules, named after the boxer Jack Broughton, were generally used during the later part 
of the 18`h century up until 1838. Broughton formulated his rules after one of his opponents died 
following a fight. In these rules, fighters still fought bare knuckle and there were no timed rounds. 
Instead a round ended when a fighter was either struck or thrown to the floor, and punches could also 
be thrown in the clinch. Broughton was a prominent enough figure of Georgian London to be buried in 
Westminster Abbey. His prominence bears testament to the past popularity of boxing in Britain to the 
extent that boxing has left its linguistic mark on the language ever since. 
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sufficient quality, is to say whether they are `up to scratch' or `brought up to scratch'. 
The scratch was a yard square chalked or marked in the middle of the ring. In the 
bare-knuckle era rounds were not timed as in contemporary boxing, instead a round 
ended when a man was struck or thrown to the ground. Fighters then had an allotted 
amount of time, usually thirty seconds, in which to come to the scratch ready to fight. 
Failure to be brought up to the scratch, either by oneself or one's seconds, resulted in 
defeat. Hence, the ability to come up to the scratch was the difference between 
success and failure, as the better quality fighter would always be stood ready at the 
scratch. 
Effects of Fights 
Opponents Voters' 
=Disorientation, -ýa `those who have seen 'Excitement =;: °; `... but sit up and 
this SNP film have take notice when a 
been stunned by its fight starts, 
simple power', especially one with 
`the SNP didn't know no holds barred' 
what had hit it' 
'Dismemberment `ripped the SNP to Support `Our thrust will be to 
pieces' give people positive 
reasons to vote for 
us, 
Table 5.11 Politics is pugilism: effects of fights 
Following the logic of the pugilistic schema, if words are punches then the 
effects of those words are also described in terms of physical and mental effects. As 
Table 5.11 demonstrates, there are two different groups affected by the metaphorical 
punches thrown. The first and perhaps most obvious are opponents, who according to 
the corpus evidence can be either disorientated or dismembered in some way. 
Disorientation could cover degrees of sensory impairment, opponents could be merely 
stunned or disorientated but they, presumably, can be knocked-out if the force of the 
argument were strong enough. As in a prize-fight, in addition to an adversary, the 
audience or voters can also be affected by the fight. Therefore, voters can be excited 
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be the skills or barbarity of the pugilists and their support can be swayed. In the above 
table the quote suggests that votes would support the `positive' `thrusts' of the party 
as if supporting a fighter who always abides by the rules and fights a clean fight. 
,,: Tactics 
Wweak spots' concentrating attention on your opponents' 
. 
Posture `new stance' 
. Fair. play, -,, -, `refused to put the 
boot into the opposition' 
Cheating `below the belt' 
Table 5.12 Politics is pugilism: tactics 
Boxing also employs tactics and so a political debate is described in terms of a 
pugilistic encounter. Political arguments are portrayed as punches strategically aimed 
at `weak spots', like a boxer throwing punches to the torso of a poorly conditioned 
adversary. When a tactic is not working politicians can take up a `new stance', to 
launch punches from different angles, to overcome a fighter's defences. Table 5.12 
also shows that political brawlers can choose to play by the rules or cheat and throw 
low blows. This illustrates that there are opinions as to the right and wrong ways in 
which to engage in political fisticuffs. There is, therefore, a strong similarity with the 
politics is war schema, where there are positive (and right) and negative (and wrong) 
ways in which to wage war. 
5.3.4 A conflict paradigm 
A common theme to all three of these metaphors is that they involve some kind of 
conflict, which is either verbal or physical. The conflict is usually between two 
competing sides: there are two boxers in a fight; there are two sides to an argument 
(Billig, 1996); and wars are usually conceptualised as a conflict between right and 
wrong, allies and enemies or `us' verses `them'. The similarity of these metaphors 
goes further, as they appear interrelated at a cognitive level, as everyday experience of 
language would suggest. In English, it is not only that politics is understood in terms 
of war, argument and pugilism but also that these three metaphors are understood in 
terms of each other. An argument is war, `a war of words' and war is argument `a 
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bloody quarrel between two nations'. War is pugilism, `the RAF delivered a knock- 
out blow tonight' and pugilism is war, `Lennox Lewis and Mike Tyson will go to war 
tomorrow'. And argument is pugilism, `the Chancellor gave his young opponent a 
bloody nose in the commons today' and pugilism is argument, `I'll let my fists do the 
talking'. 
The interrelated nature of these three metaphors is supported by the evidence 
of all 27 articles in the corpus. There was no single text which did not display one of 
the three conflict metaphors just described. Often at least two of the metaphors are 
mixed. For example, in the following two examples the dominant politics is war 
metaphor is mixed at different times with either the argument or pugilism metaphors. 
In the first example, politics is both war and argument, 
Scare tactic... she defended the negative slant... it would not attack 
personalities, but was prepared to go on the offensive... the SNP has been 
forced to admit... slagging each other... what we stand for. (The Scotsman, 
15 `h April 2003) 
In the following example politics is both war and pugilism, 
Nationalists' brutal broadcast... on the receiving end of Labour's attacks... the 
SNP didn't know what had hit it... SNP strategists... was brutally effective... 
the Nationalists know they must enter enemy territory.., but sit-up and take 
notice when a fight starts, especially one with no holds barred... using 
negative campaigning... part of the aim in negative campaigning is to unnerve 
opponents... campaigning has been subdued... attacks on independence. (The 
Herald, 16 `h April 2003) 
In the example from The Scotsman an event in the Scottish election is metaphorically 
defined as war, in lexical choices such as `tactics', `attack' and `offensive', and as an 
argument, with phrases like `forced to admit' and `slagging each other'. The Herald 
example provides similar evidence. One can see the war schema in choices such as 
`strategists' and `enemy territory' and the pugilistic metaphor in phrases like `didn't 
know what had hit it' and `no holds barred'. Then there are examples where all three 
metaphors are mixed together. The follow three examples clearly illustrate this, 
1. `Battle for Holyrood set to hot up... TV broadcast could set alight election... dirty tricks row over shock new TV film.., hard-hitting... accused... tactic... 
counter offensive. ' (Sunday Mail, 13th April 2003) 
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2. `A political row has erupted... the row came after... Jim Wallace hit out at 
negative campaigning... other politicians argued... fight a positive 
campaign... Mr Swinney defended tactics... the SNP's argument... ' (BBC 
News Online, 14th April 2003) 
3. `Scare tactics worked... party strategists... new stance.., weakening of the 
SNP's commitment... other political parties will accuse the SNP of hiding 
their true 
. 
purpose... they argue... their defeat... a model for its own strategy. ' 
(Evening News, 17th April 2003) 
The high level of congruence between these metaphors and the field of politics is 
quite clear in examples 1 to 3. This is a familiar pattern throughout the corpus of texts 
that cover the party broadcasts and the meanings appear highly conventionalised in 
the political field. 
Politics is war appears to be the dominant metaphor, which is then augmented 
by the addition one or more of the other two metaphors. The extent of 
interrelatedness suggests that these three metaphors are conceptually ordered together 
into an overarching conflict paradigm. The meanings of the three metaphors and their 
associated schematic representations often reproduce meanings which encode a binary 
conflict: good versus bad, fair versus unfair, right versus wrong, us versus them. As 
metaphors transfer meaning the target domain which the conflict paradigm is applied 
to is also subject to the logic of antithetical encounters. War, argument and pugilism 
metaphors are essentially metaphors that predominantly coalesce around those 
meanings that represent conflict. Any target domain such as politics will therefore 
privilege meanings within that domain which best suit the conflict paradigm. The 
importance of this paradigm and the material implications of the meanings it 
represents will be expanded on in Section 5.4 below, with particular reference to the 
discourse practices of journalists and politicians. 
5.3.5 Scottish independence is divorce 
As should be evident through the discussions of the previous chapters, Scotland's 
constitutional relationship with the UK is important to the ideological debate of 
Scottish politics. Independence is the issue that most divides Scotland's two main 
parties: Labour and the SNP. Bearing that in mind, the Labour Party employed a 
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consistent divorce and separation metaphor to describe the SNP policy of 
independence for Scotland from the British state. The state of union between Scotland 
and England is the target domain and marriage is the source domain. Therefore, 
Scotland is wedded to the rest of the UK and the Nationalist's policy of an 
independent Scotland is divorce and separation. For example, `The party [Labour] 
focused on what it called the nationalist threat to divorce from the rest of the UK. ' 
(BBC Online, 14`h April 2003). 
Lakoff (2002) has commented on the importance of metaphors associated with 
family in politics (specifically of the U. S. ). He notes that experiences of family life are 
important to people's interpretation of morality and that metaphors from this domain 
are well suited to and often used in politics. It is perhaps unsurprising to find the 
application of a metaphor referring to family life in Scottish politics. The divorce and 
separation metaphor is important to this thesis because it relates to the observation 
made earlier that Scotland's constitutional status is still important in the negotiation of 
political discourse in Scotland. Labour also used the language of divorce and 
separation in the 1999 election; therefore, they clearly feel that the independence issue 
is still current to devolved election campaigning. 
The `divorce and separation' metaphor is accompanied by language from the 
overarching conflict paradigm. For example, the SNP's policy is also labelled by Jack 
McConnell as `Tactics deliberately chosen in an attempt to fool Scotland's voters' and 
as `Deceit to hide their goal of separation' (Daily Record, 15`h April 2003). Tony 
Blair on the 15th repeats the above messages, `For all their attempts to disguise their 
plans for divorce' and `He [Tony Blair] warned that voters had a choice between 
continued stability under Labour or the `instability and isolation that a Nationalist 
victory would bring' (BBC Online, 15`h April 2003). On the same day The Scotsman 
reports Jack McConnell as saying at the STUC `the SNP's goal of independence 
would result in a "hugely expensive divorce"' (The Scotsman, 15`h April 2003) and 
that `the SNP are trying to "fool" Scotland's voters that there was no real risk in a 
vote for separation' (The Scotsman, 15`h April 2003). Negative aspects of the conflict 
paradigm are transferred to the divorce metaphor. The subterfuge element of the 
conflict schema appears particularly prominent; and conflict (and dishonest aspects of 
conflict) is not normally viewed as a positive facet of marriage. 
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Negative messages about the SNP are contrasted with a positive assessment of 
Labour (in line with the structuring of the ideological square45) which continues the 
schema of the `divorces and separation' metaphor. McConnell is paraphrased and 
directly quoted as saying `He contrasted this scenario with Scotland under a Labour 
Executive, by repeatedly using the words "build", "improve" and "partnership within 
the UK"' (The Scotsman, 15th April 2003). A building metaphor for Labour's policy 
programme is also a recurrent feature of the party's discourse in the 2003 election but 
there is not space to explore it fully here. Building and divorce metaphors, however, 
are an example of different metaphors combining. As with the three conflict 
metaphors values and meanings are transferred from one metaphor to another. 
`Divorce and separation' are defined in negative terms, destructive in character. 
Divorce is unstable, uncertain and isolating whereas partnership is stable, certain and 
inclusive. And divorce is costly whereas in partnership there is prosperity. 
The Evening Times on the 15th April reports Tony Blair as saying in a speech 
to party activists that deciding to vote for either Labour or the SNP `represented a 
stark choice "between devolution and divorce, between investment and cuts, between 
stability and security and instability and isolation"'. The divorce metaphor is 
employed by Blair as part of a rhetorical contrast of positive and negative states 
associated with the adversarial sides of the ideological square. In the Labour election 
broadcast the connection is initially made between the `divorce and separation' 
metaphor and the `building' metaphor. The unseen narrator of the broadcast declares, 
`If Scotland votes SNP on May the first, on May the second the Nationalists will 
begin the process of breaking up Britain'. This message is then reported in The 
Scotsman on the 16`h April in a satirical article criticising Labour's broadcast. Also on 
the 16`h April, in an analysis of campaign strategies, The Herald recycles the Labour 
messages as, `Negative campaigning works. Four years ago, the SNP was on the 
receiving end of Labour's attacks portraying independence as an expensive divorce' 
(16th April 2003). 
The divorce metaphor privileges negative meanings of the break-up of a 
marriage, reinforced via the transference of meaning from a building schema. The 
meanings from divorce and building metaphors reflect underlying cultural values and 
as As a conceptual system, metaphors and their associated cognitive schemata, when being used to 
encode ideological positions, are most likely subsumed under the organisational structure of the 
ideological square, i. e. in the positive and negative characterisations of in-groups and out-groups 
respectively. 
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opinions on divorce, i. e. that it is a negative and destructive event. James Mitchell in 
The Herald commented during the campaign on Labour's use of the divorce and 
separation metaphor and its cultural meanings in a Scottish context. He asserts, 
For many Scots, especially women, divorce is liberating, but the SNP is 
struggling to respond effectively. Social conservatism, encouraged by 
Presbyterianism and Catholicism alike, is alive and politicians dare not 
suggest divorce is good... The Nationalists must find a convincing alternative 
analogy or embrace divorce. (The Herald, 16 `h April 2003) 
Many metaphors have cultural salience in the construction and representation of 
cultural meanings and values (Lakoff, 2002). This cognitive-linguistic process is 
what, in the terminology of political communication, gives particular phrases or 
soundbites `resonance' with voters (Rosenbaum, 1997). The conflict metaphors 
discussed above are not merely instances of prosaic language but also culturally 
specific examples of how British (and probably Western) culture understands politics. 
If the dominant meanings of divorce in British culture are negative ones then it is 
those meanings which will be privileged in the minds of the individuals who produce 
and interpret a discourse. For example, if divorce is viewed as expensive, destructive 
and represents a failure, then when used as a metaphor those will be the dominant 
meanings transferred to the target domain. 
5.4 Language, discourse practices and the press reception of party election broadcasts 
This section will look more specifically at the professional practices and cultural 
background that constitute the production of news copy and in doing so the effects on 
party messages will be analysed. The overall theme of the press coverage of the 2003 
election broadcasts was that of negative campaigning, which in turn was characterised 
as negative campaigning between two sides: Labour and SNP. The effects of the use 
of metaphor and the schematic knowledge they represent will be investigated, i. e. the 
practical effects of characterising the field of politics or a policy in a certain way. The 
language produced by the conflict paradigm bears scrutiny here, as elements of that 
conceptual schema are deployed to critical effect by both journalist and politicians in 
the language that constitutes the discourse of press reception of PEBs. 
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5.4.1 Negative campaigning 
The negative campaigning theme formed a meta-topic of discussion in the press. The 
primary focus of press reporting was not of the policy claims and criticisms made in 
the broadcasts. Although coverage in the PEB corpus coalesced around certain events, 
the press commented on the overall style of campaigning by Labour and the SNP. 
Negative campaigning as a topic is connected to the `politics is conflict' paradigm 
discussed above. It is drawn from those parts of the conflict schema that are 
concerned with aspects of the fairness of behaviour. For example, one can think of the 
rules of war and that there are (in terms of cultural norms) proper ways for armies to 
conduct themselves. There are strategies which are honourable and likewise there are 
improper and dishonourable strategies as well, such as terrorism, targeting non- 
military targets or the use of certain weapons. Similarly, in pugilistic or sporting 
metaphors the notion of a fair fight or fair play has strong consonance with notions of 
conduct in war and right and wrong. Negative campaigning is therefore seen as an 
inappropriate way to electioneer. In congruence with the adversarial sides of the 
ideological square, individual parties are unlikely to openly concur that their election 
practices are negative but they are more likely to comment that the campaigning of 
others is. Therefore features of the conflict paradigm are drawn on in competitive 
ideological discourse. Dishonourable and unfair practices are likely to be drawn on to 
describe metaphorically the particular political activities of various groups or 
individuals one is opposed to. 
Negative campaigning was a theme that continued in the press and other 
media throughout the election. However, it became more focussed in the third week 
with the airing of the Labour and SNP PEBs discussed here. It is apposite to discuss 
the issue of negative campaigning because it elucidates several relevant points 
concerning media coverage of Scottish elections. Firstly, the consistency of language 
used to discuss negative campaigning, by both journalists and politicians, illustrates a 
similitude of professional discourse practices. Secondly, and related to the first point, 
the negative campaigning issue further illustrates the nature of recycling and 
trajectories of particular discourses. Thirdly, the issue illustrates the complexity of 
strategic communication by political agents in the mediated discourse of the press. 
Garton, Montgomery and Tolson (1991) suggest that certain metaphors evoke 
particular imaginary scenarios and common-sense discourses and are an integral part 
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of the process of political communication. This chapter has proposed that conflict 
metaphors are such integral metaphors. Garton, Montgomery and Tolson (1991) also 
assert `there is a certain consonance between the scripts and metaphors used by some 
politicians and those used in news narration' (Garton, Montgomery and Tolson, 1991: 
114). It can be seen below that both journalists and politicians reproduce this conflict 
schema time and time again in the written press. 
Pub. 
>F 
Date: , Quotation , ý, _ 
.. 
ý. ' .. 
Sunday 13/04/03 `Labour will go on the counter offensive tomorrow with an 
Mail , anti- independence campaign. ' Journalist 
The 14/04/03 `David McLetchie, the Scottish Tory leader, said: "There are 
Scots- lines of decency that politicians should not cross... "' [Quoted 
man politician] 
Daily 15/04/03 `Wallace refused to be drawn into negative campaigning 
Record , which he claimed was "a major turn-off" for voters. He has 
written to other party leaders urging them to 'fight a clean 
r ht"'. [Quoted and paraphrased politicianj 
The 15/04/03 `John Swinney last night defended the SNP's controversial 
Herald party election broadcast to be shown tonight by telling 
Labour: "You can say it is sick in bad taste and below the belt , 
- but the one thing you can't say it is not true"'. [Journalist 
and quoted politician] 
The 15/04/03 `Patricia Ferguson, Labour's campaign co-ordinator, claimed 
Scots- that the broadcast set out the stark choices facing the 
man electorate. And she defended the negative slant of the film , saying the party had made it clear all along that it would not 
attack personalities but was prepared to go on the offensive 
over the issues. ' [Journalist paraphrasing a party activist 
Evening 17/04/03 `Nationalist critics of this new stance claim it shows a 
News weakening of the SNP's commitment to its core policy of 
(Edin- independence. And the other political parties will accuse the 
burgh SNP of hiding their true purpose. ' [Journalist comment and 
News) paraphrasing of un-attributed political agents] 
Table 5.13 Shared discourse practices ot-journalists & politicians: the conflict 
paradigm 
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Table 5.13 illustrates that politicians, party activists and journalists alike 
continuously evoke the same conflict paradigm, and they effectively talk/write about 
politics in the same way. This is to the extent that politics as conflict is constructed as 
representing common-sense assumptions about the political field. Therefore, once a 
theme or subject establishes dominance in the public discourse of the press (evoking 
established cultural meanings) it is self-sustaining within the 3-5 day reportage cycle. 
The `negative campaign' theme in the press in part arises out of the established 
cultural hegemony that politics is a conflict. Those meanings provide an accessible 
rubric for discourse production and interpretation. Actions that are considered to be 
unfavourable electioneering practices are understood in terms of the ordered meanings 
of the conflict paradigm. It is not only journalists but politicians and their spokesmen 
who employ this cognitive schema when producing their discourse. Therefore it can 
be seen in Table 5.13 that a journalist can define a political party's actions in terms of 
a military campaign, saying `Labour will go on the counter offensive'. Then 
politicians give responses, clearly demonstrating the same paradigm, so that the Tory 
leader refers to `lines of decency', while the Liberal leader is reported to have called 
for a `clean fight'. 
There are perhaps unforeseen or unconscious consequences in the production 
of this discourse. Once the negative campaign theme has achieved salience all the 
main political protagonists are compelled to comment on it because of media 
questioning. However the overarching paradigm constitutes the political field as a 
conflict between two sides, in this instance Labour and the SNP. Political agents from 
smaller parties inadvertently reinforce the dominance of the two dominant parties of 
Scottish politics, casting the election as two-party contest when using conflict 
metaphors. Of course, it may have also been the case that minority party politicians 
did also comment that the election was about more than two parties. As these 
comments would not be easily compatible with the established schema for 
representing politics their utterances may have gone unreported. Therefore, it can be 
seen from the analysis of the negative campaign theme in the press, that journalists 
and politicians demonstrate a high degree of similarity in their discourse practices. 
They produce strikingly similar utterances. Utterances that continuously recycle are 
those which best fit the established norms of journalists and politicians' discourse 
practices and their (and their audiences') modes of comprehension. 
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5.4.2 Party messages 
As noted in the section above, reportage of PEBs only covered two parties and in 
doing so framed the debate in terms of negative campaigning, rather than debating the 
issues the broadcasts actually discussed. Despite reportage focussing on negative 
campaigning this chapter will suggest there is evidence that Labour was more 
successful than the SNP at getting their campaign message reported. Therefore, 
comparatively, Labour's strategic communications can be considered more successful 
than the SNP's. However, this is not to say that the SNP were unsuccessful in their 
overall campaign. For example John Curtice a week into the campaign commented, 
Labour has already allowed the SNP to set much of the campaign agenda with 
high-profile, well trailed and oft-repeated promises - more police, better pay for 
nurses, and abolition of student tuition fees. (The Scotsman, 7 th April 2003) 
This chapter focuses on the press reception of the Labour-SNP broadcasts as a 
significant event in the reportage of the election campaign, rather than the campaign 
as a whole. 
5.4.2.1 The state of Scotland and England's matrimony: Labour's `divorce' metaphor 
This section will now compare the success of the two parties' strategic 
communication. 
Part of reporting practice in the press is to reproduce direct quotations and 
paraphrases of sources (Venables, 2005) and as such the press consistently recycles 
the Labour message. As different party spokesmen at different events produced 
almost identical formations of the party's message, reporting of the party line was 
almost inevitable. Even when an article was critical of Labour's campaign strategies 
or their use of language the message was still consistently reproduced. 
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Date. ; Pub..; Headline/ ' Direct Quöte or, "' -Journalist', ` 'Context 
. .. Byline 
Paraphrase of f Comment 
, '. 
ý. Party Message',, Or, Non=party 
uote' 
14/04/03 BBC McConnell `The party Report of 
Online attacks focused on what Jack 
SNP it called the McConnell's 
`deceit' nationalist threat STUC 
to divorce from speech 
the rest of the 
UK' 
[JM] "Just a little 
more time before 
Scotland 
separates from 
the UK. " 
[JM] "Tactics 
deliberately 
chosen to fool 
Scotland's voters 
that there is no 
real risk in a vote 
for separation 
14/04/03 Scots. SNP `Labour will Comment on 
accused of screen a party SNP and 
bad taste in election Labour 
broadcast broadcast PEBs 
tonight, 
portraying 
independence 
as a backward 
and destructive 
move which 
would ruin 
Scotland. ' 
15/04/03 et Dying [JM] "On May 1, Reporting 
pensioner we can keep controversy 
ad sparks building for the over Labour 
furious future or we can and SNP 
row rip it all up and PEBs. 
face upheaval 
and uncertainty. " 
Table 5.14 Press coverage: Labour's `divorce' metaphor 
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Table 5.14 Press coverage: Labour's `divorce' metaphor (Continued) 
Date" Pub. Headline/ .ý 
Byline 
Direct Quote or"-, 
=Paraphrase of Party 
Message 
Journalist` 
Comment. ' 
OrNon- 
party 
Quote 
Context 
15/04/ dr SNP are `the Labour leader said the Article 
03 telling a Nats were trying to "fool" suppor- 
pack of the Scottish people into tive of 
lies splitting from the United Labour 
Kingdom. ' criticizing 
the SNP 
[JM] "Tactics deliberately over PEB 
chosen in an attempt to and 
fool Scotland's voters that campaign 
there is no real risk in a strategy 
vote for separation. " 
15/04/ BBC Blair `Prime minister Tony Blair Report of 
03 Online launches has warned Scots they face Tony 
attack on a "stark choice between Blair's 
SNP devolution and divorce" campaign 
from the UK... ' visit and 
speech at 
`He [TB] warned that the 
voters had a choice Burrell 
between continued stability Collec- 
under Labour or the tion in 
"instability and isolation" Glasgow. 
that a Nationalist victory 
would bring. ' 
`He [TB] said "For all their 
attempts to disguise their 
plans for divorce, no-one 
should be in any doubt that 
every vote for the SNP will 
be taken by them as a vote 
for separation". ' 
`He [TB] said it was "a 
choice between two 
futures. Between 
devolution and divorce. 
Between investment and 
cuts. Between stability and 
security and instability and 
isolation". ' 
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Table 5.14 Press coverage: Labour's `divorce' metaphor (Continued) 
Date' ' 'Pub. _° Headline/: _ 
Byline 
Direct Quote or 
Paraphrase ofParty 
Message 
'Journalist' 
Comment. 
Or Non- 
party 
Quote 
'Context 
15/04/ Scots. McConnel `... a warning that the SNP's Report 
03 1: SNP goal of independence would on 
deceiving result in a [JM] "hugely McCon- 
voters expensive divorce" that nell's 
would bring cuts to public speech 
services. ' to the 
STUC 
[JM] "we can keep building and 
for the future or we can rip it argu- 
all up and start again with for ment 
years of upheaval, between 
uncertainty and threat. " SNP 
and 
`The Scottish leader argued Labour 
that the SNP tactics were over 
deliberately chosen in a PEBs. 
attempt to "fool" Scotland's 
voters that there was no real 
risk in a vote for separation. 
He contrasted this scenario 
with Scotland under a 
Labour Executive, repeatedly 
using the words "build", 
"improve" and "partnership 
with the UK". 
15/04/ Scots. Labour `Throughout, a Vincent Satirical 
03 plays on Price-style voice-over warns com- 
independ- of the threat of a "costly SNP ment on 
ence divorce"' Labour 
`horror' PEB 
`... as the narrator tells the and 
nation that independence negative 
would "leave Scotland campai- 
isolated in an uncertain gning 
world". styles. 
She [PF] said the "stark 
choice" facing the electorate 
was between economic 
stability and investment 
under Labour or "tax rises 
and cuts to pay for a hugely 
expensive divorce". 
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Table 5.14 Press coverage: Labour's `divorce' metaphor (Continued) 
: Date Pub. Headline/;, Direct Quote 'or:,, ' Journalist. , Context" 
Byline Paraphrase of Party, Comment, 
Message,; Or. Non- 
party 
... 
;' Quote 
15/04/ et Don't vote `He [TB] said: "For all their Report- 
03 for attempts to disguise their ing on 
`divorce' plans for divorce, no-one Tony 
says Blair should doubt that every vote Blair's 
for the SNP will be taken by campai- 
them as a vote for gn visit 
separation. " to Scot- 
land 
He [TB] represented a stark 
choice "between devolution 
and divorce, between 
investment and cute, between 
stability and security and 
instability and isolation". 
15/04/ Herald Swinney `... Patricia Ferguson, Labour Repor- 
03 defends campaign coordinator, said: ting on 
`negative' "the SNP have been forced negative 
campaign to admit in recent weeks camp- 
separation from the rest of aign 
the UK is their number one strate- 
priority. "' gies of 
Labour 
and 
SNP 
16/04/ Scots. May the `On Monday night, we heard `A map Satire 
03 dark force a bloke on parole from a showed on SNP 
be with crypt intoning: "If Scotland Caledonia and 
you in TV votes SNP on May the first, severed Labour 
election on May the second the physically PEBs 
Nationalists will begin the , as if by 
process of breaking up celestial 
Britain. " How awful. ' chainsaw, 
from 
`Then the screen went wonky Mother 
again as Dr Jekyll England. 
disappeared behind the Crikey, a 
couch and reappeared as Mr geological 
Hyde to warn: "The disaster. 
Nationalist divorce would What a leave Scotland isolated in an fearful 
uncertain world". prospect. ' 
Table 5.14 Press coverage: Labour's `divorce' metaphor (Continued) 
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: Date 'Pub., Headline/.. 
Byline 
Direct Quote or 
Parap ase of 
Part Message'_ 
Journalist Comment 
Or Non"p`arty Quote 
Context 
16/04/ dr Clear `Unfortunately, Leader 
03 choice for Swinney is - in 
Scotland committed to the support 
repeatedly rejected of 
policy of Labour. 
independence which Election 
would isolate and charact- 
eventually bankrupt erized 
Scotland. ' as a 
choice 
`But there is another between 
huge plus for giving two 
the vote to Labour sides, 
and that is the Labour 
partnership between and 
Blair himself and SNP. 
Brown - national and 
international-calibre 
politicians who care 
deeply about 
Scotland. ' 
`Under the SNP , Scotland would be 
out of step with the 
times. A Scotland for 
steep personal 
taxation, divorced 
from reality. The 
Daily Record goes 
for the Blair-Brown- 
McConnell 
partnership any day. ' 
17/04/ en Parties "`If Scotland `Meanwhile, Labour Com- 
03 have votes SNP on is trying more or less ment on 
agreed to May 1, on May 2 the same message as Lab- 
scare and the Nationalists last time about the our's 
scare alike will begin the threat of "divorce" portray- 
process of posed by the al of 
breaking up Nationalists. ' SNP's 
Britain", the policy 
party's latest on broadcast indepe- 
declared. ' ndence. 
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Byline or' ' 
Paraphrase of 
Par Message 
Or Non" 
20/04/ sh Divorce talk `A Labour `Labour's core Report on 
03 `wrong', spokesman said: election strategy of the 
says anti- "It is a massive comparing reaction 
abuse leap of logic independence to of anti- 
campaigner. and one that we divorce is abuse 
would never inappropriate and campaign 
make to imply sends the wrong ers to 
that the fact that message to separated Labour's 
divorcing couples and their `divorce 
Scotland from children, a leading and 
the rest of the campaigner against separa- 
Uk would domestic abuse has tion' 
damage said. ' character- 
Scotland means ization of 
that we would `Margaret McGregor, independ- 
suggest that a convenor of the Zero ence. 
woman in an Tolerance Trust, 
abusive condemned Labour 
relationship for putting the `fear 
should not seek factor' into divorce, 
a divorce. ' when in reality many 
women in abusive 
relationships need all 
the support they can 
get to seek 
separation. ' 
"The whole message 
is very negative, ' said 
McGregor. `In 
reality it's often very 
difficult for parents 
to decide on divorce 
and separation, 
especially if there are 
children involved. On 
top of that we have 
the politicians saying 
there will be terrible 
consequences. " 
Table 5.14 Press coverage: Labour's `divorce' metaphor (Continued) 
Table 5.14 Key: 
People: Jack McConnell (JM), Tony Blair (TB), Patricia Ferguson (PF) 
Publications (Pub. ): The Herald (Herald), The Scotsman (Scots), Evening Times (et), 
Daily Record (dr), Sunday Herald (sh), Evening News (en) 
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One might regard Labour's divorce and separation metaphor as an instance of 
successful strategic communication in electoral discourse. The message is successful 
not in terms of its effects on voters46 but in terms of the consistency of its 
reproduction and recycling in the press. This reproduction is influenced by several 
factors: firstly, the consistency in the production of the message by party agents; 
secondly, the location of this message production i. e. at events designed for media 
consumption; and thirdly because the message draws on established cultural meanings 
shared by politicians, journalists and the public. The result is that even though much 
of the press reception of PEBs related to negative campaign strategies, Labour 
achieved what the SNP failed to do. Labour's message was consistently and 
accurately reproduced and embedded within the wider press reception of the election. 
5.4.2.2 Waiting lists and the NHS: the SNP's `dying man' 
The SNP faced the same criticisms of negative campaigning on this occasion; 
however, a consistent identifiable message was not put across. A PEB that became 
known as the `Dying Man' broadcast had no narrator and so there was no verbal 
`hook' for the press to recycle. The broadcast flashed up text, such as `Labour said 
they'd reduce waiting lists. They haven't. Labour said they'd deal with bed shortages. 
They haven't', but these pieces of text were not recycled. Instead many of the press 
reports recycled the `Dying Man' broadcast by describing what occurred in it. For 
example, 
The film shows an elderly man sitting, waiting for medical treatment. He 
slowly gets worse until he disappears, leaving his empty chair behind. There 
are no voice-overs or music, the images are stark and clear, and the man, called 
Bill, never speaks. One of the final images is of a doctor peering into what 
appear to be the man's eyes, which slowly fade to darkness. The message the 
SNP hope to get across with the broadcast is that Labour has failed to reduce 
waiting lists. It finishes with the slogan, "How long can you wait? " (The 
Scotsman, 10 April 2003) 
Alternatively, reports reproduced a SNP party spokesmen explaining the message of 
the broadcast as in the following example, 
46 In this instance the effects on voters' opinions of these particular political messages is unknown, however the Electoral Commission's report (2003) concluded that negative campaigning did not have 
any significant affect on voters. 
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Nicola Sturgeon, the SNP election co-ordinator, claimed this week's message 
would resonate with voters: `The election broadcast exposes the tragic truth 
behind Labour's failure to tackle waiting times. It tells a simple story that far 
too many people the length and breadth of Scotland will recognise. It is the 
story of waiting; waiting for the care you need, waiting for Labour to deliver on 
their promises. (Sunday Herald, 13 `h April 2003) 
The Nationalists were, therefore, unable to have a consistent party message recycled 
in several different media domains, constantly re-enforcing a simple theme. The 
`How long can you wait? ' slogan repeats the theme of the Nationalists' first broadcast 
which saw different people singing `Why are we waiting? ' and a poster advertisement 
with a picture of Jack McConnell and the slogan `Time's up'. If these were slogans 
intended to be repeated in the press they were certainly less effective at being recycled 
than the equivalent Labour messages on divorce and separation. Table 5.15 simply 
illustrates the SNP's lack of success in terms of column inches and the number of 
articles. 
Date -`_ Pub: °'` Headline/-" 
Byline 
Direct Quote or-, -,: 
Paraphrase of Party, fi Message- 
Journalist 
Comment 
Or Non- 
art P Y, 
Quote' 
Context 
13/04/ sm Nats in `The subtitles ask: "How Discuss 
03 dirty long can you wait? "' -ion of 
tricks row SNP 
over `Dying 
shock new Man' 
TV Film broad- 
cast. 
13/04/ sh The `When it seems he has Discus- 
03 election's collapsed, there is a doctor sion of 
tough new shinning a torch into a SNP 
phase: patient's face, as graphics `Dying 
SNP say accuse Labour of failing to Man' 
Labour let keep their hospital waiting broad- 
patients list, bed shortage and staff cast and 
die shortage pledges. And with Labour/ 
the question `How long can SNP 
you wait? ', the final scene argu- 
shows the man's empty ment 
chair. ' surrou- 
ndin it. 
able .. 1.5 tress coverage: J1NY's 'IJying man' message 
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Table 5.15 Press coverage: SNP's `Dying man' message (Continued) 
Date3u ''Pub Headline/,. ? Direct Quote or. Journalist Context 
Byline _Paraphrase of Party Comment 
Message . Or Non- 
party 
uote 
14/04/ Scots. SNP `The broadcast finishes with Discuss 
03 accused of the slogan: "How long can -ion of 
bad taste you wait? " The advert Labour 
in represents an escalation of and 
broadcast the SNP's media campaign SBP 
which has been based around broad- 
the slogan: "We can't wait casts, 
any longer. "' mostly 
focus- 
ing on 
critic- 
ism of 
the 
SNP. 
14/04/ Scots. Morbid `The message the SNP hopes Report 
03 SNP film to get across with the of 
`crosses broadcast is that Labour has criticis 
line of failed to reduce hospital m of 
decency' waiting lists. It finishes with SNP 
the slogan, "How long can broad- 
you wait? "' cast 
`It represents an escalation of 
the SNP's media campaign, 
which has been based around 
the slogan, "We can't wait 
an loner. "' 
14/04/ BBC Election "`My message to Jack Report 
03 Online broadcast McConnell and his Labour of 
`shocking' Party is simple - time's up, " critic- 
he [John Swinney] said'. ism of 
SNP 
broad- 
cast 
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Date `Pub' Headline/, " 
'Byline 
Direct Quote or* : n;. 
: Paraphrase of Party 
Message 
Journalist. 
Comment' 
Or Non- 
party. 
uote 
Context. 
15/04/ dr John `The SNP yesterday attacked Report 
03 sounds Jack McConnell, saying his of SNP 
alarm bell "time's up". Nats leader John poster 
for Jack Swinney unveiled a poster unveil- 
showing a scowling picture ing 
of McConnell superimposed 
on an alarm clock. The 
slogan reads: "Time's up" 
and the hands of the clock 
point to seven o'clock, the 
time polls open on May 1. ' 
`He [John Swinney] added: 
"My message to Jack 
McConnell and his Labour 
Party is simple. Time's up. "' 
Table 5.15 Press coverage: SNP's `Dying man' message 
Table 5.15 Key: 
People: Jack McConnell (JM), Tony Blair (TB), Patricia Ferguson (PF) 
Publications (Pub. ): The Herald (Herald), The Scotsman (Scots), Evening Times (et), 
Daily Record (dr), Sunday Herald (sh), Evening News (en), Sunday Mail (sm) 
Possible reasons for this lack of recycling may be simply that the PEB slogan 
came in the form of a question. It is the press that is usually in the habit of asking 
questions, even rhetorical ones. Therefore, journalists may have chosen not to ask the 
question for the SNP or to reformulate it in different language. This may not be a 
conscious decision: the rhetorical question did not fit the conflict schema as well as 
Labour's. Labour's message on independence did not come in the form of a slogan or 
catchphrase as such but as a metaphor intimately related to a speaker's conceptual 
system, drawing on common cultural or common sense knowledge. As such, Labour 
were able to embed a consistent party message within the reportage of the PEBs. The 
Labour message was frequently reported in articles because it was consistently 
repeated at subsequent media events, which may not have been directly related to the 
party broadcast (for example, speeches to the STUC). Because the Nationalists did not 
have a consistent, identifiable and accessible message the press coverage could not 
recycle it. Therefore much of the reportage focussed on criticism of the SNP's 
electioneering strategies and their defence of them. The SNP also lack the support of 
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any major newspaper title. In contrast the Labour Party who in the UK context has the 
general support of stable mates The Times and The Sun and in Scotland can claim the 
loyal support of the Daily Record, the biggest selling daily tabloid in Scotland. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter began with an analysis of common metaphors and schemata employed in 
the representation of the political field in media discourse of the Scottish print press. 
It was demonstrated that there was a high degree of similarity between journalists and 
political agents in their application of said metaphors and schemata. These metaphors 
and their associated schemata privilege certain meanings and exclude others. In this 
case, metaphorically referring to the political field in terms of conflict represents 
politics as a contest between two antagonistic factions: the Labour Party and the SNP. 
Scotland's multi-party system is represented by both journalists and politicians of all 
colours as two party politics, in the corpus examined here. 
The conflict paradigm is pervasive in the discourse of the election, to the 
extent that it forms a common-sense value of how the political field is constituted. 
This is at the expense of meanings which would better represent minority parties' 
interests. The multi-party complexion of the Scottish Parliament has already been 
discussed, with no one party likely to form a majority executive and with many other 
small parties and individual candidates likely to obtain political office. Therefore 
representing politics as a conflict between two sides appears inappropriate in the case 
of Scottish devolution. Conflict represents neither the actuality of the situation nor the 
interests of many of the participants. Even so, influential agents involved in Scottish 
politics have no need to challenge this hegemony: it is in the interest of both Labour 
and the Nationalists to have the political field conceived with them as the main 
protagonists. The press appear to continue a tradition derived from Westminster 
reportage, of constituting politics as a battle between two opposing ideologies. This is 
given a distinctively Scottish flavour by substituting Labour's Conservative 
opponents with Scottish Nationalists. Garton, Montgomery and Tolson comment in 
their work on metaphor and schema that, 
Particular ideological assumptions and narrative scenarios occupy a place of dominance within this [mediated political] forum, to the extent that their 
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pervasive solidity as forms of common sense is very difficult to challenge. 
Moreover, such forms of discourse are not simply restricted to the fields of 
topics (such as defence) which they represent, but are also mobilized, 
metaphorically, in the way public debate is reported. (1991: 115-116) 
Therefore the conflict paradigm is perpetuated as a common-sense representation of 
the field of politics as it is reinforced by the institutional agents of the two dominant 
parties and the media. Smaller participants in the political field would find it difficult 
to have their alternative voices represented in discursive constructions that structurally 
subsume the meanings they are trying to promulgate. 
This chapter also suggested that the negative campaign theme, particularly 
prominent of the third week of the election, arose out of the conflict paradigm. 
Although critical of Labour and the Scottish Nationalists the commentaries still 
propagated the conflict paradigm's structuring of the political field as a binary 
conflict. When other parties were drawn into the debate, reportage of their comments 
were more often than not limited to commenting on the activities of Labour and the 
SNP. This reinforces the assumed centrality of the two main parties to this political 
process and runs counter to the interests of competing minority parties and candidates. 
The negative campaign theme further illustrates Garton, Montgomery and Tolson's 
(1991) observation that schema can become regulative or productive mechanisms in 
the production of media discourse. Once a story and its associated language gains 
prominence, future discourses are conceived and framed in keeping with the structure 
of the established schema. In this instance the conflict paradigm is the overarching 
schema for representing the political field. The negative campaign theme was the 
story that took hold and played out over the third week, constantly reinforced by 
politicians and journalists in different publications day after day. In performing a 
regulative function, metaphors and schema privilege certain meanings and exclude 
others: this explains why the press only focussed on Labour and the SNP. The 
Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Greens and Scottish Socialist parties had 
broadcasts, events and messages they wished to be communicated in the third week of 
the campaign. However, as minority participants the minority parties were unable to 
compete against the hegemony of two party politics media coverage. Therefore, it 
was illustrated that other activities by Labour and the Nationalists, such as poster 
launches and speeches were assimilated into the binary conflict paradigm and 
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negative campaign theme. Minority party activities were unable to be prominently 
represented in this area of reportage. 
Finally, this chapter compared the Labour and Scottish Nationalist messages 
of the third week of the campaign. Although both parties had to communicate their 
messages through often negative commentary about their campaign methods, Labour 
achieved greater success. This chapter suggested that Labour was more successful for 
several reasons: they were able to stay `on message' more successfully, partly because 
their message wasn't in the form of a slogan or question; and Labour's choice of 
language was a culturally salient metaphor that evoked many common-sense 
assumptions about the nature of divorce. The divorce metaphor could easily be 
transferred to the target domain of the SNP's policy on independence. Although the 
SNP received coverage and recycling of their message, instances were far fewer 
occurring over fewer days than Labour's. These final observations illustrated the 
complexity of mediated political communication through the press. The press' 
reportage of the two broadcasts focussed on the negative campaign strategies of the 
parties involved. The Labour party were able, in this instance, to successfully embed 
their message within this coverage; whereas the SNP's became lost in the criticism. 
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CHAPTER 6: IMAGINING SCOTLAND: `THE NATION' AS IDEOLOGICAL 
TOOL 
6.1 Investigating language and national and state identities 
Thus far one of the things this thesis has demonstrated is that national identity plays 
an important role in Scottish politics. National identity creates an overarching 
nationalist agenda in the sense that, as McCrone (2001: 126) suggests, all Scottish 
politicians are Nationalist in their outlook. However, it has also been shown that the 
different parties construct different positions for Scotland in relation to the UK, both 
in terms of ideological content and in the labelling of in and out-groups. Chapter 3 
illustrated that categorisation of nation and state groupings had an important 
ideological aspect when explaining party political in-group and out-group labelling. 
Some parties are unionist, others unionist within a federal framework, while others are 
separatist, wishing to situate Scotland outside the current UK constitutional 
framework. These ideological positions of Scottish nationalism have been shown to 
affect the potential patterns of coalition, with the federalist Liberal Democrats holding 
the balance of power between the unionist Labour Party and the separatist SNP. All 
three parties are left of centre and social democratic in their ideological orientations 
but Labour and the SNP's differing positions over Scottish independence preclude a 
partnership between them in the current UK political climate. 
It should be clear by now, through the discussion of previous chapters, that 
language plays an important role in the representation of and public competition 
between ideologies. Both the importance of the nationalist agenda in Scottish 
devolved politics and the significance of language in the mediation of intergroup 
conflict around that issue have been investigated. This chapter intends to continue to 
explore how language represents the nationalist agenda in Scottish politics. 
If Scottish national identity is so important to the political culture of Scotland, 
it is legitimate to ask, what do ideological interpretations of Scotland look like? If the 
different parties construct different positions for Scotland within or outwith the UK 
are their conceptions of what Scotland is different? If there are differences between 
political conceptions of Scotland, are conceptions different and/or related to other 
socio-cultural conceptions of the nation? For example chapter 2 demonstrated that in 
recent times, at least, Labour and the SNP have been successful in linking in the 
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public mind centre-left, social democratic values with Scottish national identity to the 
extent that right-wing Conservatism was often associated with Englishness, and as 
such the Scottish Conservatives find themselves ideologically isolated in Scotland. 
Therefore, do all the parties of Scotland draw on any non-political or non-civic47 
sources in constructing their conception of the Scottish nation? And are these 
conceptions used in any ideologically competitive way in devolved Scottish election 
discourse, i. e. in combination with conceptions of party identity? The analysis in 
sections 3 and 4 below will explore statements in manifestos and PEBs to explore the 
character of the discursive construction of Scotland and Scottish national identity by 
Scotland's political parties. The analysis will show the effects of party political 
ideology on the ideological conceptions of Scotland, demonstrating the active use of 
the nation as an ideological tool of persuasion. 
In exploring the above questions this chapter will firstly place this 
investigation of discursive constructions of `the nation' within a broader theoretical 
tradition. Anderson (1983), Billig (1995) and others have explored the `imagined' 
nature of modern nations and the role of discursive acts in maintaining what Billig 
refers to as a `banal' nationalism48. Much of the work done in this discursive tradition 
has focused on national press, including Scottish specific work (Higgins, 2004a and 
2004b; Law, 2001; Schlesinger, 1998), which will be discussed further below. Billig 
notes politicians also play an important role in this process, 
Democratic politics is founded on the institutions of nationhood; politicians 
have become celebrities in the contemporary age, their words, which typically 
reproduce the cliches of nationhood, are continually reported in the mass 
media. (1995: 11) 
This chapter therefore looks at the role of politicians in the discursive process of 
constructing the nation. These discursive approaches are contrasted with the empirical 
47 That is conceptions of nationalism which do not draw on the traditional political ideologies of left 
and right or public institutions, such as educational and legal systems. In their critical discourse 
analysis of Austrian national identity, Wodak et al (1999) make the distinction between Staatsnation 
and Kulturnation aspects of national identity. Staatsnation is equivalent to civic-nationalism, a kind of 
constitutional patriotism associated with the formal democratic institutions of society. By contrast, Kulturnation is equivalent to non-civic nationalism, which draws on more ethnic, as well as bounded 
conceptions of national identity, such as place, landscape, common language and common history. 48 Banal nationalism refers to the everyday habits, including discursive ones, which maintain the ideological coherence of a nation, particularly in Western democracies. The theory explains how the 
nation is maintained in the minds of its people day-to-day by being continuously `flagged' in seemingly 
unobtrusive ways. See page 172-176 below for further explanation. 
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work of Curtice et at (2002), McCrone (2001), Brown et al (1999), Bennie, Brand, 
and Mitchell (1997) and Brown, McCrone, and Paterson (1996). The discursive 
approach requires a degree of revision in light of the aforementioned empirical work 
as well as this investigation. In addition, in light of this chapter the empirical 
investigations mentioned are also shown to have limitations and require adaptation. 
6.2 Imagining Nations: the National as Ideological Construct 
The following sections explore what the actors on Scotland's political stage conceive 
Scotland to be. In this exploration the focus is on the discursive manifestations of 
political parties' imaginings of Scotland. This `imagining' is not meant provocatively; 
it does not intend to imply that Scotland is a fanciful notion, an imaginary and 
therefore false concept. The sense is that of Benedict Anderson's work, and is one 
which fits with this discursive investigation of ideology and politics. For Anderson 
nations are imagined but not imaginary, 
It [the nation] is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation 
will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of 
them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. (Anderson 
in Spencer and Wollman, 2005: 45) 
In this theory the ubiquity of national imagining is therefore a powerful constituent in 
what makes a nation, a communion of Cartesian egos aggregating their sentiment, `we 
think therefore we are'. Nationalism for Anderson is born out of the proliferation of 
print capitalism, and is primarily a discursive narrative. Individuals form nations 
through the community of print press and novelistic audiences, who imagine their 
commonality to be fundamentally limited, that is sovereign and bordered, connected 
through time and spatial proximity. One can see how such a mass act of cognition 
suits a cognitive-linguistic approach, particularly with its emphasis on textual 
audiences. The `Nation' forms important elements of accounting for the context of 
culture, from which political genres result. Politicians propose to speak for `the 
people' and in the interests of `the Nation' and audiences do not have trouble 
determining which people and what nation they speak of. 
Like Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983) places the industrialisation of literacy 
central to explaining the contemporary ideology of nations and nationalism. Behind 
the work of both Anderson and Gellner is the premise that nations and nationalism are 
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a phenomenon of the industrialised world, nations are not social artefacts which can 
be really seen in the primordial mists of time. However, though nations are a modern 
phenomenon, they are not thought to be modern by those who imagine them. On the 
contrary, Hobsbawm (1992) and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) have discussed both 
the historical emergence of nations and the invention of traditions which portray 
nations as timeless and bounded. They are bounded in the sense that `our' traditions 
link `us' together culturally, and in turn those traditions differentiate `our' nation from 
`theirs' (cf. Billig, 1995: 71). In these theories, nations and nationalism are a product 
of a process and organisation of industrialised modernity and nationalist beliefs are 
maintained by the communicative practices of nation states. Smith (2001) has tried to 
reconcile the above `modernist' accounts of nations, which heavily emphasise the role 
of elites in the conceptualisation of the nation state, with primordialist and ethno- 
symbolic theories49. He concludes, `the nation can be regarded as a sacred 
communion of citizens, and nationalism as a form of `political religion' with its own 
scriptures, liturgies, saints and rituals' (Smith, 2001: 146). Smith's metaphorical use 
of `scriptures' and `liturgies' maintains the importance of discursive devices in the 
maintenance of nations and national identities, which leads this discussion to a more 
general point about nationalism. 
The sense being given to nationalism here is an ideological one; and like other 
ideologies it can enact the processes of hegemony. Therefore, nationalism does not 
have to be foregrounded and openly disputed; it can also be `banal' (Billig, 1995), that 
is to say, everyday and omnipresent in a world of nation states. What is often 
described as patriotism, under this paradigm, is a form of nationalism. Billig (1995) 
has gone some way to illuminate the ways in which nationalism is present in the 
everyday discourses of societies. Nationalism is an ideology which is maintained and 
communicated through a complex dialectic of remembering and forgetting. The 
nation is routinely flagged through the discursive (and semiotic) practices of everyday 
life; and it is because of the naturalness of these practices that `our' patriotism is often 
unseen but when brought to the fore is always thought of as natural, neutral and 
rational. This aspect of Billig's theoretical approach draws on Bourdieu's (1990) 
concept of `habitus'. Billig explains, 
a9 For an overview of theories of nations and nationalism see Smith (2001) and Spencer and Wollman (2005). 
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Patterns of social life become habitual or routine, and in so doing embody the 
past. One might describe this process of routine-formation as enhabitation: 
thoughts, reactions and symbols become turned into routine habits and, thus, 
they become enhabited. The result is that the past is enhabited in the present in 
a dialectic of forgotten remembrance. (1995: 42) 
Owing to the forgotten rituals of everyday life it would be unusual for someone to 
forget or be unaware of their national identity. Billig (as did Barthes, 1983) draws 
attention to the un-waved and un-saluted flags (1995: 40-43) on the wall of the town 
hall or service station forecourt. Some flags are not meant to be saluted: while the 
union flag may be saluted by soldiers trooping the colour, the same flag as motif on a 
ladies' t-shirt should not. It is the un-saluted flags that form part of the habitus of 
everyday life; their presence and symbolic significance is simultaneously forgotten 
and remembered. These everyday practices and rituals by which national identity is 
maintained and remembered have been overlooked by many academics (Billig, 1995: 
51), as well as being unnoticed by individual citizens. 
National identity is is a form of group identity, a way in which the world is 
implicitly divided up topographically and psychologically into an `us' and numerous 
`them'. Here this investigation returns to the earlier discussion of Social Identity 
Theory and Self Categorisation theory (see chapters 1 and 3) as an analytical tool for 
investigating group behaviour, including discursive acts. A national identity is one 
such group identity and therefore one would expect to see positive in-group and 
negative out-group characterisations (for example, `our' reasonable British patriotism 
versus `their' belligerent French nationalism). However, an important point to note is 
that Social Identity Theory accounts for why a national identity can be something 
which is both present and not present in the minds of fellow countrymen. The theory 
predicates that individuals have multiple identities or ways in which they can 
categorise themselves. These identities are both latent and context sensitive, becoming 
active in an appropriate situation (Billig, 1995: 69). Billig goes on to explain, 
The latency of nationalist consciousness does not depend on the vagaries of 
individual memory: if it did, then many more people would forget their 
national identity. Nor does national identity disappear into individuals' heads 
in between salient situations... The apparently latent identity is maintained 
within the daily life of inhabited nations. The `salient situation' does not 
suddenly occur, as if out of nothing, for it is part of a wider rhythm of banal life in the world of nations. What this means is that national identity is more 
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than an inner psychological state or an individual self-definition: it is a form of 
life, which is daily lived in the world of nation-states. (1995: 69) 
At this point the argument has come full circle from Billig's introduction because it is 
everyday discourse practices which are therefore an essential part of remembering and 
forgetting national identities. Billig illustrates his point with a linguistic investigation 
of daily newspaper journalism, showing that copy is rooted in an assumed national 
audience. The nation and its audience is signalled by the routine use of deictic 
markers, which are `Beyond conscious awareness, like the hum of distant traffic, this 
deixis of little words makes the world of nations familiar, even homely' (1995: 94). 
The deictic markers like `here', `us', `our', `then' and `now' flag the nation of place, 
of temporal and demographic continuity and in doing so represent much more than 
they initially encode in their surface structure. These `little words' presuppose that the 
readers understand what `our' nation is, who its members are, what 'we' believe in 
and which traditions `we' observe. 
For all the strengths of Billig's work, Scotland raises some relevant concerns 
with this theory50. These concerns centre on the conflation of state and national 
identities, an homogenisation of state and national audience. Brown, McCrone and 
Paterson, before devolution, referred to Scotland as a `stateless nation' (1996: 25), a 
country with a definable national identity separate from Britishness but lacking `a 
fully independent legislature' (1996: 25). Similarly, Tom Nairn (1977) remarked on 
what he termed Scotland's `sub-nationalism'. Developing after the Union, for Nairn 
(1977) this was a type of non-political, cultural nationalism that developed and 
existed sublimated by the more `cosmopolitan' identity of the British state. Billig 
himself notes on several occasions a less than uniform `British' arrangement in the 
identities and the institutions which propagate those identities. He observes that the 
`British' press often means an English and London-centric press and that other parts 
of the Kingdom (particularly Scotland) have more dominant regionally specific media 
(1995: 111). Billig also observes that England is frequently hyper-extended to mean 
Britain in the English press (1995: 70). On this later point Smith expands, 
In practice, the English have always found it impossible to distinguish their 
own English ethno-nationalism from a British patriotism, which they conceive 
of equally as their `own'. This is not simply an imperialist reflex. Rather, it 
so The same criticism can be levelled at much of the work of the theorists discussed above. 
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reflects the way in which British patriotism was felt in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries to be a `natural' extension of English ethnic nationalism; 
and how a British nation came to be viewed by the English, and not a few 
Scots... as a coming together of the various nations inhabiting a united 
kingdom. (2001: 16) 
Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone (2001) have all noted that Scots 
make a clear distinction between a `British' state identity and their `Scottish' national 
identity, and observe that the English tend not to do likewise. In these above studies 
(see chapter 2 for more detail) participants were asked to weight the importance of 
their identities (i. e. Scottish more than British, British more than Scottish, equally 
Scottish and British, just Scottish or just British) and in doing so the Scots, though 
varying the weight of their responses, had no difficulty in understanding the question. 
However, it was observed that the question of distinguishing one's state and national 
identity is not always understood in England, which supports Smith's (2001) assertion 
of the equivalency of Englishness and Britishness. This is by no means to invalidate 
Billig's analysis of banal nationalism, but as both Law (2001) and Higgins (2004a, 
2004b) have observed in relation to press analysis the theoretical approach perhaps 
could be augmented to account for the more complex aspects of the British case. 
Law observes that `Billig tended to treat banal nationalism as a single genetic 
cell coded by state-centred rhetoric' (2001: 314). In two subsequent papers Higgins 
(2004a and 2004b) agrees with Law (2001), that at least in the Scottish media there is 
ample evidence for a more complex dialectic in the projection of national and state 
identities in Scotland. In studying press reception of the 1999 Scottish devolved 
election, Higgins (2004a and 2004b) explored the complex relationship between state 
and national identities in the Scottish media, observing that there was a distinctly 
politicised influence in the mediation of the two identities. This mediation of national 
and state identities was not merely a case of framing news stories from an 
ideologically Scottish versus an ideologically British perspective. Instead, national 
and state identities mean different things to different groups in Scotland and 
accordingly carry different balances and weights of emphasis or occlusion. The 
Scottish press used varying applications of deixis and location marking - or what 
Higgins calls `locational tokens' (2004a) - which rhetorically mediated between dual 
identities, placing different levels of emphasis on particular identities depending on 
political ideology (i. e. unionist or separatist) and context. Therefore, these are not 
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antithetical identities, a rhetorical position could be exclusively Scottish or British, 
equally positions could be more Scottish than British, or more British than Scottish, or 
equally Scottish and British. Higgins concluded that a greater role should be given to 
`politics in shaping the expression of national identity in the media' (2004b: 467) as 
patterns of discursive categorisation of Scotland match the constitutional preferences 
of newspapers. 
Thus far this investigation has come to the conclusion that Scotland and 
Britain and their associated identities, have a political entailment in Scotland which is 
not manifest in England with its national-state identity(s). Britishness does not have 
the hegemonic dominance in Scotland as it does in England. The details of nationalist 
advocacy have been drawn into and entangled with party political arguments. 
Scotland is not banally ideological, in that its mental image does not sit passively and 
unnoticed in the minds of Scotland's politicians or people. Scotland is strategically 
foregrounded and evoked for political advantage. The existence of a Scottish nation 
and identity is not at dispute in Scottish politics; discord arises in representing how 
that nation and its identity sit with the British state and identity. It was previously 
stated that state and national identities are to a large extent conflated in England, 
while in Scotland this is not the case. The following analysis supports Law's (2001) 
claim that state and national identities should be distinguished and Higgins' (2004b) 
call for greater consideration to be given to politics in the formation of these identities 
in the analysis of banal nationalism. 
The studies of Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone (2001) 
concur with that of Law (2001) and Higgins (2004a and 2004b) in differentiating state 
and national identities. However, Brown et at (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and 
McCrone (2001) tend to emphasise civic aspects of nationalism as prime in the 
politics of Scottish identity. Their argument has largely been premised on heavy 
emphasis on a civic society. This distinctive Scottish civic-society is claimed to have 
been kept alive by the institutions of law, education and church post 1707 in the 
absence of sovereign state apparatus (see Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 1996; 
McCrone, 2001; and Paterson, 1994). The analysis below will point to evidence 
which would suggest that consideration of non-civic aspects of national identity 
should also be investigated to give a more representative picture of Scottish national 
identity (a conclusion which their own evidence could be used to support). 
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6.3 Party Political Descriptions of the Nation 
Work by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) and the Comparative Manifesto 
Project (CMP) has taken a quantitative approach, to statements in party literature. 
This research has the strength of being able to analyse a large number of lengthy 
documents. However, MRG and CMP codes manifesto statements by subject but does 
not give a detailed account of the content of those statements. Therefore, MRG and 
CMP analysis does not provide the level of textual detail that this thesis has sought to 
give; and the quantitative analysis does not look at manifestos as part of wider 
discourses. As such, the following qualitative analysis takes a systemic functional 
approach in order to be able to compare the detail and meanings of inter-party 
conceptions of Scotland. This section will look exclusively at Scotland and Scottish 
national identity; whereas the following section investigates how Scotland and 
Scottish national identity are negotiated in relation to Britain and British identity. 
Billig (1995) and Shotter (1993) claim nationalism is a tradition of 
argumentation. The argument concerns who the national `we' is, 
Rival politicians and opposing factions present their different visions of the 
nation to their electorates. In order for the political argument to take place with 
the nation, there must be elements which are beyond argument. Different 
factions may argue about how `we' should think of `ourselves' and what is to 
be `our' national destiny. In so doing they will take for granted the reality of 
`us', the national place. (Billig, 1995: 95-96) 
These `taken for granted assumptions' can be seen in the construction of Scotland the 
place and Scotland the people which political parties routinely use to address their 
audience. Indicative of this is the following example from the contents page of the 
SNP manifesto, where the sections are entitled `Our Choice', `Our Prosperity', `Our 
Public Services', `Our Environment', `Our Nation', `Our Scotland' and `Our 
Potential'. The collective possessive determiner roots the party manifesto in a national 
Scottish audience, as well as identifying the party with the national interest. 
It will be shown that all the Scottish parties address the nation and that they 
share many conceptions of the nation and its people. Correspondingly, one can 
observe certain grammatical patterns for encoding the nation. The first is that the 
nation and its people are modelled on experiences of `being', for example the type of 
experience of the world one sees encoded by relational clauses, as opposed to 
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experiences of `doing', encoded by material clauses, or experiences of saying or 
sensing, encoded by mental and verbal projected clauses. A second common 
representation is one of `possessing', that is possessing particular features 
(characteristics, aspirations and achievements). It follows, in a systemic functional 
analysis, that possession is not just marked by the genitive inflection ('s) but also as a 
form of relational clauses. For example, relational clauses that encode possession as 
attribute or identity (see Table 6.1 for hypothetical examples). 
" (i) attributive, " (ii) identifying 
,. 
is an attribute of a 
_ ._.,., ._r 
is-the identitof 
. ,.. - ey .. -, 
(1) intensive `x is a' Scotland is small Scotland is a world leader 
in child law 
(2) possessive `x has a' Scotland has an excellent Excellent education is 
education system Scotland's birthright; 
Scotland's birthright is 
excellent education 
(3) circumstantial `x is at Scotland is at a crossroads Scotland is the future 
a' 
Table 6.1 The principle categories of `relational' clause (adapted from Halliday and 
Matthiessen, 2004: 216) 
As table 6.1 illustrates, relational clauses of `being' are characterised by intensive 
verbs, while relational clauses of `possession' are, unsurprisingly, marked by 
possessive verbs. For the purposes of this investigation, relational clauses are of 
particular interest because they are either attributive or identifying, encoding the 
descriptions of a thing as an element of that thing's being. Circumstantial relational 
clauses are of less interest to this section simply because one sees less evidence of 
them in the data analysed. The third common representation is the personification of 
the nation. Clearly, this overlaps with the second type of representation, for example, 
`Scotland has an enduring spirit' would be an example of a possessive relational 
clause `has' and ascribing `an enduring spirit' to Scotland personifies the nation as 
being able to possess something. Personification also includes instances where the 
nation is said to `do' something and therefore have action. Also relevant are material 
process clauses, where the nation is said to act. 
In these varying forms of representation one sees the nation in many forms. 
There are the inclusive civic conceptions, so often foregrounded by political parties 
and academics alike, such as education, legal, demographic diversity, and religious 
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and social tolerance. In democracies, civic values tend to be inclusive because of the 
pluralistic and accountable nature of government. However, there can be non- 
inclusive civic forms as well, as societies are inherently bounded, making distinctions 
between themselves and others and assigning rights and responsibilities on that basis. 
Inclusive civic values might be religious tolerance or universal right to education, 
whereas exclusive values might be the exclusion of English residence for voting in 
devolved Scottish elections. There are also non-civic and exclusive conceptions; these 
include representations of the nation in terms of language, religion, landscape, history, 
place and tribe. The latter conceptions are ways of distinguishing one's nation from 
others on non-constitutional or legal grounds. In making distinctions, boundaries are 
created which indicate difference; boundaries which are, at some level of realisation, 
exclusive. In contrast, the former civic conceptions encode meanings associated with 
democratic and civic values, such as social diversity, inclusiveness and public 
institutions and practices (such as education and the law). Therefore, excluding 
English residents from voting in Scotland is a civic issue; excluding the English on 
the basis of their ethnic origin would be a non-civic value. Non-civic values can also 
be inclusive, for example in support of so called `community languages'. The 
following tables illustrate the Janus face of nationalism in Scotland. It can be realised 
through democratic and public institutions - civic, multicultural, inclusive - but still 
with non-civic and exclusive facets. 
Table 6.2 and 6.3 present a discourse analysis of civic and non-civic 
conceptions of the nation, building on the systemic functional approach illustrated in 
Table 6.1. The tables compare manifesto statements between campaigning parties. 
Column one denotes the party identity of the statements represented in column two. 
Columns three to five then display a functional analysis of those statements: column 
three gives a systemic functional grammatical analysis; column four categorises 
statements in terms of civic/non-civic and inclusive/exclusive/neutral conceptions of 
the nation; and column five labels the specific types of civic/non-civic and 
inclusive/exclusive conceptions. Greater delicacy is provided by column five to 
column four in describing what type of conception of the nation is being constructed 
discursively. For example, in row one, column four, the statement is defined as civic 
because is refers explicitly to the `civic society' and the parliamentary institution; 
because it is not clear whether this is an inclusive or exclusive statement it is given a 
neutral label. Column three pulls out specific linguistic evidence which points to the 
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possessive nature of the utterance, in this case there is a personification and the use of 
genitive inflection marking possession by the nation. Row five then provides 
additional information the type of civic nationalism labelled in terms of the national 
attribute or description, in this instance it refers to `society'. 
=Party Manifesto Statement Syntactic Civic National 
<Features n coding attribute/description-,, 
Encodin the g Inclusiv/ 
Nation Eicliisive 
Labour 'The first term of the Personification Civic- Societal-Civic - 
Parliament has also given a 'voice' neutral 'Scotland's civic society' 
voice to Scotland's civic 
society in a way missing Genitive 
during the Tory years' (p40) inflection 
'Scotland's' 
Labour 'Scotland's courts have a long Genitive Civic- Institutional-Legal 
history and many valuable inflection neutral 'courts' 
traditions' 16 'Scotland's' 
Labour 'Scotland has a proud Relational Civic- Institutional-Education 
educational tradition that we clause neutral 'educational tradition' 
should cherish and build upon. Possessive 
It is a Scottish strength... ' process 'has' 
(p8) 
Labour 'Scotland's diversity is a Genitive Civic - Societal-Diversity - 
strength... ' (p39) [inclusive] inflection inclusive 'diversity' 
'Scotland's' 
Personification 
'Scotland's' 
'strength' 
SNP 'The SNP welcomes the Genitive Civic - Societal-Diversity - 
contribution of Scotland's inflection + inclusive 'ethnic minorities' 
ethnic minorities to our personification 'tradition of welcoming' 
national life. Scotland has a 'Scotland's' 
long tradition of welcoming 
those who choose to live here' Possessive 
(p27) determiner 
'our' 
Relational 
clause 
Possessive 
process 'has 
SNP 'Scotland has always been an Relation Civic - Societal-Diversity - 
outward looking nation' (p24) clause inclusive 'outward looking' 
Possessive/att- 
ributive 
process 'has 
always been' 
SNP 'We will ensure that Scottish Phrasal noun Civic- Institutional-Education 
History, Literature, and 'Scottish neutral 'taught' 'schools' 
Language are taught in our History, 'Scottish History, 
schools... ' (p11) [civic - Literature and Literature and Language' 
education, but exclusive in Languages' 
'our' culture] 
Possessive 
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determiner 
`our' 
LibDem 'Liberal Democrats welcome Noun phrase Civic - Societal-Diversity - 
the diversity of modern ascribing inclusive 'diversity', 'ethnicity', 
Scottish society and seek to attribute 'the 'sexuality', 'gender', 
ensure that everyone, diversity of 'disability', 'treated on an 
regardless of ethnicity, modem equal basis' 
sexuality, gender, disability or Scotland' 
age is treated on an equal 
basis' (p35) [civic-inclusive] 
LibDem 'We will: Empower the Genitive Civic - Societal-Civic + diversity 
voluntary and independent inflection inclusive - 'civic society', 'diverse' 
sector, enabling the dynamism 'Scotland's' 
and flexibility of Scotland's 
rich and diverse civic 
society... ' (p33) 
Conser- 'As Scots, we rightly take Possessive Civic- Institutional-Education 
vatives great pride in our tradition of determiner neutral 'tradition of learning' 
learning. It is a passport for 'our' 
progress for individuals and 
for society' (p IS) 
Conser- 'We recognise that diversity is Possessive Civic - Societal-Diversity - 
vatives one of our defining determiner inclusive 'diversity' 
characteristics as a nation. ' 'our' 
21 
SSP 'Scotland has always had a Relational Civic - Institutional-Education 
separate education system clause inclusive 'education', 'education 
from the rest of Britain. Possessive & system' 
Today, Scottish education process 'has' exclusive 
tends to be more broadly Societal-Inclusive - 'less based and less elitist than in Phrasal noun elitist' 
other parts of the UK. ' (p22) 'Scottish 
education' Societal-Exclusive - 
'separate'. 'from the rest' 
Table 6.2 Party statements of civic conceptions of the nation 
One can find ample evidence of expressions of civic nationalism. In Table 6.2 
Scotland's civic society is personified with `a voice' given to it by the establishment 
of the devolved assembly. Legal and educational practices and institutions are 
articulated by Labour, Conservatives, SNP and SSP alike, as being `traditions' 
belonging to Scotland. Traditions imply some form of collective practice with 
temporal continuity. Labour imbues education practices in Scotland with an emotional 
value, as Scotland is said to possess a `proud educational tradition' (2003: 8). This 
emotion is echoed by the Conservatives, who proclaim `As Scots, we rightly take 
pride in our traditions of learning' (2003: 21). The SSP mark out Scotland as different 
due to the distinctiveness of its education system; they say it has `always had a 
separate' (2003: 22) system from the rest of the UK. 
Diversity is another important facet of civic nationalism because it does not 
constitute national belonging in exclusive ethnic terms. Diversity also implies 
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important meanings associated with the salience of equality and difference within the 
civic community, which lie at the heart of many conceptions of contemporary 
democratic polities (i. e. equality before the law, and freedoms of religious and 
political expression). As Table 6.2 illustrates, Scottish parties regularly employ these 
conceptualisations of the nation, just as Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and 
McCrone (2001) suggest. Labour describe diversity as a `strength' (2003: 39), again 
personifying the nation. Similarly, the SNP state that Scotland has a `tradition of 
welcoming' (2003: 27) and of being `outward looking' (2003: 24). The Liberal 
Democrats hail the `diversity of modern Scotland' (2003: 35), while the 
Conservatives proclaim diversity to be a `defining characteristic' (2003: 21) of 
Scotland. The character of the Scottish nation is therefore variously defined as both 
`modern' and as having `traditions'. These traditions are civic institutions and 
practices such as education and the law, which imbue the nation with characteristics 
of a civic-inclusiveness and the valued attribute of diversity. Yet this very diversity 
and inclusiveness are characteristics which define Scotland and therefore presumably 
mark it out as different from other nations. Civic and inclusive conceptions of the 
nation and of national identity are indeed evident in the proclamations of Scotland's 
politicians. However they are not the only type in evidence. 
Party Manifesto Statement' Syntactic. ',, _, ',, -., Non-civic National Features'., ` Inclusive/ `attribute/description 
' 
Encoding the exclusive 
. .... Nation, -, 
SNP `Scotland is a nation of Relational Non-civic Societal-Culture 
abundant natural and cultural clause - Landscape + culture + 
assets. We have breath-taking Intensive exclusive heritage - `cultural 
scenery, rich energy sources process assets' 'breathtaking 
and fertile agricultural land... 'is' scenery', 'fertile 
we [the party] want our Relational agricultural land', 
vibrant heritage, culture, and clause 'heritage', 'culture' 
creativity to flourish and be Possessive 
shared with our neighbours in process 'have' 
the world' (p14) 
Possessive 
pronoun 'our' 
SNP 'We live in a beautiful Relational Non-civic Place-Landscape 
country, which is rich in clauses - 'beautiful country', 
natural resources and energy Intensive exclusive 'natural resources' 
sources. ' (p14) process 
`is, 
SNP 'Geographically, Scotland is a Relational Civic - Societal-Diversity - diverse nation, with some of clauses inclusive 'diverse nation' ' the least densely populated Intensive , our strength is in that 
and most scenic landscapes in process diversity' 
Europe. As a nation, our 'is' 
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strength is in that diversity... ' Non-civic Place-Landscape -'most 
(p19) - scenic landscapes in 
exclusive Europe' 
SNP 'As an island nation with a Role 'as' Non-civic Place-Landscape - 
rich maritime history and - 'island nation' 
numerous islands and Accompani- exclusive 
archipelago communities... ' ment 'with' Place-Historical -'with a 
(p22) rich maritime history' 
SNP 'We will administer Genitive Non-civic Societal-Culture + 
Scotland's culture and inflection - Language -'culture', 
languages with a new 'Scotland's' inclusive 'languages' 
department. ' (p 18) [non-civic 
languages and culture 
Labour 'Sport is an integral part of our Relational Non-civic Societal-Culture - 
culture' (p32) clause - neutral 'sport', 'culture' 
Intensive 
process 
'is' 
Labour 'Scotland's culture, from the Genitive Non-civic Societal-Culture - 
languages we speak to the arts inflection + - 'culture', 'languages', 
we perform and applaud, the personification inclusive 'arts', 'sports', 'libraries', 
sports we play and the riches 'Scotland's' 'museums' 
we find in our libraries and 
museums, makes Scotland 
unique. ' (p36) 
Labour 'We will recognise the Genitive Non-civic Language/heritage - 
importance of Gaelic as a inflection + - 'Gaelic', 'living heritage' 
unique part of Scotland's personification exclusive 
national living heritage' (p37) 'Scotland's' 
LibDem 'Scotland has a distinctive and Relational Non-civic Language -'language', 
colourful language heritage. clause - inclusive 'speakers', 'English', 
Today in Scotland there are Possessive 'Scots', 'Gaelic', 
speakers of English, Scots, determiner 'Chinese', 'Urdu', 
Gaelic, many community 'has' 'British Sign Language' 
languages such as Chinese 
Urdu and British Sign Diversity - 'colourful', Language. Language enriches enriches', 'many 
our entire society and allows community languages' 
citizens to access public 
services and communicate 
with each other' (p36) 
LibDem 'We will: promote access to Genitive Non-civic Landscape - 
the countryside, mountain inflection - 'countryside', 
areas and water... for 'Scotland's' exclusive 'mountain', 'water', 
international and domestic 'unique scenery', 
visitors to enjoy Scotland's 'wildlife' 
unique scenery and wildlife' 
(16 
Greens 'We will enable all schools to Genitive Non-civic Societal-Diversity + 
offer languages reflecting inflection - Culture + Racial + Scotland's cultural and ethnic 'Scotland's' inclusive Language -'diversity' diversity, including, Gaelic, 'cultural', 'ethnic', 
British Sign Language, 'Gaelic', 'British Sign 
Bengali, Urdu, Punjabi, and Language', 'Bengali', 
Chinese languages. ' (p8) 'Urdu', 'Punjabi', 
'Chinese', 'languages' 
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SSP `Despite Scotland's sparse Genitive Non-civic Landscape - 'natural 
population and its vast tracts inflection - wilderness' 
of natural wilderness... ' (p29) 'Scotland's' exclusive 
Possessive 
pronoun 
Its, 
Table 6.3 Party statements of non-civic conceptions of the nation 
Table 6.3 demonstrates that non-civic expression of national identity and the 
nation are also tangible in the proclamations of the Scottish political parties. The three 
most evident types of non-civic conceptions of the nation are that of landscape, 
culture and language (though language is often conceived as a constituent element of 
the national culture). In referring to the national landscape, parties are constructing 
conceptions of Scotland the place. This geographical definition is clearly non-civic as 
it does not pertain to either the political or civic institutions/practices of the polity. 
Landscape is a particularly exclusive definition of the nation as well, indicating 
boundaries and geographical specificity. For example, the SNP note that Scotland is 
`an island nation' (2003: 22) and `a small nation' (2003: 24). However, other 
conceptualisations use more emotive lexis in their instantiations and the homeland is 
flagged in patriotic and dramatic terms. The nation's geography is variously described 
as `unique' (Liberal Democrats, 2003: 16), said to have `vast tracts of natural 
wilderness' (SSP, 2003: 29). Scotland is thought to be a `beautiful country' (SNP, 
2003: 14) and to possess the `most scenic landscapes in Europe' (SNP, 2003: 19). 
This is not the Scotland the democratically open society, it is the Scotland of the glen 
and highland mist, of lochs and heather; it is the nation as the place of emotional 
belonging and geographical uniqueness. Here `our' nation is more beautiful than 
others and the national `we' is connected to the landscape it inhabits. 
Thus far, this chapter has proposed a descriptive distinction between civic and 
non-civic aspects of society. However, in contemporary democracies a strict 
distinction is probably not accurate, as many aspects of what would be considered 
non-civic life are often subsidised, supported and regulated by the state. For example 
sport, film and theatre, art and language all receive some form of state sponsorship in 
the UK, be it in the form of tax breaks, direct subsidies and grants or forms of 
centralised administration. Just as Benedict Anderson (1996) astutely suggested that 
there probably has never been a tidy fit between nations and states, so it is safe to 
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assert the boundaries between civic and non-civic aspects of society overlap 
somewhat. Therefore, it is unsurprising to see that expressions of cultural nationalism 
are evident in Table 6.3. The SNP want to administer `Scotland's culture and 
languages' (2003: 18) from a new department and to share this `vibrant heritage, 
culture and creativity' (2003: 14) with its international neighbours. Labour suggest 
sport is `an integral part' of Scottish culture (2003: 38) and that `Scotland's culture... 
makes Scotland unique' (2003: 36); whereas the Greens define Scotland as `culturally 
and ethnically' (2003: 8) diverse. These conceptions again balance differing 
definitions of the nation; they are at once exclusive in defining `our' national culture, 
but often also inclusive, suggesting that culture is diverse. This is perhaps even more 
evident in the parties' statements about the nation's languages. 
All three of the centre-left parties (and the Greens) in Scotland proclaim they 
will give institutional support for languages. They make positive and inclusive claims 
about Scotland's languages; they variously refer to English, Scots and Gaelic and 
`community languages' such as Urdu, Punjabi and British Sign Language. These 
languages are in lists and therefore might appear paratactic and equivalent in value. 
Seen in these terms the parties' attitudes to languages would be culturally inclusive. 
However, for the three centre-left parties some languages are `more equal than 
others'. Labour states that Gaelic is part of Scotland's `national living heritage' 
(2003: 37) and all three parties commit themselves to supporting Gaelic, while the 
Liberal Democrats and SNP include Scots as a language worthy of state protection. 
To this end the Liberal Democrats state `We will: Recognise the importance to 
Scotland's history and culture of our heritage languages of Gaelic and Scots' (2003: 
36-37), and the SNP promise `secure status for the Gaelic and Scots languages' (2003: 
18) while only `encouraging community languages' (2004: 18). In policy terms one 
must assume that Scots and Gaelic are of more value than `community languages'. 
Perhaps then the implication to be taken is that Scots51 and Gaelic are somehow more 
Scottish than other languages, as `living heritage' would suggest, which evokes some 
form of temporal continuity and shared cultural practice between countrymen. 
Anderson (1983) Billig (1995) Hobsbawm (1990) and Smith (2001) all point to the 
importance of language in creating a sense of national identity. Scotland's politicians 
are no different, although they inclusively proclaim Scotland to have a diversity of 
S' That is not to say that defining Scots as a language is not without controversy and in calling it a 
language is itself a political act. 
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languages and cultures, they also exclusively privilege one or two of those languages. 
Therefore, Scots and Gaelic are less languages found in Scotland and more the 
Scottish languages52. These, non-civic conceptions of the nation and nationalism by 
Scotland's politicians would seem to sit at odds with some of the empirical literature 
discussed earlier. 
Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone (2001) assert that, for 
all the major parties, conceptions of Scottish national identity and nationalism are 
civic in nature. McCrone suggests, 
The key to understanding Scotland lies in recognising that nationalism derives 
from... institutional autonomy, and is not some vague set of historic emotions 
which politicians can manipulate. (2001: 195) 
Birth, ancestry and residence are considered the main markers of Scottishness by a 
majority of Scots (McCrone, 2001). In addition, there is evidence to illustrate Scottish 
icons are held in high regard. McCrone notes the percentages of Scots proud of the 
following icons: Scottish landscape 97 percent; Scottish music 82 percent; Tartan 79 
percent; William Wallace 76 percent (2001: 147). Scots are said to pragmatically 
choose civic democratic solutions for Scotland at elections (or referenda), and these 
pragmatic decisions override any non-civic, more emotive conceptions of nationalism. 
For Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone (2001), civic nationalism 
must be the dominant conception of Scottish nationalism. However, at elections or 
referenda voters are asked to make a decision within the context of formal state 
institutions. It is, therefore, hardly unexpected that voters, given the civic context, 
make decisions which fulfil civic conceptions of national identity. These civic 
decisions are those that best fit the habitus of the democratic culture of which voters 
are a part. Given a cultural context, such as an international football match, then non- 
civic exclusive conceptions of the nation and nationalism are paramount; here 
heritage, parentage, commonality of place of birth and language are much more 
important. 
However, even though McCrone comments that in Scotland nationalism is not 
something which politicians can manipulate by pushing the appropriate emotional 
buttons, Scottish politicians clearly still use the language of non-civic nationalism. It 
52 English as the dominant language requires neither protection nor encouragement. 
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is just that non-civic and civic and inclusive and exclusive conceptions exist side by 
side. The overarching context of an election may privilege civic conceptions of 
nationhood but, as was indicated earlier, the distinction between the non-civic nation 
and the nation's mechanism of state is not always clear. Therefore, in a Scottish 
election where the state has administrative remit of aspects of the nation's cultural 
life, it is perhaps predictable to see cultural, non-civic conceptions of national identity 
and nationhood. Pressures to administer and support language(s), sport, the 
countryside, music and art necessarily draw cultural conceptions of nationalism into 
the civic arena. As such, one can find manifestations of these non-civic and 
sometimes exclusive conceptions of nation and national identity in the language of 
politicians. 
The important point is that while people are in a civic context, like an election, 
they make decisions appropriate for that context. Scots may well have voted for a 
parliament and continue to vote in elections informed by civic-nationalism. However, 
their decision is still underpinned by a sense of national place and national belonging, 
which can never be fully reconciled with purely civic and inclusive ends. Sufficient 
numbers of Scots felt themselves not just politically but culturally different to desire 
greater institutional autonomy. In policy terms, the North East of England and 
Yorkshire and Humberside are similar to Scotland in their centre-left policy 
preferences; but neither had the political will to deliver even a moderate form of 
devolution in 2005. What is the difference? It is not just a sense of political difference 
but a sense of cultural difference, of national belonging. 
The above analysis illustrates that non-civic and civic and inclusive and 
exclusive forms of nationalism intermingle in the devolved party literature. This 
chapter has disagreed somewhat with Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and 
McCrone's (2001) assessment of Scottish national identity. It is not that the 
nationalism displayed is ostensibly civic and inclusive, nor is it purely non-civic and 
exclusive, ethnic and tribal. Instead, there is interplay between differing 
manifestations. There is ample evidence for the civic and inclusive nationalism but 
there are also exclusive and cultural expressions. These however are never the fully 
fledged `hot' (Billig, 1995) and irrational forms which are said to be at odds with 
democracies. Exclusive and cultural conceptions appear to co-exist happily with the 
other forms. A balance is struck between defining the national `in-group' as bounded 
and different but also tolerant and pluralistic as a democracy requires. Where tensions 
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are manifest is between party political conceptions of the nation and nationalism, 
particularly with regard to how national identity should be mediated against state 
identity. The chapter will now turn to an example of the party political effects of 
negotiating state and national identities in Scottish devolved electoral politics. 
6.4 Party Ideology and Conceptions of Nation and State 
Scottish political parties all have distinguishable conceptions of what the nation 
is. 
These conceptions are affected by party political ideology: as one might expect each 
party purports to really speak in the interests of the nation. However, 
in Scotland it is 
not just left/right or authoritarian/liberal elements of party policy which are the 
locus 
of ideological competition in elections to decide the fate of the nation. 
Separatist/unionist ideologies enter into the Scottish ideological mix in a way unseen 
in English politics (with the exception of European politicsS3). Therefore, an 
important aspect of investigating Scottish electoral politics is to account for how the 
concepts of nation and state interact with each other and with other 
facets of party 
politics. Chapter 2 has already explored the centre-ground of Scottish politics and 
illustrated how an important and distinguishing feature of Scottish politics was that 
Labour, SNP and the Liberal Democrats have been quite successful in associating 
aspects of Scottish identity with centre-left politics. It was also demonstrated that 
both in terms of the ideology and policy manifestations of those ideologies the centre- 
left parties share tangibly similar political ground. What differentiated them are their 
stances on the constitutional status of Scotland in relation to the British state. 
Exploring the discursive processes involved in constructing ideological out- 
groups in electoral campaigning, Chapter 3 illustrated that there was a locational 
aspect to defining one's ideological opponents in Scottish politics. For unionists like 
Labour and the Conservatives there were no locational out-groups; their focus on 
Scotland and the Union did not present a context in which there were political out- 
groups outwith Scotland. However, Nationalists such as the SNP and SSP drew 
 It would be interesting to investigate how national and state identities are negotiated in relation to the 
European Union. Little is given over to international affairs in these manifestos but where there are 
examples Europe is referred to generally positively. However, elections for the European Parliament 
are a different campaigning context. Anecdotally, one might observe that across the UK opinion polls 
indicate that voters are far from enthusiastic Europhiles (see Chapter 2). Major campaign themes in 
European elections tend to be over getting the most out of the EU for Britain (or Scotland in the SNP's 
case) and standing up to Brussels. To discuss this further at this point would be tangential. 
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antithetical comparisons with non-Scottish out-groups particularly with 
English/UK/London labels. Both Law (2001) and Higgins (2004a and 2004b) have 
argued that Billig's (1995) conception of `banal nationalism' be revised after 
exploring the Scottish media. Thus far this thesis' exploration of devolved electoral 
politics supports this position: national and state identities are not conflated in the 
habitus of Scottish life. Different parties, depending on their separatist/unionist 
credentials, construct the relationship between national and state identities in differing 
ways. This process is most obvious in the manner in which parties characterise the 
nation's relationship with the state. 
Party identity did not appear to play a notable role in differentiating conceptions 
of the nation. Although the SSP tended to broadly address electors as a working class 
audience, this did not appear to affect constructions of the nation in the terms 
discussed here. Similarly, the Green Party did not evoke Scotland as a `green and 
pleasant' land any more than the other parties. If anything the Greens seemed to 
address a Scottish national audience less than the other parties; perhaps because their 
environmentalism makes them frame issues in more international terms. Therefore, 
although unionism and separatism, as ideologies, affect how conceptions of national 
and state identities interrelate discursively, individual party ideology does not seem to 
differentiate greatly conceptualisations of the nation, with each party sharing similar 
conceptions of what Scotland is like. 
6.4.1 Unionists 
The Labour Party, as has been previously noted, during the 2003 (and 1999) devolved 
elections chose to portray the relationship between the Scottish and Westminster 
Parliaments, Scottish Executive and UK government and Scottish Labour Party and 
UK Labour Party as a `partnership'. In terms of the ideological square, this is a 
positive characterisation of in-group members. However, the noun `partnership' 
performs an interesting function, discursively acting as a superordinate term 
conjoining levels of state governance and national and state identities. For example 
the Labour PEB (Text B) refers to `partnership and stability under the Labour 
Government', which could include government both north and south of the border. 
Both national and state identities are represented in positive terms but also have a 
common goal under the superordinate term. The `partnership' description works along 
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with the `building' metaphor in Labour campaign texts, for example `Labour has laid 
strong foundations... Scottish Labour has worked everyday to build a better Scotland' 
(Text A) so that the partnership has a superordinate goal of creating a better future. 
This is the positive side of the ideological square; however, on the negative side one 
can see the SNP negatively portrayed. Instead of being in partnership with the UK 
government, the SNP is said to want `divorce and separation' from the UK. As an 
alternative to `building', the Nationalists are characterised as destructively `breaking 
up Britain' (Text C), independence would be to `rip it [progress] all up and start 
again' (Scottish Labour: On your side, 2003: 5). Therefore, the current constitutional 
arrangements are a partnership which is positive and productive, whereas 
independence is divorce which is negative and destructive. Therefore, Labour uses the 
independence issue to frame the rest of the policy debate. Achieving productive goals 
in education, health, law and order and the economy are positively associated with the 
UK constitutional framework, while preserving the identity of Scotland within the 
subordinate categorisation 54. This observation appears to chime with work by Sherif 
(2001) and Gaertner et al (2001) on reducing inter-group bias. Scottish Labour 
portrays many policy objectives within the superordinate goal of stability, both 
economic and constitutional. Superordinate terms like `partnership' and `the UK 
economy' are the discursive manifestations of these goals. Partnership creates a 
positive frame within which to view the Union, reconciling the division between 
constituent nations and overarching state. In addition to this, the SNP's separatist 
ideology is characterised as the kind of `hot' nationalism, which Billig refers to (1995: 
43-46). For example, `But schools and education would be neglected while the 
Nationalists gave priority to their obsession with an expensive divorce' (PEB, Text 
C). Labour denotes the Nationalist's movement as emotional and irrational, as they 
are `obsessed' with a divorce rather than with `rational' policy concerns. This 
portrayal of the SNP follows Billig's (1995) description of the term `nationalism' 
being used to characterise `their' ideology as emotional and excessive in opposition to 
`our' rational and measured patriotism. Fitting the descriptive framework of the 
ideological square, the SNP are thus depicted negatively as an out-group. 
54 For example, `Higher growth is vital if all our other ambitions for Scotland are to be realized. We 
will use the opportunity provided by the strength of the UK economy with the lowest interest rates, 
inflation and unemployment of my adult life, to invest in the future' (emphasis added) (Scottish 
Labour: On you side, 2003: 4) 
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Like Labour, the Scottish Conservative Party does not identify political out- 
groups on the basis of the location outside Scotland and also seek to discursively 
construct links between the levels of nation and state. The language mediates discrete 
but connected positions for national and state identities. In commenting on Scotland's 
culture the Conservatives state `It is a vital component of being Scottish and British' 
(Scottish Conservatives: time to do something about it, 2003: 17). The co-ordinating 
conjunction `and' indicates that `Scottish' and `British' are identifiably different yet 
related. Partnership is also a descriptive tool of the Conservatives, who refer to a wish 
to `Strengthen relationships between the constituent parts of the United Kingdom' 
(Scottish Conservatives: time to do something about it, 2003: 1). `Constituent parts' 
and the preposition `between' indicate elements of equivalence which come together 
to form a larger whole `the United Kingdom'. Implicit in this statement is the 
differentiation of nations and state, that it is a partnership between nations that 
constitutes the United Kingdom. They also state that as unionists the Scottish 
Conservatives want to emphasise `the partnership between Scotland's two 
Parliaments' which will `strengthen the United Kingdom' (Scottish Conservatives: 
time to do something about it, 2003: 5). The genitive inflection denotes Scotland's 
stake in both constitutional levels of governance, and `partnership' as with Labour's 
usage implies a constructive relationship `between' two discrete levels, the national 
and state. 
A feature of Scottish unionist ideology therefore is to recognise the difference 
between nation and state both in the abstraction of identities and at levels of 
governance post 1999 devolution. Unionists mediate the relationship between those 
levels of governance and manifestations of identity; in doing so they seek to reconcile 
the distinction between them, constructing the relationship as a productive 
partnership. Key to this investigation, in relation to Billig (1995) is that there is no 
conflation of national and state identities, they are separate and distinct but connected. 
As with Higgins (2004a), context plays a role in how the location of nation and state 
is referenced, this in turn reflects different strategies for mediating those identities. 
For example, in the following extract Labour are constructing a Scottish focused 
position, but one which recognises the overarching UK state context. `My [i. e. Jack 
McConnell's] vision is of a Scotland where opportunities to grow are enjoyed by all 
young Scots... where we use our partnership inside the UK' (Scottish Labour: On 
your side, 2003: 3). `Scotland' and `Scots' obviously mark the national homeland and 
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people. Equally, the collective `we use our' (pronoun and possessive determiner) 
again point to the Scottish people and Scottish Labour party and their part in the UK 
`partnership'. In addition to these elements, the preposition `inside' points to the 
superordinate level of state, thereby differentiating nation and state. Scottish Labour 
alternatively can also focus on the UK level when it is beneficial. For example Tony 
Blair in Labour's PEB (Text B) asserts that the devolved election is a choice between 
a negative SNP vote and a positive vote for `partnership and stability under the 
Labour Government'. The context here is the state `partnership', and the success of 
the economy's low inflation and low mortgage rates. But the economic successes 
mentioned do not fall under the responsibilities of the devolved powers. `Labour 
Government' is ambiguous, but given the context probably includes both UK and 
devolved government, but reference to the economy and partnership projects a 
positive frame from which to view the union, with its state and national levels. 
Scottish unionists therefore can modulate between identities depending on the given 
context. They can point to the national level, `we' Scots and `we' Scottish Labour; 
and they can point to the state level of `we' in the UK or `we' the UK Labour party, 
where the UK state level necessarily includes the Scottish national 'we'. 
6.4.2 Separatists 
For parties like the SNP and SSP there is only one deictic centre, that of the Scottish 
`we'. Either in terms of place, people or party the in-group or centre of political 
concern is Scottish. Rather than attempting to mediate the relationship between nation 
and state as unionists do within the current UK context, nationalists want to obtain co- 
ordinating fit between nation and state rather than a subordinate one. In the 
nationalist's conception of Scotland, the UK is an `other' and they construct out- 
groups on the basis of their location outside Scotland. Therefore, as was illustrated in 
Chapter 3, out-groups are identified as `London', `London Government', 
`Westminster' and 'UK Government'. The Scottish deictic centre constructed as an 
antithesis to the UK is demonstrated by the following, 
And successive UK governments have been more of a hindrance than a help to Scotland. As long as we remain part of the centralised UK, we will continue to 
see low growth... ' (SNP: Release our potential, 2003: 3) 
192 
The SNP distinguish the current state level as something which is a `hindrance' to the 
national level. `[P]art of the centralised state' implicitly denotes Scotland as a 
marginal part of that state. The `we' of the second clause complex is specifically a 
national Scottish `we' at the exclusion of a state `centralised UK'. There is no 
modulation between different deictic centres in nationalist rhetoric. However, as with 
the unionist examples, what is important to note is that nationalists make a clear 
distinction between national and state levels in the current UK context. Nationalists 
are arguing for a union not of nations under a collective UK but a union of nation and 
state at the Scottish level. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Initially, this chapter sought to demonstrate that civic and inclusive forms of 
nationalism are not the only important forms in Scottish politics, contrary to what 
Brown et at (1999), Curtice et at (2002) and McCrone (2001) maintain. Other non- 
civic and exclusive forms are also drawn on in the language of Scottish politicians. 
Civic and inclusive concepts of nationalism are naturally important in elections which 
are ostensibly imbued with civic and inclusive meanings in contemporary 
democracies. Brown et al (1999), Curtice et at (2002) and McCrone (2001) conclude 
from voting patterns in elections and referenda that electors vote on the basis of civic 
nationalism, and therefore this must be the predominating form of nationalism in 
Scotland. However, it was suggested that voters perhaps make decisions appropriate 
for the context, i. e. a democratic election, but that does not mean that other forms of 
nationalism are not important in accounting for Scotland's national identity. Brown et 
al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone's (2001) work also indicates non-civic 
and exclusive definitions of Scottishness which are held by a majority of the 
population. They overlook these non-civic and exclusive conceptions of Scottishness 
as they do not fit conclusions drawn from voting patterns and opinion survey data 
which look at democratic contexts. This chapter then illustrated that civic and non- 
civic and inclusive and exclusive conceptions of the nation and national identity 
intermingle in the language of politicians. There does not appear to be a problem in 
this intermingling; these different conceptions comfortably co-occur. It was suggested 
that this is predictable given that an election requires participants to rhetorically 
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define the national in-group while simultaneously projecting an image of openness 
and tolerance, appropriate for a democracy. 
This investigation provided evidence in support of Law (2001) and Higgins' 
(2004a and 2004b) call for Billig's (1995) account of banal nationalism to be 
augmented in light of Scottish examples. In Scotland, politics (as well as the media) 
plays an important role in mediating between national and state identities, which are 
clearly not conflated as they appear to be in Billig's (1995) analysis. McCrone asserts 
that, `actors have considerable capacity to construct and negotiate national identities' 
(2001: 153) and goes on to suggest `issues of identity are essentially comparative 
ones, strongly influenced by context' (2001: 160). Comparative and contextual factors 
certainly appear to be of issue in Scottish devolved elections. Politicians can draw on 
either level of identity depending on the rhetorical demands of the context. 
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CHAPTER 7: NEW SCOTTISH POLITICS, NEW DISCOURSE? CONCLUDING 
REMARKS ON A STUDY OF A SCOTTISH DEVOLVED ELECTION 
7.1 Introduction 
This investigation focussed on the campaign for the 2003 Scottish Parliament 
election. The aim of the study was to explore the discursive strategies employed by 
political parties during the month long campaign: with the aim of elucidating the 
character of campaign discourse for Scottish devolved elections. The post 1999 
political arrangement in Scotland differs from the UK Westminster arrangement. This 
analysis explored the possible effects of those differences on the discourse of political 
parties during campaigning. As such, the investigation intended to explicate relations 
between changes in social practices with changes in discourse practices in the 
ideological competition of Scottish politics. To conduct this research a CDA 
methodology was developed and deployed within the study. 
This concluding chapter will firstly summarise the results presented in the 
previous chapters, indicating the conclusions and the contribution of this study to an 
understanding of Scottish politics and political discourse studies. Secondly, some of 
the practical and methodological difficulties and limitations of analysis will be 
explored. And lastly, suggestions will be made for potential future research. 
7.2 Summary of Observations and Research Contribution 
The introductory chapter laid out some of the recent political and historical 
background to Scottish devolution. Of particular interest was the change in the 
electoral system which introduced a mixed form of proportionality. Important 
outcomes of this system, employed in 1999 for the first election of the Scottish 
Parliament, were: no one party obtained a majority; the first voluntary peacetime 
coalition government on British soil was entered into; the SNP, for the first time, 
received representation more in line with their levels of popular support, which they 
have never been able to achieve under a SMSP system for Westminster; and the 
minority Green Party and Scottish*Socialist Party benefited from proportionality 
(Paterson et al, 2001: 2-3). Composition of both the legislature and executive differed 
significantly from Westminster: no longer was there a political polarisation, divided 
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by the left-right dichotomy. Also, with hindsight, considering the results of the 2003 
devolved election, the pattern from 1999 was in many ways repeated and in some 
ways elaborated. For example, in 2003 Labour again won the most seats but not 
enough for a majority, the SNP formed the main opposition party, and the Liberal 
Democrats held the balance of power and entered into a second power sharing 
executive with Labour. In addition, the minority Greens and SSP won seats but this 
time in excess of 1999 (where they won only one each) and for the first time achieved 
the threshold for recognition of party status in the Parliament. 
Looking at the ideological composition of the Scottish Parliament the party 
political dividing lines are no longer drawn between Labour and the Conservatives, as 
they have been for the best part of a century at Westminster. The Scottish 
Conservatives were placed third overall in both devolved elections, but are 
ideologically isolated as the only right-wing party in the Parliament. The two parties 
of power and the main party of opposition are all centre-left in their ideological 
leanings. What appear to divide the two main parties of Scotland are not the left and 
right philosophies of economic and social ordering but the differences of separatism 
and unionism. 
In outlining an analytical approach for this study, chapter one put forward a 
CDA methodology. Critical discourse analysis affords the analyst an opportunity to 
relate changes in the social order and its practices to changes in discourse practices 
(and vice versa) through their textual manifestations. According to the critical 
discourse tradition, relations of power and ideology can be studied through discourse 
produced by those propagating their ideology in the pursuit or maintenance of power. 
Of the varying forms of CDA approaches available, this study decided to draw 
primarily from the frameworks developed by Fairclough (1992; 1995a; 1995b; 2001), 
van Dijk (1998; 2002; 2006a; 2006b) and Chilton (1996; 2004; 2005). This was in an 
attempt to combine the strengths of Fairclough's orientation towards the analysis of 
the social dimension of discourse with the insights of van Dijk and Chilton's work on 
the cognitive aspects of discourse. In this way, the author hoped to be able to provide 
productive insights to relations between changes in social and cultural practices (i. e. 
changes to the electoral system and resulting parliamentary composition), and 
cognitive aspects of discourse production (i. e. the rhetorical and ideologically 
motivated strategies used to negotiate the political field). 
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Chapter 2 mapped the ideological landscape of Scottish politics, with 
particular focus on the ideological centre, where most elections are fought and won. 
This was an attempt to look at the content of parties' ideologies and place them within 
their social and political context. Drawing on previous research and the competing 
parties' manifestos, this discussion concluded that Scottish political culture was 
definably different from the, predominantly English, Westminster culture. Scotland 
was and is more ideologically left of centre than England in terms of popular opinion 
and party political representation. Labour, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats occupy 
the popular centre ground, and under the devolved arrangements these parties are the 
most likely to form a power-sharing executive. It was also suggested, with reference 
to previous research, that the three parties of the Scottish centre, over the last 40 
years, have been able to successfully link left-wing ideology with Scottish national 
identity. These points have meant that the Scottish Conservative party is ideologically 
isolated in devolved Scotland. They are currently ideologically incompatible with any 
of the other centrist parties, and only able to obtain levels of representation because of 
the proportional electoral system they opposed. 
Analysis of previous research and the content of manifestos also confirmed 
that the main ideological battle in Scotland is not between left and right but separatist 
and unionist ideologies. This was referred to as the nationalist agenda in Scottish 
politics, pointing to how Scottish national identity is politicised in ways Englishness 
is not in England. It was shown that the three centre-left parties have a great deal in 
common in terms of the detail of their ideological goals and policy preferences. 
However, the battle lines are drawn over how best to achieve their goals, with Labour 
contextualising their argument within a `successful' unionist partnership and the SNP 
advocating constitutional independence. The federal-unionist Liberal Democrats then 
hold the balance of power, ideologically compatible with both Labour and the SNP on 
the left-right dichotomy, and with a constitutional preference different to both. With a 
crowded ideological centre ground and power sharing the likely outcome of the 
election, the end of chapter 2 raised issues in relation to how this ideological 
landscape is negotiated by its participant parties and whether there are tangible effects 
on their campaign discourse. This then laid the way for the forthcoming investigation. 
Chapter 3 continued the analysis of manifestos, focusing instead on how the 
rhetorical construction of parties' ideological positions was achieved. It was argued, 
that this approach is necessary because the content of ideologies is not the same as the 
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methods used to advocate a particular ideology. This chapter employed a cognitive 
framework for discourse analysis. Van Dijk's (1998) ideological square, as an 
explanation for the ordering of ideological discourse, was combined with Chilton's 
(2004) deictic analysis, mapping in and out-group positions in discourse. It was 
demonstrated that the nationalist agenda played a prominent role in the labelling of 
political in and out-groups. Unionist Labour and Conservative parties tended to have 
their out-groups with Scottish locations and both utilised ambiguities of reference to 
negotiate UK political agents. Labour drew positively on the UK `partnership' with 
ambiguities of positive reference in relation to policies, making it possible for them to 
claim Westminster economic achievements. The unionist Conservatives were 
ambiguous in the criticism of Labour to avoid criticising the Union. However, the 
separatist SNP, SSP and federal unionist Liberal Democrats all used locational tokens 
(Higgins, 2004a) or labels in constructing party political out-groups. For the two 
separatist parties they identified agents outwith Scotland as political opponents. In 
contrast, the Liberal Democrats used the UK context to rhetorically contrast 
government without them as negative, e. g. `people can't trust Labour on their own'. It 
was also shown that the two minority parties, the Greens and SSP, also defined non- 
party political out-groups, such as `the car lobby' or `Godfathers of global capitalism'. 
Therefore, chapter 3 began to illustrate how parties rhetorically construct their 
opponents. These rhetorical constructions were shown to be affected by the ordering 
processes of the ideological square. Opponents are then constructed in discourse on an 
antithetical basis to the in-group, where the in-group is proximally and the out-group 
distally located in discourse. Proximal positions relate to positive sides of the 
ideological square, where distal positions encode the negative sides. However, when 
applied to a devolved Scotland, van Dijk's (1998) ideological square was found to 
have insufficient descriptive power. It was asserted that the effects of the electoral 
system could be seen at play and the ideological square required amendment. Labour 
did not define the Liberal Democrats as an out-group (as they do at Westminster), and 
the SNP only label the Liberal Democrats as an out-group in conjunction with their 
coalition partners, as in `the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition'. The Liberal 
Democrats make no direct criticism of Scottish Labour and only criticise Labour as a 
UK party, governing alone at Westminster. Also, the Liberal Democrats register only 
one instance of the SNP as negative out-group, which occurs as part of the UK party 
leader's comments and not as part of the Scottish leader's critique. The constitutional 
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arrangements of devolution were asserted to materially affect the discursive 
negotiation of the political field. Whereas Labour and the SNP remain antagonistic 
towards each other, those two parties exhibit less adversarial, if not cooperative, 
discourse towards the Liberal Democrats, and the Liberal Democrats to them. Labour 
and the SNP are divided by their attitudes to the Union and by their electoral status as 
the two dominant parties of Scottish politics. However, because the Liberal 
Democrats hold the balance of power under the proportional electoral system they are 
constructed in less adversarial terms by their potential coalition partners. The 
ideological square in van Dijk's initial formulation is unable to account for non- 
adversarial discourse in competitive scenarios. The square needs augmentation to 
account for instances of cooperative discourse in competitive contexts which require 
compromise. As such, a quasi in-group category was suggested to bridge the 
methodological gap. Under particular circumstances groups may choose discursive 
compromise for mutual gain. In this case, an allied out-group may be constructed in 
similar terms to the in-group. 
Developing on the previous investigation, chapter 4 explored another facet of 
ideological negotiation. While chapter 3 looked at how parties construct discursive 
positions for themselves and their opponents, chapter 4 investigated how the parties of 
the Scottish centre formulated their arguments, that is, how the parties rhetorically 
construct positive in-group and negative out-group's actions, attributes and 
achievements. This study moved on to examine rhetorical construction in party 
election broadcasts (PEBs), employing a systemic functional grammatical analysis. 
This enabled a study of transitivity and modality in rhetorical constructions, to 
explore responsibility for and commitment to policy achievements and programmes. 
Conclusions from the previous chapters were reaffirmed by this analysis. As before, 
the nationalist agenda was seen to play an important role in Scottish electoral 
discourse. Adversarial discourse strategies continued between Labour and the SNP, 
who remain divided by this issue. Again less adversarial strategies were employed in 
relation to the Liberal Democrats. Labour and the SNP failed to criticise their 
potential coalition partners and likewise the Liberal Democrats did return their 
criticism. This chapter also focussed on how the Liberal Democrats negotiate 
responsibility for the same policy programme, while campaigning on separate tickets. 
When representing policy achievements the two parties represent achievements as 
their own and omit mentioning the other's role. Labour, however, do not discuss the 
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abolition of tuition fees in their broadcasts; whereas the Liberal Democrats do not 
refer to law and order. As these were significant policy areas for both parties, it was 
mooted that omission could well be another instance of leaving a rhetorical space for 
each other or tacitly cooperating. It was observed that the Liberal Democrats tended 
not to encode strong degrees of obligation or commitment to future policy goals (i. e. 
through the use deontic or epistemic modality). Instead, their broadcasts exhibited the 
boulomaic system of modality, encoding the leader's desire to achieve policy goals. It 
was suggested this rhetorical strategy reflected the Liberal Democrats as a minority 
coalition partner, where they would have to selectively negotiate which policies were 
included in a partnership agreement. Such examples of rhetorical strategies, therefore, 
supported the previous chapter's call for a redrawing of the ideological square. 
The subsequent chapter departed from looking at the texts of campaigning 
parties, turning its attention to mediated forms of political discourse. As such, chapter 
5 investigated press reception of PEBs, critically examining the language used and the 
trajectories of party messages. Examining a corpus of newspaper articles, analysis 
suggested that a pervasive cognitive schema manifested in the discourse of politicians 
and journalists alike. Based on the characteristics of three intersecting political 
metaphors (politics is war, politics is pugilism, and politics is argument) the schema 
was described as `the conflict schema'. The schema demonstrated a pervading 
common sense effect on the representation of political campaigns, reproducing them 
in terms of a competition between two sides. The metaphors and language of the 
conflict schema perform a regulative function of the discursive representation of the 
political field: privileging certain meanings to the exclusion of others. The cognitive 
ordering of the political field in this way explains why only the SNP and Labour 
broadcasts featured in newspaper comment on the PEBs. This representation of the 
political field benefits the two main parties, Labour and the SNP, as they are cast as 
the two competing protagonists of the campaign to the exclusion of others. Other 
political agents of differing hues had discursive contributions included in campaign 
reportage; however, these were ordered in terms of comments on the two main parties 
and not in representing their own policies. Smaller parties struggled against the 
hegemony of two party politics. This study critically questioned the appropriateness 
of representing devolved Scottish elections is this way. This is particularly so as a 
multi-party system was clearly in operation and neither of the two biggest parties 
were likely to achieve an outright majority. The representation of a two party conflict 
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also appears inappropriate in light of the less adversarial discourses which co-occur 
with adversarial discourses. The reportage of Labour and the SNP was, therefore, 
asymmetrical in their favour and an inaccurate characterisation of the political system. 
Latterly, the chapter compared the recycling of SNP and Labour Party messages 
through reportage of the PEBs. Labour appeared to be the more successful of the two 
parties, who both had to communicate their messages through ostensibly hostile 
coverage. Labour's message was reproduced more often and accurately; and their 
success was put down to their ability to stay `on message' in subsequent media 
interactions and because of their use of another culturally salient metaphor 
(independence is divorce). 
The final chapter of analysis addressed a key political issue which featured 
prominently in each of the previous chapters: that of the nationalist agenda. 
Specifically, the chapter sought to explore the discursive representations of Scotland 
and Scottish national identity in campaign discourse of politicians. As such, an 
overview of both the manifestos and PEBs was taken. The investigation also 
attempted to tackle some of the methodological problems of previous research on 
nationalism in general and Scottish nationalism in particular. In the current political 
science and sociological literature on Scottish national identity the pervading 
paradigm is one which asserts that Scottish national identity is essentially civic in 
nature. The social science research focuses mainly on explicitly political referents (i. e. 
elections and referenda). This conception of national identity equates to the 
institutional or Staatsnation concept referred to in the critical discourse work of 
Wodak et al (1999) and de Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak (1999). Chapter 6 suggested that 
voters and politicians perhaps evoke differing versions of national identity dependent 
on the context. In an election they are asked to make a democratic and civic choice, so 
those conceptions of national identity are the most prominent, but not at the exclusion 
of other conceptions. The analysis demonstrated that civic and non-civic, and 
inclusive and exclusive forms of national identity intertwine in the discourse of all 
Scotland's politicians. It was also suggested that this mixing was entirely appropriate, 
as the context of a democratic election requires participants to discursively define the 
bounded national in-group but also advocate an open, tolerant and inclusive 
democracy. 
Chapter 6 then built on the work of Billig (1995), Higgins (2004a; 2004b) and 
Law (2001), and their accounts of banal nationalism. This analysis supported the call 
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of the latter two researchers for the adaptation of Billig's original theory, in light of 
the case of a sub-state nation: Scotland. There was evidence presented here to support 
the claim that Scots make a clear distinction between their state (UK/British) and 
national (Scottish) identities. It has been evident that this distinction is at the crux of 
ideological competition in devolved Scottish politics; however, whether separatist or 
unionist the distinction between state and national identities is still made clear. Where 
differences arise they are over the positive or negative characterisation of the union 
and its associated state identity. This analysis has demonstrated that Scottish 
politicians utilise either identity depending on their discursive requirements. 
In further summary, this investigation has demonstrated evidence that the 
composition of devolved Scottish politics defers from the English centred 
Westminster political context. These differences are due to regionally (or rather 
nationally) specific socio-political characteristics and because of the new devolved 
constitutional arrangements. Correspondingly, there is a material affect on the 
construction and negotiation of political discourse in devolved Scottish elections. 
While aspects of the British tradition of adversarial politics continue, new cooperative 
discourses are evident. These less adversarial rhetorical strategies involve the Liberal 
Democrats in relation to the two largest parties: rivals SNP and Labour. These 
cooperative rhetorical strategies are due to potential patterns of coalition, which are 
determined, in large part, by separatist-nationalist ideological leanings. The mediation 
of state and national identities was, therefore, demonstrated to play an important role 
in the discursive production of party political ideologies in Scotland. In addition, the 
role of the media was explored in relation to the press reception of party broadcasts. 
In this instance, media discourse was shown to order and reproduce the political field 
in terms of adversarial discourse. This casting of Scottish electoral politics as a two 
sided competition runs counter to both the multi party character of devolved Scottish 
politics and the illustrated examples of cooperative party political discourse. 
Methodologically, this thesis has productively integrated social and cognitive 
approaches to CDA, in line with recent calls from critical discourse analysts to do so 
(Hart, 2005; Koller, 2005; van Dijk, 2006a and 2006b; Wodak, 2006). Chapter 1 laid 
an initial foundation for the forthcoming analysis through employing quantitative 
social science approaches, which explored the socio-political background of political 
ideology in Scotland. Subsequent chapters then expanded on initial observation by 
employing cognitive approaches. Ideology was then investigated from the perspective 
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of cognitive strategies of negotiating the political field. The analysis considered 
particularly metaphor and schemata (Lakoff, 1987 and 2002; Lakoff and Johnson, 
1980), the ideological square (van Dijk: 1998) and proximal deixis (Chilton, 2005) as 
cognitive structures affecting the ordering and representations of discourse. 
7.3 Difficulties and Limitations of the Study 
External observation has its advantages. In terms of reception of contemporary 
political messages from politicians and the media, the researcher's stance mirrors that 
of voters; however, the researcher is undoubtedly more immersed in the campaign, 
than the average voter. There is, therefore, a risk of over-reading the meaning of texts, 
making stronger inferences than actually might have been intended. Also, the 
researcher lives with the texts of the election campaign for long after it is over. 
Subsequent events occur, and there is the risk that hindsight informs and colours one's 
interpretation. However, not to use hindsight when it is clearly available would also 
be remiss, especially when trying to determine both the motivation and meaning of 
discourse. For example, this study observed that more than two years after the 2003 
election the Scottish Green Party discussed the possibility of coalition with the SNP, 
as a third party of coalition, should the post electoral conditions arise. This adds 
further weight to the assertion that the political conditions in Scotland lend themselves 
to coalition. 
I am neither a journalist nor a politician and, therefore, infer from second hand 
sources and deductions what potential motivations and particular social and discourse 
practices they use. But other researchers, embedded and familiar with the practices of 
these professions have published their insights (Bell, 1991,1994; Bell and Garrett, 
1998; Bruce, 1992; Ingham, 2003; Pritcher, 2002a, 200b; Venables, 2005). 
In using linguistic tools of analysis, such as systemic functional analysis, cases 
were not always clear cut as to the correct way of interpreting syntax and lexis. And 
in, for example, the rhetorical analysis in chapters 3 and 4 one was often interpreting 
what was implied or even left unsaid. Again in the study of rhetorical strategies there 
was an awareness of the weight of the rhetorical tradition which was not being drawn 
on in any great detail. In another study, one might wish to explore the contributions of 
Cicero, Quintilian and the great sophist Gorgias in relation to modem political 
rhetoric. This study reconciled its neglect of these past intellects by attempting to link 
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the production and reception of ideological discourse with an account of the 
motivations of social agents (that is the application of the ideological square and 
Social Identity Theory and Self Categorisation Theory). Also, whereas classical 
rhetoric stops at the text, CDA looks beyond it to the social context of its production 
and reception. This study did not consider political text in isolation but intertextually 
related (Fairclough, 1992) as part of a wider discourse that both constitutes and is 
constituted by the social environment in which it arises. 
Due to time restraints and limitations of space, much more data was collected 
during the election campaign than could be analysed. For example, to support this 
investigation's claim of a new dynamic for negotiating potential and actual coalition 
partnership between Labour, SNP and Liberal Democrats a study of televised election 
hustings would have been useful. Both Scottish BBC and Scottish ITV ran a number 
hustings involving individual party leaders and panel discussions, which were 
recorded as part of this study's data collection. Conversational analysis would have 
been a particularly useful tool in studying how the party leaders negotiated questions 
about the coalition. I began making transcriptions of the panel discussions with party 
leaders but time constraints prevented a complete analysis. Anecdotally, I would 
assert that the strategies analysed above were at play in these discussions, but their 
further analysis will have to wait for a later date. Similarly, there was a great deal of 
ephemera available through the ASPECT project at Strathclyde University, which 
collected constituency party leaflets during the campaign. Again, a systematic 
analysis was not possible for the above reasons. Comparing local and national 
campaign in terms of content and approach could be a fruitful area of study. 
A more direct comparison could have been made between devolved and 
Westminster elections. However, several reasons pointed to why this was not 
practical. First, the problems of one researcher dealing with the amounts of data 
involved in one Scottish election were difficult enough, let alone including an even 
bigger UK general election. Secondly, it was possible to draw on secondary sources to 
support claims for the adversarial strategies involved in Westminster elections. 
However, these possible flaws are to confuse breadth of study with focus. This 
investigation sought to identify the salient themes and issues which related to the new 
governing arrangements in devolved Scotland and in particular how these are 
negotiated in the discourse of an election campaign. Occasionally, the study would 
widen out to include all the main campaigning parties (e. g. chapters 4 and 6) but in 
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general it remained focused on the centre-left parties and their relationships. Again 
this was partly to do with managing data but also because, as chapter 2 indicated, the 
centre-left parties were where the new (distinctively Scottish) fulcrum of power lay in 
the devolved Parliament. 
CDA has not been without its critics and detractors of its methodological 
approach (Pennycook, 1994; Stubbs, 1997; Tyrwhitt-Drake, 1999; and Widdowson, 
1995,1996). The main criticisms are that CDA is circular in approach, that it is not so 
much linguistic as sociological and political in character, and that it is fundamentally 
politically biased in approach. In large part responses to these accusations have 
already been discussed in the introductory chapter but more in the guise of 
explanation than justification. These indictments will be dealt with in a direct fashion. 
Stubbs (1997) takes issue with CDA's assertion that ideologies cannot be read directly 
off texts, and, therefore, if this is not possible then it is the analyst who is `reading 
meanings into texts on the basis of their own unexplicated knowledge' (1997: 298). 
Similar criticisms are levelled by Widdowson (1995). Fairclough (1996) responds to 
these criticisms by suggesting they conflate interpretation and explanation. All 
readers, analyst or otherwise, are involved in an active interpretation of texts, bringing 
to bear their different personal resources in making meanings. Interpretation is, 
therefore, a necessary element of explanation of text. The critical discourse analyst 
not only visits features of the text in the explication of meanings, but also the social 
context from which readers draw their resources for interpretation. Text is in a 
dialectal relationship with discourse production and action and analysis of the latter 
two is an essential part of CDA but not of everyday interpretations of text. It is 
accepted practice in the fields of pragmatic and semantic studies to look beyond the 
surface structure of text in the explication of meaning. In exploring ideology and 
power, which are necessarily manifest in discourse (in its CDA triadic definitions), 
CDA is hardly behaving extraordinarily, in terms of linguistic analysis, when looking 
beyond texts to social structures and practices. From the perspective of this study, 
some ideological meanings can be directly read off texts; but when dealing with 
political texts this is hardly surprising. However, when trying to explain certain 
aspects of discourse, particularly the absence of certain adversarial strategies and 
national identity, looking beyond texts was a necessary and imperative part of 
analysis and explanation. 
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Accepting the above explanation, the criticism may still stand that the 
analysts' interpretation is still based, in part, on their own unexplicated knowledge. 
Mitigation of this is found in the triadic approaches to analysis and CDA's stance on 
truth. First, discourse is visited from three perspectives, each informing the other, and 
like other approaches, analysis is based within a wider tradition. In addition, CDA 
tends to draw on empirical traditions, in political science, sociology and psychology. 
Secondly, CDA is not an analysis of truth but of ideology, where meanings are not a 
matter of empirically verifiable truth but of interpreting vacillating positions in the 
production of meanings. 
Is CDA not really linguistic analysis, but social and political analysis, and is it 
fundamentally ideological in itself? Firstly, it should be clear by now that CDA is 
socio-political and linguistic in nature, and again this comes back to the dialogic 
account of discourse and the triadic approach to analysis. Nevertheless, as indicated in 
chapter 1, the vast majority of people working in the tradition have backgrounds in 
linguistic analysis. In this investigation, I certainly found it extremely beneficial to 
draw on previous work done in political and social sciences. Equally, the linguistic 
tools provided ways to view data which those other empirical traditions could not. For 
example, previous empirical analysis on manifestos has elucidated a great deal about 
the trends in policy preferences over time, but the approach is unable to tell one about 
how these issues are framed and used for political advantage by political parties. 
Previous manifesto analysis might tell one that `devolution' appeared X number of 
times in manifestos, but not how that policy was projected. It was noted in this 
investigation that the SNP maintain their policy of independence but in certain 
election material decided to marginalise the issue. Similarly, empirical data analysis 
has been very good at divining people's attitudes to nationalism, but poor at 
illustrating how national identity is mediated in day to day life, in differing contexts. 
On the second point, as a study of ideology and power, critical discourse analysts feel 
it is impossible to escape one's position of analysis, and therefore commit to 
explaining as fully as one can their methodological background. Analysis is certainly 
political in its challenging of common sense belief; in fact maintaining a perceived 
position of objectivity is to perpetuate inequalities of power and the supposed 
`naturalness' of certain pervasive beliefs. Also, CDA is not myopic in its explication 
of meaning because of this oppositional stance. In any analysis there are at least two 
alternative readings suggested, the analyst's, and the conventional reading which is 
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being questioned. Readers are not forced to accept the analyst's account. That CDA 
has greatest sway with practitioners with more left-wing leanings does not preclude 
the use of the approach in exploring left-wing discourses. Fairclough has commented 
`these political positionings and priorities are not inevitable: a CDA of the left is quite 
conceivable, directed for instance at left-wing or feminist texts' (1996: 52). 
Admittedly, if employing CDA, right-wing theorists might find it difficult to reconcile 
the aims of their analysis with the theoretical premises which the analysis is based on. 
With respect to this analysis, much of the discourse analysed was that of the centre- 
left. In addition, not all relationships of power and ideology exist between left-right; 
as this thesis demonstrated, nationalist and unionist ideologies are equally amenable 
to critical analysis. 
7.4 Suggested Future Research 
From the observations of this investigation more work needs to be done in two areas: 
firstly, on how institutional and cultural forms of nationalism coexist and occur in 
differing contexts; and secondly how state and national identities interrelate when a 
state is made up of several sub-state nations. On this note, one might see a productive 
line of enquiry taken in exploring the reaction of Englishness (conflated with 
Britishness) to the peripheral Celtic countries' different relationship with Britishness. 
At the time of writing there was particularly vocal reaction in the English press to 
various ('rebellious') Scots in the public eye such as Jack McConnell who said they 
would not be supporting England in the world cup. The West Lothian Question has 
taken on a new post-devolutionary form, with the Conservative Party and sections of 
the popular English press calling for a ban on Scottish MPs voting on allegedly 
English issues. This call is not matched by a similar determination to ban London 
MPs voting on issues devolved to the London Assembly and Mayor. 
Chapter six might cause one to reflect that if nation and state identities can be 
differentiated, constructed and negotiated in different ways, then does this apply to 
any other `big identities? Benjamin Disraeli once proclaimed `London: a nation, not a 
city' (1870: chapter 27), which illustrates the point that some `world' cities like New 
York and London have strong senses of identity. Equally some Yorkshire and 
Cornishmen might sometimes give primacy to their regional identity over state and 
national identities. In other instances individuals might make no distinction between 
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state and national identities and their national-state identity may be always 
hierarchically superior to their regional or city identity. Questions which may be 
asked then are what contexts and circumstances make certain identities more 
important than others? And how are these `big identities' constructed and negotiated 
in relation to each other? The work from Scottish empiricists covered in chapters one 
and six makes a distinction between state and national identities, not least because in 
Scotland they are distinct. Scottish empiricists also make a distinction between civic 
and non-civic forms of nationalism. De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak (1999) and Wodak 
et al (1999) make a similar distinction between institutional (civic) and cultural (non- 
civic) forms of nationalism, which this thesis' evidence also supported, but they 
conflate state and nation. 
This thesis mainly focussed on the centre ground and in doing so is probably 
also reproducing existing hegemonies concerning the constitution of the political 
field. Future analysis might begin to look further into the discourse of minority parties 
in Scottish politics and how as peripheral agents they struggle with existing structures 
of power. 
Having developed a framework to account more fully for the discursive 
negotiation of ideological conflict, it would be pertinent to apply this framework to 
other instances of discursive competition and conflict. These may be other political 
but equally social or industrial contexts. As such, it would be interesting not just to 
look at antithetical positions of domination and resistance, as CDA has tended to do, 
but also of compromise and accommodation in the mediation of ideology and power. 
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APPENDIX I 
(Party Election Broadcast Transcriptions) 
TEXT A: LABOUR PARTY ELECTION BROADCAST 
[Jack McConnell] 
I'm sure like me your thoughts at this time are with our troops in the Gulf and with 
their families back home, here in Scotland. But on the 1St May Scotland faces a 
choice, a choice between two futures. And I believe we need to build on what we've 
started, build on the achievements of our young Parliament, build on the lower class 
sizes in primary schools, to have lower class sizes in secondary too, build on the 
lower waiting times for cancer and for heart disease, with lower times for all 
operations and the local GP's surgery and build on the tough action we've taken 
against sex offenders, with tougher action against drug dealers now. So I believe that 
on the 1St May you should vote Labour to help us build a better Scotland. 
You might think the Scottish Parliament has been a disappointment. You might think 
it's achieved nothing. Setting up the Scottish Parliament hasn't been without its 
challenges but in just four short years Labour has laid strong foundations. Whether 
it's a nursery place for every three and four year old or free nursing and personal care 
for Scotland's older people, whether it's free local bus travel for all Scotland's 
pensioners or guaranteeing jobs for all new nurses and midwifes, Scottish Labour has 
worked everyday to build a better Scotland. 
Labour is also committed to helping Scotland's hard-working families to build safer 
communities, that's why tackling crime and drugs is one of our top priorities. 
Whether it's toughening the Sex Offender's Register or new powers to seize the assets 
of drug dealers, Scottish Labour has worked every day to make every Scottish 
community safer for our children and families. 
In four short years, forty real achievements making a real difference to people across 
Scotland. 
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TEXT B: LABOUR PARTY ELECTION BROADCAST 
[Tony Blair] 
Thursday's elections are a massive choice for Scotland. On May 2nd people will wake 
up either to divorce and separation under the Nationalists or to partnership and 
stability under the Labour Government. It's a choice for the economy, between the 
low inflation, low mortgage rates, low unemployment we've had in the last few years 
or all the economic risks of separation. It's a choice of public services, between the 
investment and reform under the Labour Government or cuts under the Scottish 
nationalists. And it's a choice about leadership. It's a choice between a leadership that 
wants Scotland ripped out of the United Kingdom or Labour's leadership under Jack 
McConnell and his team, who will work in partnership with the Westminster 
Parliament to get the best out of the UK for Scotland. Thursday's elections matter. 
Come out and vote and vote for partnership and not divorce. 
[Jack McConnell] 
Winning the election is important not because of some sense of achievement for 
ourselves but because of what I believe we can achieve for Scotland over these next 
four years. And I know that sometimes it seems that in Scotland nothing has changed 
but there have been real achievements in the first four years of our young Parliament. 
We have delivered a nursery place for every three and four year old in Scotland and 
over a thousand extra teachers in our schools and we've also delivered free personal 
care for our senior citizens and free local bus travel for Scotland's pensioners too. 
And in the first four years of our young Parliament, tougher sentences for sex 
offenders, a drug enforcement agency that is catching the dealers and action on youth 
crime too. So in the second term of our young Parliament we will build on what 
we've started and in the next four years reduce class sizes in our secondary schools, 
bring down those waiting times in the health service and take action to do with youth 
crime and disorder, that takes place in far to many Scottish communities every Friday 
and Saturday night. That's government that's on your side, a government in Scotland 
acting for the people of Scotland, a government that puts schools and hospitals first 
and takes action to tackle crime. 
[Text] 
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Vote Scottish Labour on the 15` May. 
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TEXT C: LABOUR PARTY ELECTION BROADCAST 
[Unseen narrator] 
If Scotland votes SNP on May IS`, on May 2"d the Nationalists will begin the process 
of breaking up Britain. Last month the nationalist leader John Swinney said that 
`independence is very, very close'. And if he gets his way then what? What would be 
the real cost? The Nationalists won't admit that breaking up Britain will threaten jobs, 
cause economic instability, cut investment to our schools and hospitals and increase 
our taxes. In Scotland today there are more people in work and unemployment is at a 
record low, but Nationalist plans for a separate Scotland will put apprentices and jobs, 
in places like Govan, Scotstoun and Rosyth under serious threat. 
Britain has a strong and stable economy; Scotland has the lowest mortgage rates ever. 
Hardworking families and businesses can plan with confidence. But the Nationalists 
would cause instability and uncertainty; they would put all that at risk. In Scotland we 
are building new schools, cutting class sizes, investing in education. But schools and 
education would be neglected while the Nationalists gave priority to their obsession 
with an expensive divorce. Our children only have one chance at school; the 
nationalists will put this at risk. 
Pensions are now rising. Pensioners in Britain have a £200 winter fuel allowance, we 
have introduced free personal care for all older people but the Nationalists plan to 
create a separate Scottish pensions system would put all that at risk. All that we have 
worked so hard for would be at risk. And most worrying of all, the nationalists' 
divorce would leave Scotland isolated in an uncertain world. 
On May Is` there is a choice. Don't let the Nationalists put Scotland's future at risk. 
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TEXT D: SNP PARTY ELECTION BROADCAST 
[On screen text] 
Labour said they'd reduce waiting lists. 
They haven't. 
Labour said they'd deal with bed shortages. 
They haven't. 
Labour said they'd tackle staff shortages. 
They haven't. 
How long can you wait? 
[John Swinney] 
On May lst you have a simple choice. Vote Labour and you'll wait and you'll wait. 
Despite what they tell you, nothing has changed and nothing will because Labour's 
interests are not in the people of Scotland. Labour's interests are in Labour in London. 
At a time when the wealth gap between Scotland and the UK is increasing and we're 
languishing at the bottom of the European growth league, Scotland is not Labour's 
priority. Vote for the SNP on the 1st May and you'll see a difference. Increasing 
nurses' pay means more nurses and more nurses' means we can drive down waiting 
times. One thousand more police officers on our streets mean safer communities. And 
reducing class sizes means that Scotland's children will have the best start to their 
education. 
And as for independence, I think it will be good for Scotland. I want it but it's not for 
me to decide, that decision lies with you. Our priority as a party is to prove ourselves 
to you that we can make a difference to your lives, here in Scotland. 
So on the first of May, you have a simple choice. Vote Labour and you'll wait. 
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TEXT E: CONSERVATIVE PARTY ELECTION BROADCAST 
[Male 1] 
So law and order, ah? 
[Male 2] 
Or the lack of it. 
[Male 1] 
Where's the bobby on the beat these days? 
[Male 2] 
Aeh, exactly. 
[Male 1] 
One minute they've caught the criminals, put them in gaol, the next minute they're 
out, walking about the street. 
[Male 2] 
Aeh, you're right there. 
And what about these drug dealers, ah? 
[Male 1] 
That's another one. 
[Male 2] 
Something needs to be done about that. 
[Male 1] 
What? 
[David McLetchie] 
Scottish Conservatives know that crime and drugs ruin far too many communities in 
Scotland. We need more police officers on the streets. We need fast track prosecution 
and stiffer sentences for drug dealers. We need to take persistent young offenders off 
the streets and make sure that the sentences handed out in courts are the sentences 
actually served. 
We can do something about it. 
[Male 1] 
So, I went to the hospital a few days ago. 
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[Male 2] 
Oh aeh, have you still got that problem that you had? 
[Male 1] 
Aeh. It took me ages to get an appointment as well. I was actually getting quite 
worried. 
[Male 2] 
Well, so you should. 
[Male 1] 
It's been nine months since I'd first seen the doctor. 
[Male 2] 
Nine months? 
[Male 1] 
Yep, ridiculous! 
[Male 2] 
Mind you, it's not the fault of the doctors and the nurses, you know? 
[Male 1] 
Well, I'm not saying that, as far as I'm concerned they do a good job. It's just that 
there's something wrong there. 
[Male 2] 
Yeh, I know but what can we do about it? 
[David McLetchie] 
Scottish Conservatives believe in the National Health Service but we need a health 
service that puts patients first, gives them real choice and trusts doctors and nurses to 
do the job at local level, without constant interference from politicians. 
We can do something about it. 
[Male 2] 
And what about that new Scottish Parliament building, Holyrood? 
[Male 1] 
Follyrood more like. How much has it cost them now? 
[Male 2] 
About three hundred million at the last count. 
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[Male 1] 
Three hundred million? 
[Male 2] 
Three hundred million and rising. 
[Male I] And who's paying for that then? 
[Male I& 2] 
We are. 
[Male 2] 
It's our taxes. 
[Male 1] 
That's a right waste of money that is. 
[Male 2] 
I know but what can we do about it? 
[David McLectchie] 
The money wasted on the new Scottish Parliament building at Holyrood could have 
built one hundred new primary schools or twenty five new secondary schools or three 
brand new state-of-the-art hospitals. We don't need a palace for politicians. We do 
need to cut government in Scotland down to size, that means fewer ministers, fewer 
spin doctors, fewer bureaucrats, better value for money. 
We can do something about it. 
[Male 1] 
So you watching the game tonight? 
[Male 2] 
No. 
[Male 1] 
No? 
[Male 2] 
I've got to do my paperwork tonight. You know, I sometimes wonder why I even 
bothered setting up on my own. It's just rules and regulations over and over again. 
[Male 1] 
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I know, it's frustrating. I mean, I would love to take on someone else but I just can't 
afford to do it with all this tax and red tape. 
[Male 2] 
What can we do about it? 
[David McLetchie] 
Scottish Conservatives know that it's the people and not the politicians who create 
jobs and wealth and pay the taxes that finance our public services. That's why we are 
determined to reduce rates and taxes, cut red tape and get Scotland moving again by 
investing more in roads and transport. We can do something about it. Four years on 
and there's not much to show for the Scottish Parliament. We need a change of 
approach. We need a government that trusts the people. We need a government that 
backs up our doctors and nurses, teachers and police officers. We need a government 
that stops wasting money and instead spends it wisely on the public services, for the 
benefit of us all. That's what I stand for, that's what the Scottish Conservatives stand 
for. 
Together we can do something about it. 
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TEXT F: LIBERAL DEMOCRAT PARTY ELECTION BROADCAST 
[Unseen narrator] 
Jim Wallace has been Scotland's Deputy First Minister for four years. Living in the 
beautiful Orkney Islands he knows the values of a strong local community. And he 
knows too the importance of clean air and water. People here are very conscious of 
the need to protect the environment. 
[Jim Wallace] 
Are we prepared to invest in jobs and our environment by backing the development of 
renewable energy technology? My answer and that of the Liberal Democrats is yes. 
[Unseen narrator] 
Jim Wallace takes particular pride in what the Scottish Liberal Democrats have done 
for older people. If they are no longer able to wash feed or dress themselves they no 
longer have to pay for care. It's a big worry lifted. 
[Jim Wallace] 
It seems very odd that if you were, say, suffering from cancer there are certain care 
packages that you got free but if you were suffering from Alzheimer's you didn't. 
And that seemed to be totally arbitrary and that's what we've addressed in what we 
did by making personal care free for the elderly. 
[Unseen narrator] 
With teenage daughters Jim Wallace knows the importance of education, he was 
determined to get university tuition fees abolished and he succeeded. 
[Female 1] 
As a first time voter I'm going to vote Lib Dem because I feel that they have done a 
lot for the students by abolishing tuition fees. 
[Female 2] 
They've increased coverage by GPs. They've sent a huge number of pre-school 
children into nursery education. 
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[Male 1] 
Jim Wallace, of course, has been the guiding force behind all these changes. 
[Male 2] 
He does nae turn his head when somebody asks him a question, he'll listen and take 
note and he'll act on what ye ask him. 
[Male 1] 
Well, overall I think the achievement of the Lib Dems in Scotland has been so 
significant it has changed our country. 
[Female 2] 
The Liberal Democrats in Scotland have made a big difference. 
[Unseen narrator] 
In the next Scottish Parliament there's much more Jim Wallace wants to achieve, free 
eye and dental checks for a start. 
[Jim Wallace] 
It is the Liberal Democrats who have the ideas, the energy, the credibility and the 
track-record and a great opportunity lies before us and there should be no limit to our 
ambition. 
[Unseen narrator] 
On May 1S` people all over Scotland will have the chance to support the Scottish 
Liberal Democrats. You have three votes, for your constituent MSP, for your regional 
MSP and for your local councillor. The more support you give us the more we really 
can make a difference. 
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APPENDIX II 
(Corpus bibliography of newspaper articles covering party election broadcasts, in 
chronological order) 
Mcgarvie, L. `Nats in dirty tricks row over shock new TV film: battle for Holyrood 
set to hot up' Sunday Mail, 13th April 2003 
Fraser, D. `The election's tough new phase: SNP say Labour let patients die' Sunday 
Herald 13th April 2003 
`Fear and loathing as SNP and Labour go head to head in television showdown' 
Scotland on Sunday, 13th April 2003 
`McConnell attacks SNP `deceit" BBC News online 14th April 2003 
MacDonell, H. `La-la-land advert team switches sides' The Scotsman, 14th April 2003 
MacDonell, H. 'SNP accused of bad taste in broadcast' The Scotsman, 14th April 2003 
MacDonell, H. `Morbid SNP film `crosses line of decency' The Scotsman, 14th April 
2003 
`Negative campaigning does not always work' The Scotsman, 14th April 2003 
`Election broadcast `shocking" BBC News online, 14th April 2003 
`John sounds alarm bell for Jack' Daily Record, 15th April 2003 
`Jim's clean fight plea' Daily Record, 15th April 2003 
'SNP are telling a pack of lies' Daily Record, 15th April 2003 
`Dying pensioner ad sparks furious row' Evening Times, 15th April 2003 
`Blair launches attack on SNP' BBC News onlinel5th April 2003 
Scott, D. `McConnell: SNP deceiving voters' The Scotsman, 15th April 2003 
Scott, D. `Parties clash over hospital waiting lists' The Scotsman, 15th April 2003 
Denholm, A. `Labour plays on independence `horror" The Scotsman, 15th April 2003 
Ritchie, M. `Swinney defends `negative' campaign' The Herald, 15th April 2003 
Currie, B. `Don't vote for `divorce' says Blair' Evening Times, 15th April 2003 
McNeil, R. `May the dark force be with you in TV election' The Scotsman, 16th April 
2003 
Mitchell, J. `Nationalists' brutal broadcast takes leaf out of Labour's book of negative 
campaigning' The Herald, 16th April 2003 
`McLetchie calls for end to `phoney war' The Scotsman, 16th April 2003 
`Clear choice for Scotland' Daily Record, 16th April 2003 
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Sinclair, P. `How low can SNP go? They use dead wife in sick new TV stunt' Daily 
Record, 17th April 2003 
`Deterioration in Labour debate on home rule' and `Labour resorting to tired old 
rhetoric' (letters page) The Herald, 17`h April 2003 
Swanson, I. `Parties have agreed to scare and scare alike' Evening News, 17`h April 
2003 
Crawford, A. `Divorce talk `wrong', says anti-abuse campaigner' Sunday Herald, 20`h 
April 2003 
222 
REFERENCES 
ABRAMS, D. and HOGG, M., 1990. Social identity theory: constructive and critical 
advances. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
ANDERSON, B. R. O., 2006. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and 
spread of nationalism. Rev. edn. London: Verso. 
ANDERSON, B. R. O., 1983. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and 
spread of nationalism. London: Verso. 
ATKINSON, M., 1984. Our masters' voices: the language and body language of 
politics. London: Methuen. 
BAKHTIN, M. M., 1981. The dialogic imagination: four essays. Austin: University of 
Texas Press. 
BARTHES, R., 1983. Barthes: selected writings. London: Fontana. 
BARTLETT, F. C., SIR, 1932. Remembering: a study in experimental and social 
psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
BEARD, A., 2000. The language of politics. London: Routledge. 
BELL, A., 1994. Media (mis)communication on the science of climate change. Public 
Understanding of Science, 3(3), pp. 259-275. 
BELL, A., 1991. The language of news media. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
BELL, A. and GARRETT, P., eds, 1998. Approaches to media discourse. Oxford; 
Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. 
BENNIE, L. G., 1997. How Scotland votes: Scottish parties and elections. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
BERNSTEIN, B., 1968. Elaborated and Restricted Codes: An Outline. International 
Journal ofAmerican Linguistics, 33(4), pp. 126-133. 
BERNSTEIN, B. B., 1990. The structuring of pedagogic discourse. London: 
Routledge. 
BILLIG, M., 1996. Arguing and thinking: a rhetorical approach to social psychology. 
New edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
223 
BILLIG, M., 1995. Banal nationalism. London: Sage. 
BILLIG, M., 1990. Collective memory, ideology and the British Royal Family. In: D. 
MIDDLETON and D. EDWARDS, eds, Collective remembering. London: Sage, 
pp. 60-80. 
BILLIG, M., 1982. Ideology and social psychology: extremism, moderation and 
contradiction. Oxford: Blackwell. 
BILLIG, M. and MACMILLAN, K., 2005. Metaphor, idiom and ideology: the search 
for `no smoking guns' across time. Discourse and Society, 16(4), pp. 459-480. 
BOGDANOR, V., 2001. Devolution in the United Kingdom. New edn. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
BOGDANOR, V., 1999. Devolution in the United Kingdom. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
BOURDIEU, P., 1991. Language and symbolic power. Cambridge: Polity. 
BOURDIEU, P., 1990. The logic of practice. Cambridge: Polity. 
BOURDIEU, P., 1977. Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
BRACK, D., 2000. Introduction. In: I. DALE, ed, Liberal Party general election 
manifestos 1900-1997. London: Routledge: Politico's, pp. 1-20. 
BROMLEY, C. and MCCRONE, D., 2002. A Nation of Regions. In: J. CURTICE, D. 
MCCRONE, A. PARK and L. PATERSON, eds, New Scotland, new society?: 
are social and political ties fragmenting? Edinburgh: Polygone at Edinburgh, 
pp. 234. 
BROWN, P. and LEVINSON, S. C., 1987. Politeness: Some universals in language 
use. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
BROWN, A., MCCRONE, D. and PATERSON, L., 1996. Politics and society in 
Scotland. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
BROWN, A., MCCRONE, D., PATERSON, L. and SURRIDGE, P., 1999. The 
Scottish electorate: the 1997 general election and beyond. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press. 
224 
BROWN, G. and YULE, G., 1983. Discourse analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
BRUCE, B., 1992. Images of power: How image-makers shape great leaders. 
London: Kogan Page. 
BUDGE, I., CREWE, I., MCKAY, D. and NEWTON, K., 2004. The new British 
politics. 3rd edn. London: Pearson Longman. 
BUDGE, I. and FARLIE, D., 1983. Explaining and predicting elections: issue effects 
and party strategies in twenty-three democracies. London: Allen & Unwin. 
BUDGE, I., ROBERTSON, D. and HEARL, D., 1987. Ideology, strategy and party 
change: spatial analyses of post-war election programmes in 19 democracies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
CALDAS-COULTHARD, C. R. and COULTHARD, M., eds, 1996. Texts and 
practices: readings in critical discourse analysis. London: Routledge. 
CHARTERIS-BLACK, J., 2004. Corpus approaches to critical metaphor analysis. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
CHILTON, P. and SCHAFFNER, C., 1997. Discourse and Politics. In: T. A. V. DIJK, 
ed, Discourse studies: a multidisciplinary introduction; v. 2. London: SAGE, pp. 
206-230. 
CHILTON, P., 2005. Missing links in mainstream CDA: Modules, blends and the 
critical instinct. In: R. WODAK, ed, A new agenda in (critical) discourse 
analysis: theory, methodology and interdisciplinarity. Amsterdam; Philadelphia: 
J. Benjamins, pp. 19-52. 
CHILTON, P., 2004. Analysing political discourse: theory and practice. London: 
Routledge. 
CHILTON, P., 1996. Security metaphors: Cold War discourse from containment to 
common house. New York: Peter Lang. 
CHOULIARAKI, L., 2000. Political discourse in the news: democratizing 
responsibility or aestheticizing politics? Discourse and Society, 11(3), pp. 293- 
314. 
CHOULIARAKI, L., 1999. National identity in late modernity. A case study on 
audience reception. In: R. WODAK and M. REISIGL, eds, Racism in 
Discourse. Vienna: Passagen Verlag. 
225 
CHOULIARAKI, L. and FAIRCLOUGH, N., 1999. Discourse in late modernity: 
rethinking critical discourse analysis. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
COOKE, A. B., 2000. The Conservative Party and its manifestos: A personal view. In: 
1. DALE, ed, Conservative party general election manifestos, 1900 - 1997. 
London: Routledge, pp. i-iv. 
COUPLAND, R., 1954. Welsh and Scottish Nationalism. A study, etc. pp. 426. 
Collins: London. 
CURTICE, J., MCCRONE, D., PARK, A. and PATERSON, L., eds, 2002. New 
Scotland, new society?: are social and political ties fragmenting? Edinburgh: 
Polygone at Edinburgh. 
DE CILLIA, R., REISIGL, M. and WODAK, R., 1999. The discursive construction of 
national identities. Discourse and Society, 10(2), pp. 149-173. 
DEVINE, T. M., 1999. The Scottish nation, 1700-2000. London: Allen Lane. 
DEVINE, T. M. and FINLAY, R. J., eds, 1996. Scotland in the twentieth century. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
DICEY, A. V. and RAIT, R. S., 1920. Thoughts on the Union between England and 
Scotland. London: Macmillan. 
DISRAELI, B., 1870. Lothair. new edn. London: Longmans. 
EGGINS, S., 1994. An introduction to systemic functional linguistics. London: Pinter. 
FAIRCLOUGH, N., 2001. Language and power. 2nd edn. Harlow: Longman. 
FAIRCLOUGH, N., 2000. New labour, new language? London: Routledge. 
FAIRCLOUGH, N., 1997. Rhetoric and critical discourse analysis: A Reply to Titus 
Ensink and Christoph Sauer. In: C. SCHAFFNER, ed, Analysing political 
speeches. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, pp. 86-89. 
FAIRCLOUGH, N., 1996. A reply to Henry Widdowson's `Discourse analysis: a 
critical view. Language and Literature, 5(1), pp. 49-56. 
FAIRCLOUGH, N., 1995. Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language. 
London: Longman. 
FAIRCLOUGH, N., 1995. Media discourse. London: Edward Arnold. 
226 
FAIRCLOUGH, N., 1992. Discourse and social change. Cambridge: Polity. 
FAUCONNIER, G., 1997. Mappings in thought and language. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
FINLAY, R. J., 1997. A partnership for good?: Scottish politics and the Union since 
1880. Edinburgh: John Donald. 
FIRTH, J. R., 1957. Papers in Linguistics, 1934-1951. Oxford University Press: 
London, pp. 233 
FISKE, J., 1987. Television culture. London: Methuen. 
FOUCAULT, M., 1984. The order of discourse. In: M. J. SHAPIRO, ed, Language 
and politics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 108-138. 
FOUCAULT, M., 1972. The archaeology of knowledge. Translated by A. M. 
Sheridan Smith. London: Tavistock Publications. 
FOWLER, R., 1996. On Critical Linguistics. In: C. R. CALDAS-COULTHARD and 
M. COULTHARD, eds, Texts and practices: readings in critical discourse 
analysis. London: Routledge, pp. 3-14. 
FOWLER, R., 1991. Language in the news: discourse and ideology in the press. 
London: Routledge. 
GAENTNER, S. L., MANN, J., MURRELL, A. and DOVIDIO, J. F., 2001. Reducing 
intergroup bias: The benefits of recategorization. In: M. A. HOGG and D. 
ABRAMS, eds, Intergroup relations: essential readings. Philadelphia, Pa.; 
Hove: Psychology Press, pp. 356-369. 
GARTON, G., MONTGOMERY, M. and TOLSON, A., 1991. Ideology, scripts and 
metaphors in the public sphere of a general election. In: P. SCANNELL, ed, 
Broadcast talk. London: Sage Publications, pp. 100-118. 
GELLNER, E., 1983. Nations and nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
GIBBS, R. W., 1994. The poetics of mind: figurative thought, language, and 
understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
GRAMSCI, A., 1971. [Quaderni del carcere. ] Selections from the Prison notebooks of 
Antonio Gramsci. Edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell 
Smith. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
227 
HABERMAS, J., 1989. The structural transformation of the public sphere: an inquiry 
into a category of bourgeois society. Cambridge: Polity. 
HABERMAS, J., 1984. The theory of communicative action. Cambridge: Polity. 
HALLIDAY, M. A. K., 1985. An introduction to functional grammar. London: 
Edward Arnold. 
HALLIDAY, M. A. K., 1978. Language as social semiotic: the social interpretation of 
language and meaning. London: Edward Arnold. 
HALLIDAY, M. A. K. and MATTHIESSEN, C. M. I. M., 2004. An introduction to 
functional grammar. 3rd edn. London: Arnold. 
HART, C., 2005. Analysing political discourse: Toward a cognitive approach. 
Critical Discourse Studies, 2(2), pp. 189-201. 
HARVIE, C., 1994. Scotland and nationalism: Scottish society and politics, 1707- 
1994.2nd edn. London: Routledge. 
HASSAN, G. and WARHURST, C., 2002. Anatomy of the new Scotland: power, 
influence and change. Edinburgh: Mainstream. 
HASSAN, G. and WARHURST, C., 2000. The new Scottish politics: the first year of 
the Scottish Parliament and beyond. Norwich: Scottish Stationery Office. 
HEARN, J., 2000. Claiming Scotland. national identity and liberal culture. 
Edinburgh: Polygon at Edinburgh. 
HEATH, A. and KELLAS, J., 1998. Nationalisms and constitutional questions. 
Scottish Affairs, (Special Issue: Understanding Constitutional Change), pp. 110- 
129. 
HEATH, A. F., JOWELL, R. and CURTICE, J., 2001. The rise of New Labour: party 
policies and voter choices. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
HIGGINS, J., 2004. The articulation of nation and politics in the Scottish press. 
Journal of Language and Politics, 3(3), pp. 463-483. 
HIGGINS, J., 2004. Putting the nation in the news: the role of location formulation in 
a selection of Scottish newspapers. Discourse and Society, 15(5), pp. 633-648. 
HOBSBAWM, E. J., 1992. Nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, 
reality. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
228 
HOBSBAWM, E. J. and RANGER, T. O., 1983. The Invention of tradition. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
HODGE, R. and KRESS, G. R., 1988. Social semiotics. Cambridge: Polity. 
HODGE, R. and KRESS, G. R., 1979. Language as ideology. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
HOGG, M. A. and ABRAMS, D., 1988. Social identifications: a social psychology of 
intergroup relations and group processes. London: Routledge. 
INGHAM, B., 2003. The wages of spin. London: John Murray. 
JACKSON, E. R., 2004. Dislocating the Nation: Political devolution and cultural 
identity on stage and screen. In: E. BELL and G. MILLER, eds, Scotland in 
theory: reflections on literature. Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 107-119. 
KAVANAGH, D., 2000. Labour Party manifestos 1900-1997. In: I. DALE, ed, 
Labour Party general election manifestos 1900-199 7. London: Routledge: 
Politico's, pp. 1-9. 
KELLAS, J. G., 1991. The politics of nationalism and ethnicity. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Education. 
KELLAS, J. G., 1975. The Scottish political system. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
KOLLER, V., 2005. Critical discourse analysis and social cognition: evidence from 
business media discourse. Discourse and Society, 16(2), pp. 199-224. 
KRESS, G. R., 1996. Representational resources and the production of subjectivity: 
questions for the theoretical development of Critical Discourse Analysis in a 
multicultural society. In: C. R. CALDAS-COULTHARD and M. 
COULTHARD, eds, Texts and practices: readings in critical discourse 
analysis. London: Routledge, pp. 13-31. 
KRESS, G. R., 1989. Linguistic processes in sociocultural practice. 2nd edn. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
LAKOFF, G., 2004. Don't think of an elephant! Know your values and frame the 
debate. Vermont: Chelsea Green. 
LAKOFF, G., 2002. Moral politics: how liberals and conservatives think. 2nd edn. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
229 
LAKOFF, G., 1987. Women, fire, and dangerous things: what categories reveal 
about the mind. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press. 
LAKOFF, G. and JOHNSON, M., 1981. Metaphors we live by. Chicago; London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
LAKOFF, G. and TURNER, M., 1989. More than cool reason: afield guide to poetic 
metaphor. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press. 
LAW, A., 2001. Near and far: banal national identity and the press in Scotland. Media 
Culture and Society, 23(3), pp. 299-317. 
LEITH, M., 2006. Nationalism and national identity in Scottish politics. PhD edn. 
University of Glasgow. 
LINKLATER, M. and DENNISTON, R., 1992. Anatomy of Scotland. Edinburgh: 
Chambers. 
LUNT, P. and LIVINGSTON, S., 2001. Language and the media: An emerging field 
for social psychology. In: W. P. ROBINSON and H. GILES, eds, The new 
handbook of language and social psychology. New edn. Chichester: J. Wiley, 
pp. 585-600. 
LYNCH, P., 2001. Scottish government and politics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
MARR, A., 2004. My trade: a short history of British journalism. London: 
Macmillan. 
MCCRONE, D., 2001. Understanding Scotland: the sociology of a nation. 2nd edn. 
London; New York: Routledge. 
MCCRONE, D., 1992. Understanding Scotland: the sociology of a stateless nation. 
London: Routledge. 
MITCHELL, J., 1996. Strategies for self-government: the campaigns for a Scottish 
parliament. Edinburgh: Polygon. 
MONTGOMERY, M., 2005. The discourse of war after 9/11. Language and 
Literature, 14(2), pp. 149-180. 
NAIRN, T., 2004. Break-up: twenty-five years on. In: E. BELL and G. MILLER, eds, 
Scotland in theory: reflections on literature. Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 17-34. 
230 
NAIRN, T., 1977. The break-up of Britain: crisis and neo-nationalism. London: 
NLB. 
PARDO, M. L., 2001. Linguistic persuasion as an essential political factor in current 
democracies: critical analysis of the globalization discourse in Argentina at the 
turn and at the end of the century. Discourse and Society, 12(1), pp. 91-118. 
PATERSON, L., 2002. Governing from the centre: Ideology and public policy. In: J. 
CURTICE, D. MCCRONE, A. PARK and L. PATERSON, eds, New Scotland, 
new society?: are social and political ties fragmenting? Edinburgh: Polygon at 
Edinburgh, pp. 196-218. 
PATERSON, L., 1994. The autonomy of modern Scotland. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
PATERSON, L., BROWN, A., CURTICE, J., HINDS, K., MCCRONE, D., PARK, 
A., SPROSTON, K. and SURRIDGE, P., 2001. New Scotland, new politics? 
Edinburgh: Polygon at Edinburgh. 
PATTIE, C. J. and JOHNSTON, R. J., 2002. Assessing the television campaign: The 
impact of party election broadcasting on voters' opinions in the 1997 British 
general election'. Political Communication, 19, pp. 333-358. 
PEARCE, M., 2005. Informalization in UK party election broadcasts 1966-97. 
Language and Literature, 14(1), pp. 65-90. 
PEARCE, M., 2001. `Getting behind the image': personality politics in the Labour 
party election broadcast. Language and Literature, 10(3), pp. 211-228. 
PENNYCOOK, A., 1994. Incommensurable discourses? Applied Linguistics, 15(2), 
pp. 115-138. 
PITCHER, G., REVD, 2002. The death of spin. Chichester: Wiley. 
PITCHER, G., REVD, 2002. The death of spin?: communication in the 21st century. 
London: Demos. 
QUIRK, R., GREENBAUM, S., LEECH, G. and SWARTVIK, J., 1985. A 
Comprehensive grammar of the English language. London: Longman. 
ROSENBAUM, M., 1997. From soapbox to soundbite: party political campaigning 
in Britain since 1945. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
SAEED, J. I., 1997. Semantics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
231 
SCANNELL, P., 1991. Broadcast talk. London: Sage Publications. 
SCHAFFNER, C., 1997. Analysing political speeches. Clevedon: Multilingual 
Matters. 
SCHLESINGER, P., 1998. Scottish devolution and the media. In: J. SEATON, ed, 
Politics & the media: harlots and prerogatives at the turn of the millennium. 
Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 55-74. 
SCOTTISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION., 1995. Scotland's parliament, 
Scotland's right. Scottish Constitutional Convention. 
SERGEANT, J., 2005. Maggie: her fatal legacy. London: Pan Books. 
SHAPIRO, M. J., 1984. Language and politics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
SHERIF, M., 2001. Superordinate goals in the reduction of intergroup Conflict. In: 
M. A. HOGG and D. ABRAMS, eds, Intergroup relations: essential readings. 
Philadelphia, Pa.; Hove: Psychology Press, pp. 64-70. 
SHOTTER, J., 1993. Cultural politics of everyday life: social constructionism, 
rhetoric and knowing of the third kind. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
SIMPSON, P., 1993. Language, ideology, and point of view. London: Routledge. 
SMITH, A. D., 2001. Nationalism: theory, ideology, history. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
SPENCER, P. and WOLLMAN, H., 2005. Nations and nationalism: a reader. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
SPERBER, D. and WILSON, D., 1995. Relevance: communication and cognition. 
2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. 
STANYER, J. and WRING, D., 2004. Public image, private lives: An introduction. 
Parliamentary Affairs, 57(1), pp. 1-8. 
STUBBS, M., 1997. Whorf's children: critical comments on critical discourse 
analysis (CDA). In: A. RYAN and A. WRAY, eds, Evolving models of 
language. British Association for Applied Linguistics (Annual meeting). 
Swansea edn. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, pp. 100-116. 
SWALES, J. M., 1990. Genre analysis: English in academic and research settings. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
232 
TAJFEL, H., 1982. Social identity and intergroup relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
TAJFEL, H., 1981. Human groups and social categories: studies in social 
psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
THATCHER, M., 1995. The path to power. London: HarperCollins. 
TURNER, J. C., 1984. Social identification and psychological group formation. In: H. 
TAJFEL, ed, The Social dimension: European developments in social 
psychology. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 518-536. 
TURNER, M., 1991. Reading minds: the study of English in the age of cognitive 
science. Princeton, N. J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
TYRWHITT-DRAKE, H., 1999. Resisting the discourse of critical discourse analysis: 
Reopening a Hong Kong case study. Journal of Pragmatics, 31, pp. 1081-1088. 
VAN DIJK, T. A., 2006c. Discourse, Context and Cognition. Discourse Studies, 8(1), 
pp. 159-177. 
VAN DIJK, T. A., 2006b. Discourse and manipulation. Discourse and Society, 17(3), 
pp. 359-383. 
VAN DIJK, T. A., 2006a. Introduction: discourse, interaction and cognition. 
Discourse Studies, 8(1), pp. 3-7. 
VAN DIJK, T. A., 2002. Political discourse and political cognition. In: P. CHILTON 
and C. SCHAFFNER, eds, Politics as text and talk: analytic approaches to 
political discourse. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, pp. 204-236. 
VAN DIJK, T. A., 1998. Ideology: a multidisciplinary approach. London: SAGE. 
VAN DIJK, T. A., 1997. Discourse as social interaction. London: SAGE. 
VAN DIJK, T. A., 1994. Critical discourse analysis. Discourse and Society, 5, pp. 
435-436. 
VAN DIJK, T. A., 1993. Principles of critical discourse analysis. Discourse and 
Society, 4, pp. 249-283. 
VAN DIJK, T. A., 1981. Review of R. 0. Freedle (ed. ) 1979. Journal of Linguistics, 
17, pp. 140-148. 
233 
VAN LEEUWEN, T., 1996. The representation of social actors. In: C. R. CALDAS- 
COULTHARD and M. COULTHARD, eds, Texts and practices: readings in 
critical discourse analysis. London: Routledge, pp. 32-70. 
VENABLES, J., 2005. Making headlines: News values and risk signals in journalism. 
Huntingdon: Elm Publications. 
VOLOSHINOV, V. N., 1973. Marxism and the philosophy of language. Translated by 
Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik. New York, London: Seminar Press. 
WESTERHUIS, D., 2006. Book review: Analysing political discourse: theory and 
practice, by Paul Chilton. Discourse and Society, 17(3), pp. 421-423. 
WIDDOWSON, H., 1996. Reply to Fairclough: Discourse and interpretation: 
conjectures and refutations. Language and Literature, 5(l), pp. 57-70. 
WIDDOWSON, H., 1995. Discourse analysis: A critical view. Language and 
Literature, 4(3), pp. 157-172. 
WILSON, J., 1990. Politically speaking: the pragmatic analysis of political language. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
WINTER, E. O., 1977. A clause relational approach to English texts. Instructional 
Science, 6, pp. 1-92. 
WODAK, R., 2006. Mediation between discourse and society: assessing cognitive 
approaches in CDA. Discourse Studies, 8(1), pp. 179-190. 
WODAK, R., DE CILLIA, R., REISIGL, M. and LIEBHART, K., 1999. The 
discursive construction of national identity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. 
WODAK, R. and REISIGL, M., 1999. Racism and discourse. Vienna: Passagen 
Verlag. 
WODAK, R., 2001. Methods of critical discourse analysis. London: SAGE. 
ZUELOW, E. G. E., Towards and understanding of Scottish ethnic nationalism: The 
`Watch' groups and `Anti-Englishness' in late twentieth century Scotland. The 
Nationalism Project, http: //www. nationalismproject. org/articles/zuelowl. htm. 
234 
Newspapers Articles 
Mcgarvie, L. `Nats in dirty tricks row over shock new TV film: battle for Holyrood 
set to hot up' Sunday Mail, 13th April 2003 
Fraser, D. `The election's tough new phase: SNP say Labour let patients die' Sunday 
Herald 13th April 2003 
`Fear and loathing as SNP and Labour go head to head in television showdown' 
Scotland on Sunday, 13 `h April 2003 
`McConnell attacks SNP `deceit" BBC News online 14`h April 2003 
MacDonell, H. `La-la-land advert team switches sides' The Scotsman, 14`h April 2003 
MacDonell, H. 'SNP accused of bad taste in broadcast' The Scotsman, 14th April 2003 
MacDonell, H. `Morbid SNP film `crosses line of decency' The Scotsman, 14`h April 
2003 
`Negative campaigning does not always work' The Scotsman, 14`h April 2003 
`Election broadcast `shocking" BBC News online, 14th April 2003 
`John sounds alarm bell for Jack' Daily Record, 15`h April 2003 
`Jim's clean fight plea' Daily Record, 15`h April 2003 
`SNP are telling a pack of lies' Daily Record, 15`h April 2003 
`Dying pensioner ad sparks furious row' Evening Times, 15`h April 2003 
`Blair launches attack on SNP' BBC News online 15th April 2003 
Scott, D. `McConnell: SNP deceiving voters' The Scotsman, 15`h April 2003 
Scott, D. `Parties clash over hospital waiting lists' The Scotsman, 15`h April 2003 
Denholm, A. `Labour plays on independence `horror" The Scotsman, 15th April 2003 
235 
Ritchie, M. `Swinney defends `negative' campaign' The Herald, 15th April 2003 
Currie, B. `Don't vote for `divorce' says Blair' Evening Times, 15th April 2003 
McNeil, R. `May the dark force be with you in TV election' The Scotsman, 16th April 
2003 
Mitchell, J. `Nationalists' brutal broadcast takes leaf out of Labour's book of negative 
campaigning' The Herald, 16th April 2003 
`McLetchie calls for end to `phoney war' The Scotsman, 16th April 2003 
`Clear choice for Scotland' Daily Record, 16th April 2003 
Sinclair, P. `How low can SNP go? They use dead wife in sick new TV stunt' Daily 
Record, 17th April 2003 
`Deterioration in Labour debate on home rule' and `Labour resorting to tired old 
rhetoric' (letters page) The Herald, 17th April 2003 
Swanson, I. `Parties have agreed to scare and scare alike' Evening News, 17th April 
2003 
Crawford, A. `Divorce talk `wrong', says anti-abuse campaigner' Sunday Herald, 20th 
April 2003 
Websites 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/uk_politics (03/07/2006) 
http: //www. oed. com 
http: //www. scottish. parliament. uk/msp/elections/analysis/index. htm (24/07/2006) 
Reports 
Institute of Governance, University of Edinburgh `The Scottish Elections 2003 Media 
Content Research: Report to the Electoral Commission' (June 2003) 
236 
www. electoralcommission. org. uk/templates/search/document/cfm/8846 
(downloaded 12/07/06) 
The Electoral Commission (2003) `Scottish elections 2003: The official report on the 
Scottish Parliament and local government elections 1 May 2003' (November 
2003), ISBN 1-904363-32-6 
Manifestos 
Another Scotland is possible: Scottish Socialist Party Manifesto 2003 
Make the Difference: Fresh Thinking for Four More Years. Scottish Liberal Democrat 
Manifesto 2003 
On your side: Scottish Labour's Manifesto 2003 
Reach for the future: Scottish Green Party Manifesto 2003 
Release our potential: SNP manifesto 2003 
Time To Do Something About It: Scottish Conservatives manifesto2003 
GLn_Sr.., 
I. IPýý 237 
